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PREFACE 
The Hepburn system to romanize Japanese words and names is used in this paper, 
except that long vowels are not indicated with long marks.  The names of Japanese 
individuals in the text are written in a Western format, whereas given names precede 
surnames.  This is done so that consistency is maintained among all names mentioned in 
the work. 
The names of the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin Island are in accordance with 
Russian usage, as Russia current maintains sovereignty over the islands as recognized by 
the United States as well as most countries.  In Russian, the spelling of the archipelago is 
Kuril; however, in most published material from the United States, Europe, and English 
material in Japan, the spelling is Kurile.  The archipelago will be referred to throughout 
this work using the latter spelling in order to maintain consistency with the most 
dominant spelling method. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 
 
In March 1991 Ichiro Ozawa, secretary-general of the ruling Japanese Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP), led a Japanese delegation to Moscow with the intention of 
regaining the southern Kurile Islands for Japan.  It had been nearly half a century since 
the Soviet Union seized the Kurile Islands from the Japanese, and there had never been 
a better time to regain their historical possessions.  The reformist Soviet leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev faced collapsing economic and political systems, and long suppressed 
nationalist movements among minority groups were rising in many parts of the Soviet 
Union.  Throughout the previous five years, ethnic unrest and student- and worker-led 
protests contributed to the dismantling of Soviet-controlled institutions in Eastern 
Europe.  Declarations of sovereignty were made among the Baltic nations, and soon 
thereafter, all other former Soviet republics would eventually declare independence.  
The Soviet Union was at its weakest since World War II (Nimmo 1994, 177). 
Meanwhile, Japan was at its strongest since World War II (Nimmo 1994, 177).  
Agreeing to relinquish its military power as a result of the war, Japan built its economy 
in the latter twentieth century with a similar vigor and aggressive behavior used to build 
its military just a generation earlier.  Leading the world in automobile production and 
high-technological advances, Japan was an economic powerhouse.   
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The Japanese had been patiently waiting to regain their historical possessions in 
the northwest Pacific, and with a fragile Soviet Union it seemed to be the best time to do 
so.  Though Moscow did denounce and resist independence movements in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet republics, Ozawa assumed that Gorbachev would not 
object to relinquishing such a remote and seemingly unimportant series of small islands 
in the Far East.  Ozawa reportedly brought with him to Moscow a proposed $26 billion 
offer of foreign aid, intended to be given to the Soviet Union during its time of crisis on 
the condition that the southern Kurile Islands would be returned to Japan (Newnham 
2001, 249).  One might assume that Gorbachev would agree to this proposal, given the 
economic crisis in the Soviet Union.  Thus, Ozawa’s mission would be successful and 
the two countries could finally normalize relations.  Despite the fact that the Soviet 
Union desperately needed foreign aid proposed by Ozawa and that both countries 
strongly desired to normalize relations, Gorbachev did not accept the offer.   
Less than two years later the Soviet Union dissolved.  In lieu of being returned to 
Japan the southern Kurile Islands became part of the vast Russian Federation.  Within 
the next few years Japan’s economy faced a recession while the Russian Federation 
fought a secessionist movement in Chechnya.  Russia was not prepared to relinquish any 
of its territories at this time in fear that many secessions would follow throughout its 
various republics. 
Remarkably, much progress has been made in Russo-Japanese relations in the 
post-Soviet era.  The Russians and the Japanese have both come to realize the 
significance of mutual cooperation in northeast Asia.  The two countries have become 
allies in confronting North Korea and in the war against international terrorism.  
 3 
Meanwhile, the Japanese have expressed interest in natural resource development in the 
Russian Far East (Newnham 2001, 249).  Indeed, the two countries can benefit greatly 
from cooperating in the post-Soviet era; however, the territorial dispute over the 
southern Kurile Islands remains a barrier to truly normalized relations between Russia 
and Japan. 
 
Presentation 
 In the 1980’s the once-powerful Soviet Union began to show signs of adversity 
within its government and throughout its society.  Through Gorbachev’s glasnost 
(openness) the problems the country faced, such as a failing economy and nationalist 
movements in the various republics became known to the international community.  As 
rumors of a distressed Soviet Union became reality, the Japanese government slowly 
modified its foreign policy with the Soviets, placing more emphasis on regaining the 
southern Kuriles (Newnham 2001, 250).   
In the process of the Soviet Union’s demise and the Russian Federation’s birth, 
the once powerful Soviet empire found itself in need of economic aid from the 
international community.  The Japanese took the opportunity to utilize the Soviets’ and 
later, the Russians’ weakness by adopting a foreign policy based on the unity of politics 
and economics, or seikei fukabun (Hasegawa 2000a, 176).  This hard lined iriguchiron, 
or entrance approach, to foreign policy meant that Japan would not seek, nor accept 
developments in Soviet- or Russo-Japanese economic ties without first normalizing 
political relations.  By normalizing political relations, the Japanese expected the 
immediate return of the southern Kurile Islands. 
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In 1989 the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) modified Japan’s 
foreign policy with the Soviet Union from the strict linkage of politics and economics to 
an expanded equilibrium under increasing criticism from their European and American 
counterparts for neglecting to support reforms in the Soviet Union 1 (Hasegawa 1995, 
104-05).  Within the latter policy, economic development offers would remain withheld 
until the southern Kuriles were returned to Japan, but political cooperation such as talks 
on environmental matters and transportation agreements would be considered (Nimmo 
1994, 76).  This expanded equilibrium policy was simply a modification of the unity of 
economic and politics since the degree of political cooperation was dependent on 
positive responses by the Soviet Union regarding the territorial dispute (Hasegawa 1995, 
105).  Therefore, iriguchiron, or the entrance approach, remained the approach towards 
the Soviet used by the Japanese.     
Knowing the Soviets were in need of assistance, the Japanese began making 
overtures in the early 1990’s, such as Ozawa’s offer to provide foreign aid to the 
struggling Soviet Union but with the condition that the southern Kuriles be returned to 
the Japanese.  The Soviets consistently refused offers despite realizing that settling the 
Kurile Islands dispute would mean receiving billions in Japanese foreign aid in a time 
when it was desperately needed (Tarlow 2000, 123). 
 Frustrated with the unsuccessful approach to foreign policy, on July 24, 1997, 
Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto presented a new Japanese foreign policy  
                                                          
1
 The expanded equilibrium, or kakudai kinko, was also referred to as the “balanced expansion” policy.  
While Foreign Minister Sosuke Uno formulated the expanded equilibrium as a revision of seikei fukabun, 
Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu elaborated that the policy meant Japan would develop relations with the 
Soviet Union and later, Russia by achieving a “balanced expansion” of political, economic, and cultural ties 
(Nimmo 1994, 116). 
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with Russia in a formal speech to the Association of Corporate Executives in Tokyo.  In 
Hashimoto’s new foreign policy, the regaining of the southern Kuriles, and thus 
normalizing Russo-Japanese relations, would come about by the handling relations with 
Russia through a multilayered approach (Newnham 2001, 251).  He further elaborated 
that the southern Kurile Islands dispute could only be solved through “the three 
principles of trust, mutual benefit, and maintenance of a long-term perspective” 
(Hakamada 1997, 6).  Hashimoto’s policy would liberate bilateral economic ties without 
linking them to any prior developments in political relations in order to solve the 
territorial dispute and thus, normalize relations.  Simply stated, the new policy with 
Russia is the abandoning of the entrance approach to foreign policy in favor for 
deguchiron, or the exit approach.  By using the exit approach, finding a solution to the 
territorial dispute should result from simultaneous improvements in bilateral economic 
development and political relations.  This new, softer policy on the Japanese side 
appeared to open the door to an increase in cooperation and bilateral relations between 
Moscow and Tokyo.  However, has the new policy done so?  This question will be 
analyzed in this study. 
 
Research Objectives 
Much has been written on the southern Kurile Islands dispute in the post-Soviet 
era.  This is likely a reaction to the rapid cooperative advancements made between the 
two countries in the last decade.  However, a systematic analysis of motivations and 
impacts of Hashimoto’s foreign policy change with Russia has not been done. 
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The 1997 foreign policy appears to be a significant step in opening Russo-
Japanese bilateral communication and economic development, yet the southern Kurile 
Islands dispute will continue to impede a truly normalized relationship.  Thus, the focus 
here will be to analyze the motivation and success, or lack thereof, of the 1997 
Hashimoto plan in regard to the southern Kurile Islands dispute and Russo-Japanese 
relations in general.  There are three key goals to this study: 
1.) Reveal the motivation behind the Hashimoto policy.  Why did the 
Japanese change their foreign policy with Russia in 1997 from an 
entrance approach such as the expanded equilibrium to a new 
multilayered policy?   
2.) Examine how the new foreign policy set forth by Hashimoto has 
affected Russo-Japanese economic relations, which is expected to be 
followed up with progress on the territorial dispute.  Has the 
Hashimoto policy been successful in increasing bilateral cooperation, 
developing economic ties, and creating a new sense of mutual trust, 
particularly in regard to Japanese investment in Siberia and the 
Russian Far East?  
3.) The Hashimoto policy included three axioms in regard to the Kurile 
Islands dispute, one of those being the maintenance of a long-term 
perspective.  This study will uncover how the Hashimoto policy has 
been successful in regard to the Kurile Islands dispute for the last ten 
years.  
 
It is expected that by drawing conclusions to these research objectives regarding the 
foreign policy set by Hashimoto, a significant contribution will be made to a general 
understanding of Russo-Japanese relations, the Kurile Islands dispute, and in the long 
term, an eventual agreement between the two parties. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
BACKGROUND 
 
Identification and Location 
 The disputed southern Kuriles are made up of three islands, Shikotan, Kunashir, 
Iturup, and one group of nine islets, the Habomais1.  In Japanese, the disputed southern 
Kurile Islands are written 北方領土 (Hoppo Ryodo), meaning “Northern Territories.”  
In Russian, the islands are referred to as Южные Курильские острова (Uzhnye 
Kiril’skie Ostrova), meaning “Southern Kurile Islands.”  The southern Kuriles are 
located between 43º to 46º north latitude and 146º to 149º east longitude.  Iturup and 
Kunashir are part of the Greater Kurile Island Chain extending northeast from Hokkaido, 
and directly to the southern tip of the Kamchatka Peninsula.  Shikotan and the Habomai 
Islets make up the Lesser Kuriles directly northeast of Hokkaido.  The Kurile Islands are 
directly south of the Sea of Okhotsk, and east of Sakhalin Island.  Following the Kurile 
Islands to the east is the deep Japan Trench in the Pacific Ocean. 
 The southern Kuriles total 1,928 square miles, comparable to the size of 
Delaware.  The southernmost as well as smallest of the islands, the Habomai Islets (39 
square miles), lie just over two miles off the coast of Hokkaido and can be seen from its  
 
                                                          
 
1
 Kunashir is referred to as Kunashiri in Japanese and Iturup is referred to as Etorofu in Japanese. 
 8 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Map of Northeast Asia. 
Created by author.
SEA
 OF
 
OK
HO
TSK
P  
A  
C  
I  F
  I 
 C
O 
 C 
 E 
 A 
 N
SE
A O
F
 
JA
PA
N
Osaka Tokyo
Sakhalin
(Karafuto)
Disputed Southern Kuriles
URUP
Pyongyang
Seoul
Beijing
Taipei
YELLOW
SEA
EAST
CHINA
SEA
RYU
KYU
  IS
LA
N
D 
CH
AI
N
SIMUSHIR
ONEKOTAN
PARAMUSHIR
KU
RI
LE
 IS
LA
ND
 C
H
A
IN
Shanghai
 9
 
 Fig
u
re
 2.  M
ap of
 disputed so
uthern
 K
u
riles
.
 
C
reated by
 autho
r
.
45
44
43
148147146145
SEA OF OKHOTSK
HOKKAIDO
PACIFIC OCEAN
Iturup
(Etorofu)
Kunashir
(Kunashiri)
Shikotan
Taraku
Suisho
AkiyiriHabomai
Group
Nemuro
Shibetori
Rausu
Yuri
Shibotsu
 10 
northeast coasts2.  Also seen from the northeast shores of Hokkaido are Shikotan Island 
(98 square miles) and Kunashir Island (579 square miles).  Northernmost and largest of  
the southern Kuriles is Iturup Island (1,212 square miles).  It, too, can be seen from 
Hokkaido’s Cape Nosappu depending on weather conditions (Catlin Jacob 1991, 2). 
Demographics 
 The population of the disputed southern Kuriles peaked at roughly 25,000 
Russian civilians in 1994 (Nimmo 1994, 127).  That same year, a devastating 
earthquake on Kunashir Island resulted in one-third of the population leaving the island 
(Brooke 2002, A4).  After years of hardships with electricity, fuel, food, and water 
shortages, the total population of the disputed southern Kuriles dropped to roughly 
17,000, all ethnic Russians (Working 2000, 1, and Brooke 2002, A4).  In 1945, the 
population of ethnic Japanese peaked at 17,000; however, all Japanese residents have 
since left the islands (Brooke 2002, A4).  No Ainu, the indigenous tribe of the Kuriles, 
live there today as they were relocated by Russians and Japanese on various occasions. 
Natural Resources 
Directly east of the Kurile Islands is the North Pacific cold water current as well 
as the Japanese Trench, creating one of the most profitable fishing locations in the world 
(Valencia and Ludwig 1995, 162).  The southern Kurile Islands, Iturup in particular, are 
rich in volcanic deposits of sulphur and various polymetallic mineral resources, but due 
to the difficulties associated with physically extracting these resources there has been 
little incentive to do so from the Russians or Japanese (Valencia and Ludwig 1995, 166-
67). 
                                                          
2
 Typically, Russians and Japanese refer to the four southern Kurile Islands; Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, 
and the Habomai group is identified as one of the four. 
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Figure 3.  Map of southern Kurile Islands’ natural resources. 
Created by author. 
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Landscape 
The physical landscape of the southern Kuriles is much different from common 
perceptions of the islands as a barren place shrouded by constant fog.  Summers average 
near 56º Fahrenheit while winters average 44º Fahrenheit (Chishima 1988, 5).  Snowfall 
can occur from November to April, but typically in moderate amounts (Chishima 1988, 
5).  As noted by William Nimmo, Kunashir has “strikingly beautiful forests similar to 
those on Vancouver Island in Canada’s British Columbia” (Nimmo 1994, 127).  The 
islands do receive strong cold winds, being directly on the path of the winter winds 
blowing across the Sea of Okhotsk (Working 2000, 1). 
Prior to 1945 the cultural landscape of the Kuriles was made up of Japanese 
fishing villages containing “Shinto shrines and...paper and wood houses” (Brooke 2002, 
A4).  However, the only indication of a Japanese presence on the islands today is the 
numerous grave sites (Brooke 2002, A4).  Currently, the southern Kuriles remain mostly 
underdeveloped with two national parks.  Towns are marked with unpaved roads and 
wooden buildings (Working 2001, 1).  Blackouts and a lack of telephone service and hot 
water are common in the towns (Working 2000, 2).  Most residents live off the fishing 
industry or illegally poached fish, rely on government pensions, or work in canneries 
(Working 2001, 1). 
 
Early Events 
 The earliest settlers to the Kurile Islands were Ainu, an early Caucasoid, 
seafaring tribe indigenous to a region stretching south from northern Honshu, northwest 
to Sakhalin, and east across the Sea of Okhotsk to the Kuriles (Nimmo 1994, 2).  By the 
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late seventeenth century, the Japanese were exploring Hokkaido from the south while 
the Russians were exploring Sakhalin from the north.  In 1711, two Russian Cossacks, 
Danilo Antsiferov and Ivan Kozyrevskii, explored the northern Kurile Islands.  Based 
on data collected by Ainu residents and Japanese castaways, the two created the first 
maps of the Kurile Islands and placed the entire island chain under the jurisdiction of 
Tsar Peter the Great.  By 1778, the Ainu residents were forced to pay fur tax to Russia.  
Today, the Russians base their historical claim to the Kurile Islands on these events 
(Nimmo 1994, 2). 
 In the early Eighteenth Century, Japanese settlers in the southern Kuriles were 
being attacked by Russian forces from the north that identified the territory as part of 
Russia.  Nonetheless, the Japanese maintained control in the southern Kuriles while the 
Russians occupied the northern Kuriles.  Shortly after American Commodore Matthew 
C. Perry’s visit to Japan in 1855, Russia and Japan opened diplomatic relations by 
signing the Shimoda Treaty (Rees 1985, 14).  This treaty specified that the boundary 
between the two countries would pass between the islands Iturup and Urup (Garthoff 
1995, 11). 
 In 1853, Sakhalin was annexed by Russia despite the fact that Japanese fishing 
villages had already been established on the island (Nimmo 1994, 3).  Increased tension 
between the Russians and the Japanese on the island of Sakhalin led to an 1867 
agreement in which both countries would jointly occupy the island without any line of 
demarcation (Nimmo 1994, 3).  This agreement led to Russian and Japanese settlers 
scrambling to colonize the island, thus causing a greater amount of tension than before 
(Stephan 1974, 51-59). 
 14 
Figure 4.  Map of Shimoda Treaty boundary of 1855.  Created by author. 
Figure 5.  Map of St. Petersburg Treaty boundary of 1875.  Created by author. 
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  In order to settle accelerating territorial disputes, Russia and Japan agreed in 
1875 to revise the Shimoda Treaty.  According to the Treaty of St. Petersburg, all of the 
Kurile Islands would be Japanese territory while all of Sakhalin would belong to Russia 
(Garthoff 1995, 11).  However, the treaty did not result in mutual peace for the region.  
Rather, tensions would accelerate in northeast Asia to the point of outright war between 
the two countries (Rees 1985, 21-23). 
 
Russo-Japanese War 
 
 For the next 20 years, Russia and Japan would compete for regional hegemony 
in northeast Asia.  While an emergent, aggressive Japan was forcing its political control 
on Korea and parts of China, Russia was concerned with completing a strategic rail line 
which would connect the Trans-Siberian Railroad to an ice-free port in the Pacific.  In 
order to shorten the route, Russia selected a railroad line that crossed Manchuria directly 
east to Vladivostok.  Meanwhile, the Russians were also interested in utilizing the warm 
water ports of Korea, a nation increasing under Japanese control. 
 Russia and Japan viewed Korea and Manchuria as areas for expansion, and the 
weakened states of Korea and China could not withstand the pressures placed upon them 
(Rees 1985, 23).  By 1904, Japan, eager for a withdrawal of Russian troops in 
Manchuria, severed diplomatic relations and declared war on Russia (Nimmo 1994, 5).  
With the battles so close to home, Japan had strategic advantages in the war against 
Russia.  Russia could easily match the military might of the Japanese, but had 
considerable problems in transporting their armies 5,000 miles from Moscow (Hane 
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2001, 191).  Furthermore, the Trans-Siberian Railroad was not completed at Lake 
Baikal when the war began (Hane 2001, 191). 
 The Russo-Japanese War lasted over a year, with significant death tolls on both 
sides (81,962 total), and the annihilation of Russia’s Baltic fleet (Hane 2001, 191).   It 
was the first war in modern history in which an Asian power defeated a European power.  
The Russians were embarrassed, and criticism against the already-unpopular tsar 
increased.  The Japanese rose as proud victors.  Nationalism and militarism were on the 
rise, and the Japanese regarded regional geopolitical hegemony as their destiny. 
 As a result of the war, the 1905 Portsmouth Treaty permitted Japan to control 
Sakhalin south of 50 degrees latitude (Rees 1985, 23).  When the largely nationalist 
Japanese public learned that Japan did not receive all of Sakhalin and a compensation 
payment from Russia, it resulted in rioting and the resignation of the Prime Minister 
(Warner and Warner 1974, 1).  Nonetheless, Japan would become the sole hegemonic 
power in northeast Asia for the next 40 years. 
 
Japan’s Asian Empire 
 Recognizing Japan as the dominant geopolitical player in northeast Asia, the 
weakened Russian Empire needed to establish fruitful relations with Japan in order to 
develop its territories in northeast Asia.  Meanwhile, the emerging Japanese Empire 
welcomed diplomatic relations with the ailing, weakened Russia.  From the end of the 
Russo-Japanese War in 1905 to the fall of the Russian Empire in 1917, Russia and Japan 
agreed to several open and secret treaties, many of which were to keep American 
business interests out of Manchuria (Nimmo 1994, 6).  
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When the Bolsheviks gained control of Russia in October 1917, Japan sent 
72,000 troops along with Western military forces to Siberia to maintain civil order 
(Graves 1941, 64).  When other allied forces finally left Russia in 1920, Japan insisted 
on remaining in an attempt to extend its regional hegemony into the Russian Far East 
and to utilize the natural resources in the region (Nimmo 1994, 8).  By 1922 all Japanese 
forces in Russia were located in northern Sakhalin, an area desired by the Japanese since 
the Portsmouth Treaty (Nimmo 1994, 10).  This obvious attempt by Japan to control all 
of Sakhalin troubled the new Soviet Union.  After facing stiff diplomatic and civil 
defiance, Japan withdrew its military forces from northern Sakhalin in 1925 (Rees 1985, 
24).  Concurrently, Japan formally recognized the newly formed U.S.S.R. and formed 
diplomatic ties. 
It is important to note that the Soviet Union never formally recognized the 1855 
and 1875 border treaties between tsarist Russia and Japan (Nimmo 1994, 11).  Thus, the 
Kurile Islands were never recognized as Japanese territory by the Soviet Union.  
However, the Soviets had not challenged Japan’s control of the islands until 1945. 
The 1930’s saw the rapid expansion of the Japanese Empire into Manchuria and 
Outer Mongolia.  Still weak, the Soviet Union was deeply concerned about the 
aggressive behavior of the Japanese Empire in East Asia (Rees 1985, 24-25).  An 
increasing number of Soviet troops were sent to the Manchurian border, resulting in 
numerous border clashes between the Soviets and Japanese throughout the 1930’s (Rees 
1985, 25).  The frequent border clashes and increasing death tolls on both sides caused 
the already strained relations between the Soviets and the Japanese to deteriorate 
throughout the 1930’s (Haslam 1992, 112).   
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After suffering significant losses in border clashes, the Japanese Empire began 
seeking a nonaggression agreement in 1940 with the Soviet Union.  Concerned with 
Nazi aggression in Germany, the Soviets agreed in 1941.  On April 13, 1941, the 
Japanese Empire and the Soviet Union signed the Nonaggression Pact, thus agreeing to 
“maintain peaceful and friendly relations” (Lenson 1972, 8).  Furthermore, both sides 
would honor the “territorial integrity and inviolability of the other contracting party” 
(Lenson 1972, 8).  The pact was designed to expire five years after the date it went into 
effect (April 25, 1941).  Eight weeks later, the Soviet Union was attacked by Germany.  
Some leaders in Japan had considered violating the pact by attacking a preoccupied 
Soviet Union from the east (Rees 1985, 35).  Instead, the majority of Japan’s leadership 
preferred increasing attacks in French Indochina which occurred later that year (Nimmo 
1994, 14). 
 
Soviet Seizure of the Kuriles 
 After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the United 
States and Britain began pressuring Stalin to attack Japanese forces in Manchuria and 
allow the allies to utilize military bases in Siberia, yet Stalin resisted, saying that the war 
against Germany should be the priority.  In late 1943, when the Germans were showing 
signs of fatigue in the war with the Soviet Union, Stalin proclaimed the Soviet Union 
would join the allies in the war against Japan after Hitler’s defeat. 
 In November 1943 Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chinese President Chiang Kai-shek 
met at the Cairo summit to discuss the territorial ramifications for Japan after the war.  
Japan was to be “stripped” of all colonial conquests (Nimmo 1994, 15).  Manchuria,  
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Figure 6.  Map of Portsmouth Treaty boundary of 1905.  Created by author. 
Figure 7.  Map of Proposed Soviet-Japanese border at 1945 Yalta Conference.   
Created by author. 
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Formosa, and the Pescadores Islands would be returned to China, and Japan would be 
“expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed” (U.S. 
1961, 448).  Days later, Stalin indicated to the allied forces that he concurred with the 
measures taken at the Cairo summit (U.S. 1961, 556). 
 In February 1945 Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin met at the Yalta Conference.  
At this time, Stalin informed the allies that the Soviet Union would actually enter the 
war against Japan “in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in 
Europe has terminated” (U.S. 1955, 984).  In regard to the territories that the Soviet 
Union and the Japanese Empire had fought over in the previous decades, the three 
specified that southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands would be placed under Soviet 
control. 
According to Charles Bohlen, who was present at the Yalta conference, 
Roosevelt had no knowledge of Japan’s historical control of the southern Kuriles and 
mistakenly believed that Russia had lost all of the Kuriles as well as southern Sakhalin 
as a result of the Russo-Japanese War (Bohlen 1973, 195).  State Department wartime 
consultant George H. Blakeslee prepared a comprehensive chronology of the Kurile 
Islands history for Roosevelt at the Yalta conference, and also made the 
recommendation in the report that the southern Kuriles should remain a Japanese 
possession (Rees 1985, 59-60).  However, Blakeslee’s report was not included in 
Roosevelt’s Yalta dossier, and “no evidence has been found to indicate that it was 
brought to the attention of Roosevelt” (US 1955, 379).  The provisions regarding the 
Kurile Islands that were made at Yalta were kept completely confidential and not made 
public until after the war (Nimmo 1994, 17). 
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In the final months of the war, Tokyo began seeking to strengthen relations with 
Moscow, but Stalin knew there would be no benefit in dealing with the Japanese 
(Nimmo 1994, 17).  In April 1945, after feeling assured of Germany’s defeat, Moscow 
indicated to the Japanese its intention to violate the Nonaggression Pact (Kase 1950, 
154-155).  Nonetheless, Tokyo accelerated attempts to improve Soviet-Japanese 
relations (Nimmo 1994, 19-22).  Upon being informed by Truman that the United States 
planned to utilize a new weapon far more destructive than any other in the war against 
the Japanese Empire, Stalin issued explicit instructions to accelerate Soviet entry into 
the war against Japan, despite the fact that the Soviet Union would be violating the 
Neutrality Pact (Nimmo 1994, 22).  On August 8, two days after the United States 
dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima and the day that a second atomic bomb was 
dropped on Nagasaki, the Soviet Union declared war on the Japanese Empire.  One day 
later the Soviet Army attacked Japanese forces in Manchukuo (Manchuria), northern 
Korea, and southern Sakhalin. 
On August 15 Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki proclaimed “The use of a new 
bomb which has unprecedented destructive power has brought a change in the method 
of warfare.  Moreover the Soviet Union on 9 August declared war on Japan” (Signal 
Corps Interception, 1945).  The Japanese Empire had formally accepted the terms of the 
Potsdam Declaration.  Among the surrender guidelines for Japanese troops which were 
being documented by the allied forces, one in particular dealt with surrender decrees to 
Russian forces; “The senior Japanese commander and all ground, sea, air, and auxiliary 
forces within Manchuria, Korea north of 38 degrees latitude, and Karafuto [Sakhalin] 
shall surrender to the Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East” (Message 
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from General MacArthur, 1945).  There is no mention of the Kurile Islands in the 
declaration. 
The next day Stalin requested that the Kurile Islands and Hokkaido be added to 
the list of entities occupied by Soviet forces (Nimmo 1994, 25).  However, before the 
allies could respond to Stalin’s request, Soviet forces invaded the Kuriles from the north 
engaging in combat with Japanese forces along the way on August 18.  Later, Truman 
agreed to Stalin’s request for Soviet occupation of the Kuriles but denied Soviet 
occupation of Hokkaido (Nimmo 1994, 25).  By September 5 the entire Kurile chain 
was occupied by Soviet forces. 
On September 2, 1945 Japanese and Allied representatives, including Soviet 
representatives, signed a peace proclamation.  Stalin proclaimed; 
We the men of the older generation, have waited for this day.  From now on, 
Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands will serve as a means of direct 
communications with the ocean and as a base for the defense of our country 
against Japanese aggression” (Pravda [Moscow], 1945, 1). 
   
This was the first time that the Soviet Union was in control of the southern Kurile 
Islands.  The Soviet Union was now at its peak as a geopolitical player in northeast Asia.  
Meanwhile, Japan was now in the weakest position it had experienced since Perry’s visit.  
Yet, in less than half a century the power balance between Japan and the Soviet Union 
would be completely reversed. 
 In late 1945 Hokkaido residents expressed concern that communication with the 
Kurile Island residents was cutoff by the Soviet forces (Nimmo 1994, 31).  The mayor 
of Nemuro, Hokkaido, which for decades included the Kurile Islands as part of its 
jurisdiction, made a report to the Japanese government that he could not gain access to 
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the Kuriles (Nimmo 1994, 31).  In turn, the Japanese government requested assistance 
from U.S. General MacArthur, but the request was largely ignored (Nimmo 1994, 31). 
 In January 1946, MacArthur issued Instruction No. 677 which defined the limits 
of Japan’s territories in explicit detail.  Japan would consist of the four main islands; 
Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu, and specified minor islands (SCAP 
Instruction 677, 1946).  The Kurile Islands, the Habomai Islets, or Shikotan Island were 
not mentioned.  Though some members of the Allied powers including Churchill and 
the U.S. State Department argued that the Kuriles should be returned to the Japanese, 
the Soviets made reference to the agreement made at Yalta.  For the Japanese, concern 
was primarily over the 17,385 residents on the islands who had lost contact with the rest 
of the country (Stephan 1974, 169). 
 In early 1947 the Kurile Islands were incorporated into the Russian Soviet 
Federated Socialist Republic by a constitutional amendment, and joined with Sakhalin’s 
administrative district (Nimmo 1994, 35).  These actions alarmed the Japanese residents 
who were already being advised by Soviet officers to accept living in the Communist 
system (Chishima 1988, 131-277).  Throughout 1947 most of the Japanese residents 
from the Kuriles attempted to escape via boat to Hokkaido (Nimmo 1994, 35).  Despite 
the fact that border guards were strategically positioned around the island chain to watch 
for escape attempts, most escape attempts were largely successful (Nimmo 1994, 35).  
Those who were apprehended were either shot on sight or sent to northern Siberia to 
serve their term as war criminals (Chishima 1988, 232).  After receiving pressure from 
MacArthur and due to increasingly successful escape attempts, leaders in Moscow 
decided in late 1947 to repatriate the remaining Japanese residents from the Kuriles 
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(Nimmo 1994, 35).  By the end of the following year all Japanese residents of the Kurile 
Islands had departed (Nimmo 1994, 35).  The Chishima (Kurile Islands) and Habomai 
Former Residents Association was formed in 1947 and is still in existence today. 
 In the five year period after the war ended, significant geopolitical events were 
occurring in Asia.  In 1949 India and Indonesia had both gained their independence 
from years of control by European imperial governments and the Communist Chinese 
led by Mao Tse-tung gained control of mainland China, thus forcing Chiang’s 
Nationalist Chinese to Taiwan.  In early 1950 the world learned that the Soviet Union 
had successfully detonated an atomic bomb.  In June of that year Kim Il Sung’s North 
Korea army invaded South Korea, thus confirming the rise of a Soviet-led Communist 
bloc.  The necessity for a Japanese-American alliance was crucial in order to maintain 
democracy in East Asia.  In September 1950 talks began on an alliance between the 
United States and Japan without Soviet participation.  American officials made it clear 
to the Japanese that the Allies would call for discussions with the Soviet Union on the 
status of former Japanese territories including the Kurile Islands (Rees 1985, 96-97). 
 In September 1951 the San Francisco Peace Conference was held with the 
erroneous expectation from most Allies that the Soviets would boycott the conference 
(Nimmo 1994, 41).  At the last minute a Soviet delegation arrived.  However, unhappy 
with most of the treaty’s measures, the Soviet Union refused to sign the accord (Rees 
1985, 97).  The Japanese Peace Treaty was signed September 8 of that year.  As for the 
Kurile Islands, the document specified: “Japan renounces all right title and claim to the 
Kurile Islands, and to the portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which 
Japan acquired sovereignty [by] the Treaty of Portsmouth on September 5, 1909” (U.S. 
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Department of State 1952, 3:3172).  However, the Japanese Prime Minister clarified at 
the conference that “Japan did not grab the Kuriles and South Sakhalin by 
aggression…,” also, “Japan’s ownership of the southern Kuriles was never disputed by 
the Czarist Government of Russia, while the exchange of South Sakhalin for the 
Northern Kuriles was agreed upon by treaty as early as 1875” (New York Times, 1951a, 
1). 
 From the Soviet perspective the treaty at San Francisco was illegitimate and 
Stalin had no intention of recognizing its guidelines (Nimmo 1992, 42).  Meanwhile, 
Izvestia was reporting in 1951 that living conditions on the Kuriles had improved with a 
new whale reduction plant, a housing development, and a radio station having been built 
in Yuzhno-Kurilsk, the new capital of the Kuriles (New York Times 1951b, 3).  
Furthermore, Yuzhno-Kurilsk was a “house of culture, [with] a ten-grade school and 
new executive office buildings.  The Kuriles are now regarded by the Soviet Union as 
just as Russian as Moscow” (New York Times 1951b, 3).  In April 1952 the peace treaty 
went into effect, allowing Japan to once again exist as a sovereign country.  Though the 
United States officially supported Japan’s position on the southern Kurile Islands 
dispute, Japan would have to negotiate peace with the Soviet Union on its own (Nimmo 
1994, 48).  As noted by William Nimmo, “few observers [in 1952] could have foreseen 
that it would take as long as half a century, perhaps even longer, to settle a war that 
lasted less than a month” (Nimmo 1994, 43-44). 
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The Soviet Union and Japan in the Cold War 
 
 
 In 1955 peace talks between the Soviet Union and Japan were held in London.  
Japan requested the return of all Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin as well as 
repatriation for all Japanese who were imprisoned in the Soviet Union in the post-war 
era (Rees 1985, 109).  The Soviet Union requested that Japan recognize Soviet control 
of southern Sakhalin Island and all adjacent islands, including the Kuriles, thus 
renouncing its claims to the territories in dispute (Vishwanathan 1973, 72). 
 After three months of arduous negotiations a compromise was made and a 
solution seemed imminent.  The Japanese were willing to withdraw all territorial claims 
with the exception of Shikotan Island and the Habomai group.  However an agreement 
could not be made and talks were postponed until the next year (Vishwanathan 1973, 
75). 
 In the 1956 peace summit the two sides came close to a compromise when Japan 
declared it would concede all of the Kuriles to the Soviets in order to gain Shikotan 
Island and the Habomai group (Rees 1985, 111).  At this point late in the conference 
American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles intervened by citing Article 26 of the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty (Nimmo 1994, 47).  Dulles continued by threatening that 
the United States would annex Okinawa indefinitely if Japan would fail to pursue 
territorial claims with Moscow (Garthoff 1995, 18).  It is believed by William Nimmo 
that the actions of Secretary Dulles were strategic moves to counter Soviet alliances in 
the Cold War by maintaining disgruntlement between the Soviets and Japanese (Nimmo  
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Figure 8.  Map of 1956 Soviet-Japanese Peace Summit boundary proposal. 
Created by author. 
 
4
5
4
4
4
3
14
8
14
7
14
6
14
5
S
E
A
 O
F
 O
K
H
O
T
S
K
H
O
K
K
A
ID
O
P
A
C
I
F
IC
 O
C
E
A
N
It
u
ru
p
K
u
n
a
sh
ir
S
h
ik
o
ta
n
H
a
b
o
m
a
i
G
ro
u
p
 28 
1994, 47).  The conference resulted with a statement declaring the resumption of 
diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Japan as well as an end to the status  
of war (Nimmo 1994, 48).  However, no agreement was made on the territorial dispute 
or the signing of peace. 
 The Soviet Union and Japan would not resume talks on the Kurile Islands 
dispute until late 1973 when Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka held a four-day 
conference with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev.  Little progress was made at the 1973 
talks between the two leaders and both realized that each country’s claim to the Kuriles 
had remained unchanged since the 1956 conference (Garthoff 1995, 19).  It was noted 
by MOFA that while Tanaka referred to the dispute as a “territorial” issue, Brezhnev 
employed the term “unresolved” issue (MOFA 1987, 13-14).  Future dialog on the 
southern Kuriles continued between the Soviets and the Japanese in 1975, 1976, and 
1978, but slight progress was achieved (Nakagawa 1988, 20).   
After the return of power in Okinawa to the Japanese in 1972, the Japanese 
public began to take interest in regaining the southern Kuriles.  In 1978 the Committee 
for the Return of the Northern Territories to Japan was created, with public and private 
funding from primarily Japanese nationalist donors (Nimmo 1994, 55).  This came just 
months after the Soviets implemented an exclusive economic zone along the coasts of 
the Kuriles in 1977, thus depriving many northern Japanese fishermen of their historical 
fishing waters (Valencia and Ludwig 1995, 161).  Later that year an agreement was 
made on fishing rights near the Kuriles, but no mention was made on territorial claims 
(Nimmo 1994, 56). 
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Tensions escalated again in 1979 when the Soviet Union increased the size of 
the army and air force units in the southern Kuriles (Nimmo 1994, 57).  In 1981 
Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki declared February 7 as “Northern Territories 
Day” in order to gain international awareness and popular support (Mainichi Shimbun 
[Tokyo] 1992a, 1).  February 7 signified the day in 1855 when the Treaty of Shimoda 
was signed and Japan gained the southern Kurile Islands (Mainichi Shimbun [Tokyo] 
1992a, 1).  In a public address Suzuki lamented that the southern Kuriles, “which our 
ancestors built up with their sweat and endeavor, are still being occupied by the Soviet 
Union” (Mainichi Shimbun [Tokyo] 1992a, 1). 
In 1986 the Soviet Union began permitting former Japanese residents of the 
Kuriles to visit grave sites on their home islands.  Visits were permitted for a short 
amount of time and visas were required (Nimmo 1994, 64).  The concessions made by 
the Soviet Union encouraged Tokyo to press harder on the ailing Soviet Union in the 
late 1980’s, by specifically linking bilateral economic developments to the immediate 
return of the islands. 
In 1988 Japanese former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone visited Moscow to 
discuss the Kurile Islands dispute with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.  It was 
obvious that Moscow was utilizing a tactic of “softening” to the Japanese by allowing 
former-resident visits to the Kuriles and inviting Nakasone to discuss the territorial 
dispute (Nihon Keizai Shimbun [Tokyo] 1988, 2).  The meetings were significant in that 
it was the first time a Soviet leader acknowledged a territorial problem existed (Nimmo 
1994, 68).  Also, as expressed by Gilbert Rozman in his 1992 work Japan’s Response to 
the Gorbachev Era, 1985-1991, there were hints by Gorbachev that the Soviets were 
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willing to return the Habomai Islands and Shikotan Island to Japan, as was almost 
agreed upon in the 1956 Soviet-Japanese Summits (Rozman 1992, 116-125). 
Later that year Tokyo sent a team to several Western European countries in an 
attempt to gain support for Japan regaining the southern Kuriles (Nimmo 1994, 69).  
The team visited Britain, France, Italy, and West Germany, asking governments as well 
as map companies to recognize the Southern Kurile Islands as Hoppo Ryodo, or 
“Northern Territories” by name (Liberal Star [Tokyo] 1988, 4).  The team insisted that 
the islands sought for inclusion were not strictly part of the Kurile chain3, and had 
historical significance to Japan (Liberal Star [Tokyo] 1988, 4). 
Throughout the final years of the Soviet Union’s existence there was a great deal 
of debate in the Soviet Union, Japan, and the international community on the turnover of 
the southern Kuriles.  Even United States President George H. W. Bush demanded the 
Soviets “return Japan’s Kurile Islands” at a Texas A&M University commencement 
address in 1989 (Houston Chronicle 1989, 1).  After the fall of communism in the 
Eastern European satellite countries, the Japanese increased pressure on Moscow to 
transfer power of the southern Kuriles by linking economic support to progress on the 
territorial dispute.  In January 1990, former Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe4 led 
a delegation to Moscow to meet with Gorbachev.  No decision was made on the 
Japanese demand of the southern Kuriles, but Gorbachev did accept an invitation to visit  
Japan in the following year (Nimmo 1994, 76-77). 
                                                          
3
 This argument was based on the fact that the Habomai Islets and Shitokan Island makeup the Lesser 
Kuriles, and not part of the Greater Kuriles, as an identifiable archipelago. 
 
4
 Shintaro Abe (1924-1991) was the father of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. 
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At the same time Abe was in Moscow, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist 
Republic sent a representative to Tokyo to discuss the territorial dispute.  The visitor, 
Supreme Soviet delegate Boris Yeltsin, proposed a five-stage plan that would slowly 
phase control of the islands over to Japan within a period of twenty years (Foye 1992, 
37).  Because the Japanese officials did not prefer to accept such a drawn out proposal, 
or perhaps because they did not take Yeltsin seriously as he was not representing the 
federal union government in Moscow, no deal was reached. 
In preparation for Gorbachev’s upcoming visit to Japan, a referendum was held  
among the Russian residents of the southern Kuriles in March 1991 (Nimmo 1994, 90).  
The question was asked, “Do you believe that it can be admissible to give Japan the 
islands of Kunashir, Iturup, and the Lesser Kuriles?” (Nimmo 1994, 90).  Of the 11,704 
residents who participated, 9,184, or 78 percent, opposed any transfer of the islands to 
Japan whatsoever (Teplyakov 1991, 8-9).  Gorbachev would use this as the foundation 
of his argument when he arrived in Tokyo later that spring.   
The previously mentioned visit of Ichiro Ozawa to Moscow in March 1991, 
which was likely the closest the Soviet Union and Japan ever came to an agreement on 
the Kurile Islands dispute since the Soviet-Japanese Summit in 1956, was overshadowed 
by the much publicized Gorbachev visit to Japan.  It was the first and only visit of a 
Soviet leader to Japan (Nimmo 1994, 94).  Many issues were discussed between 
Gorbachev and Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, but little progress was made on 
the Kurile Island dispute (Garthoff 1995, 19).  However, Gorbachev did agree to 
identify the islands Japan demanded by name in a joint communiqué (Nimmo 1994, 96).   
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As noted by William Nimmo,  “Where 25 years earlier Gromyko had said there 
was no territorial problem, and Brezhnev had insisted in 1970’s that there were only 
‘unresolved differences,’ and by the late 1980’s Shevardnadze had preferred to cite ‘the 
geographic question,’” Gorbachev’s agreement was another progressive increment 
towards peace (Nimmo 1994, 96).  Overall, Gorbachev’s visit helped open dialog 
between the two countries, but in terms of the southern Kurile Islands dispute no 
decision was made.  However, significant developments in Soviet-Japanese relations 
were occurring. 
In December 1991 the Soviet Union dissolved and Gorbachev resigned from his 
position.  Japan would now be dealing with a new political leader and a newly 
democratic country on the territorial dispute.  The Japanese viewed the creation of a 
democratic Russian Federation as one which would be more willing to fairly assess the 
southern Kurile Island dispute, and the chances of regaining the islands would increase 
(Ziegler 1999, 15).  However, this assumption would prove to be false throughout the 
following years of bilateral diplomacy. 
 
The Post-Soviet Era 
Ethnic unrest was rising in various regions of the Russian Federation and 
Moscow knew that if one region could successfully secede from the country others 
would likely follow suit.  The fear of wildfire secessions resulted in Moscow taking a 
hard line on relinquishing territories including the southern Kuriles (Trenin 2002, 215).  
In order to gain public support for retaining the southern Kurile Islands the Sakhalin 
Oblast declared June 6 as “Kurile Islands Day,” the date in 1778 when Russian explorer 
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Lebedev-Lastochkin began demanding the native Ainu pay fur tax to the Russian 
Empire (Nimmo 1994, 127).  Meanwhile, Yeltsin, the man who only a year earlier 
offered a five-step plan to return the southern Kuriles to Japan, stated at the 1992 G-7 
meetings “I have no intention of discussing any territorial issue with Japan” (Asahi 
Shimbun [Tokyo] 1992, 1).  It seemed Japan had missed a prime opportunity to regain 
the islands after the Soviet Union dissolved. 
In September 1992 Yeltsin scheduled a visit to Japan, causing much concern 
among conservatives in Russia (Nimmo 1994, 149).  Sakhalin Governor Valentin 
Fyodorov urged Yeltsin to postpone his trip to Japan or he would organize a resistance 
movement among the islanders (Japan Times [Tokyo] 1992b, 1).  The opposition won 
and Yeltsin canceled his visit to Japan the day before he was to depart.  His 
postponement of the meetings caused a rift between Moscow and Tokyo, and especially 
between Yeltsin and Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa who talked “heatedly 
and angrily” for 25 minutes after Yeltsin’s postponement Mainichi Shimbun 1992b, 1).  
Yeltsin rescheduled his trip to Tokyo for May 1993, yet again it was postponed under 
similar circumstances (Garthoff 1995, 20).  Yeltsin finally came to Tokyo in July 1993 
for the G-7 summit, and again in October 1993, to follow up on the twice-postponed 
visit.   
The most significant result of the October 1993 summit between Yeltsin and 
newly elected Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa was the joint statement, the 
Tokyo Declaration.  Within the declaration, both sides pledged to strive for the 
promulgation of a peace treaty by resolving the territorial question on the basis of law 
and justice.  Furthermore, the Russian Federation would officially honor all the 
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agreements and treaties concluded by the Soviet Union and Japan (Hasegawa 2000a, 
193).  The Tokyo Declaration would be the basis for future dialog on the territorial 
dispute between the two countries throughout the following years. 
By the late 1990’s Tokyo sought to adopt a new policy with Russia in which the 
unity of economics and politics, and its 1989 expanded equilibrium addendum utilized 
throughout the early 1990’s, would give way to a new multilayered approach (Newnham 
2001, 251).  In 1997 Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto admitted the southern 
Kurile Islands dispute could only be solved through “the three principles of trust, mutual 
benefit, and maintenance of a long-term perspective” (Hakamada 1997, 6).  The new, 
softer policy by the Japanese led to increased cooperation and improved bilateral 
relations between Yeltsin and Hashimoto, who met in November 1997 and April 1998 
(Ziegler 1999, 15).   
In November 1998 Hashimoto’s successor Keizo Obuchi and Yeltsin met in 
Moscow.  Based on a pledge made by Hashimoto and Yeltsin in the November 1997 
“no neck-tie” summits, the two sides declared they would normalize relations by 2000 
(Ziegler 1999, 18).  To the Japanese this meant regaining the disputed territories in the 
near future.   Unfortunately, no significant developments were made in the Yeltsin-
Obuchi meeting aside from the formation of a subcommission on border demarcation 
and another on joint economic activities on the disputed islands (Ziegler 1999, 18).   No 
further talks occurred between the countries’ leaders until 2000, proving the Yeltsin-
Hashimoto commitment to a peace treaty by 2000 to be an empty statement.  In March 
2001, when new Russian President Vladimir Putin and new Japanese Prime Minister 
Yoshiro Mori met in Irkutsk, both agreed they would endorse the 1956 Soviet-Japanese 
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peace proposal, but no steps were taken to do so (MacWha 2001, 32).  One month later 
Mori was replaced by a more nationalist leader, Junichiro Koizumi. 
In January 2003 Putin and Koizumi met in Moscow.  Primary on their agenda 
was an effort to increase pressure on North Korea to abandon its nuclear development 
programs (Myers 2003, A.6).  Also accomplished was a joint statement claiming the two 
countries would “accelerate negotiations toward signing a formal peace treaty by 
resolving the issue of sovereignty” for the disputed Kuriles (Matsuzawa 2003, 1).  The 
issue remained such a sensitive matter that neither Putin nor Koizumi would directly 
refer to the islands by the given name in their respective languages (Myers 2003, A.7).  
Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the southern Kuriles have maintained 
an economic and strategic significance.  In terms of economic significance, fishing 
rights are the primary struggle.  Fishing in the northwest Pacific is a billion dollar 
industry (Working 2001, 2).  Schools of salmon annually migrate northward from the 
east coasts of Japan to eastern Kamchatka (Artyukov 2004, 4).  It is the Russians’ fear 
that “If Japanese put several kilometers of nets in the Southern Kuriles, Kamchatka will 
have no fish” (Artyukov 2004, 4).  In addition, Russians fear that if the Japanese were to 
regain ownership of the southern Kuriles, the Sea of Okhotsk “will gain the status of 
international sea, and foreigners will claim its rich fish resources” (Artyukov 2004, 4).  
With its fertile fishing waters nearby, maintaining control of the southern Kuriles is 
essential for the Russians who benefit by having the active industry in a less developed 
region of the country.  
Although the strategic significance of the southern Kuriles has been reduced as a 
consequence of the Cold War ending, it still remains a factor in the dispute.  Currently, 
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the Sea of Okhotsk is almost completely surrounded by Russian territories with the 
mainland to the north, the Kamchatka Peninsula to the east, the Kuriles to the south, and 
Sakhalin Island to the west. However, the north shores of Hokkaido also border the sea 
in a small area in the southwest corner.  If the Japanese were to regain the southern 
Kuriles, it would make way for a larger Japanese presence in the sea to monitor Russian 
naval activities.  It is essential for the Russians to sustain their de facto occupation of the 
Sea of Okhotsk as a buffer zone for their Pacific naval activities.   
Aside from the economic and strategic significance of the southern Kuriles, 
territorial integrity and historic legality remain the foundations of current arguments on 
the dispute (Newnham 2001, 247).  If Japan was to regain the Southern Kuriles, its 
territory would increase 1.3 percent while Russia’s territory would decrease 0.03 percent.  
Furthermore, Iturup and Kunashir islands would make up the fifth and sixth largest 
islands in the country, as both are larger than Okinawa yet smaller than Shikoku.  The 
Japanese view the southern Kuriles as a part of their nation based on historical and legal 
facts.  According to the Japanese, the southern Kuriles have always been Japanese 
territory since the joint signing of the 1855 Shimoda Treaty, a document that was 
endorsed peacefully by the Japanese and Russian Empire.  The Russians also view the 
southern Kuriles as rightfully part of their nation based on the fur tax payments made by 
Kurile Ainu beginning in 1778, as well as the agreements made at Yalta in 1945.  The 
Russian position is not to relinquish any territory in fear of wildfire successions in all 
parts of the federation. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 Although the majority of material necessary for this study relates to the Japanese 
foreign policy with Russia during and subsequent to Hashimoto’s prime ministry, much 
of the subject matter, particularly in regard to the first objective, was written prior to 
Hashimoto.  Historical accounts of the territorial dispute are useful as background 
information for the scope of the thesis.  One particularly significant historical account 
which captures the essence of the southern Kurile Islands dispute was written by David 
Rees (1985) and titled The Soviet Seizure of the Kuriles.  In this work, Rees discusses 
the origins and developments of the dispute and how it has affected Russo-Japanese 
relations. 
In particular, Rees enforces the idea that the Soviet Union made a conscious 
political decision in the years following the 1945 acquisition of the Kuriles to relinquish 
political leverage with Japan in favor of a geostrategic advantage in the region.  
According to Rees, “the Soviet strategic emphasis on the retention of the South Kuriles 
has helped to prevent the development of a fruitful political relationship between 
Moscow and Tokyo” (Rees 1985, 140-41).  Rees’ work is useful in understanding the 
changes in political policies on both sides in the years leading up to the 1980’s. 
Rees’ work is written in chronological order as a historical account, but it also 
includes a final chapter assessing the role of the islands in Soviet geostrategy during the
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final years of its existence.  Also, the work contains two appendices that document 
significant extracts from various treaties and agreements involving the Kuriles, and a 
description of the islands’ geographical makeup.   
 Another thorough historical account of the dispute was written by William F. 
Nimmo (1994) entitled Japan and Russia: A Reevaluation in the Post-Soviet Era.  This 
work focuses primarily on Japanese attempts to negotiate regaining the southern Kuriles 
with the Soviet Union, and later the Russian Federation.  Nimmo’s work is important in 
understanding the Japanese foreign policy prior to the Hashimoto policy.  Nimmo also 
pays special attention to the developments of grassroots organizations and the political 
clout they have been able to obtain not only within their own countries, but in the 
international community. 
 Nimmo dissects the most recent developments in great detail, devoting the last 
third of the work solely to post-Soviet Russo-Japanese relations.  According to Nimmo, 
“major changes have occurred in the second half of the twentieth century in the relative 
position of Japan and Russia” (Nimmo 1994, xix).  While Rees’ work is better for 
gaining an understanding of the political policy developments up to the 1980’s, 
Nimmo’s account is very useful in understanding the developments that took place 
during the Gorbachev and Yeltsin eras.  Both studies provide useful background 
information for the most recent developments. 
 A 1991 monograph entitled Beyond the Hoppo Ryodo features nine scholars 
including military scientists, political scientists, and diplomats voicing their thoughts on 
a possible peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union.  Moreover, the authors also 
make special note of the economic implications of the relationship.  One chapter of 
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particular interest was the final chapter, “Hope for the Future,” which was written as a 
discussion among the authors of the nine other chapters.  Though the discussion is 
somewhat outdated in terms of current Russo-Japanese relations, some portions of the 
discussion in the final chapter are interesting and directly relevant, such as Masaru 
Tamamoto’s statement on Japanese investment in Siberia: 
Agreed, it does not seem profitable for most companies.  But if it happens, it will 
be politically motivated: the government will decide on some positive move.  
And the government will have to guarantee those investments.  Some businesses 
will go in kicking and screaming even with some sort of insurance. (Catlin Jacob 
1991, 44). 
 
This is significant in examining the trends of Japanese investment in Siberia after, and 
as a result of the Hashimoto policy.  This monograph can serve as a model for 
predicting political policy behavior based on past developments because it was written 
near the end of the Soviet era.  The authors have utilized their knowledge of Soviet and 
Japanese political policy tendencies to hypothesize future events between the two 
countries. 
 The 1995 work “Northern Territories” and Beyond, edited by James E. Goodby, 
Vladimir I. Ivanov, and Nobuo Shimotamai, is an extensive work on the history, current 
events, and potential future for Russo-Japanese relations.  A theme throughout the work 
is that bilateral communication on the islands dispute is inherently unsuccessful.  
However, several of the book’s authors express their opinions that the United States 
must participate in order for the dispute to be solved.  Such opinions are based on the 
facts that Americans mediated the Portsmouth Treaty which ended the Russo-Japanese 
War (Garthoff 1995, 18), the dispute would have been resolved in 1956 without U.S. 
Secretary of State Dulles intervention, and both Japan and Russia consider their 
 40 
relations with the United States as among their most important political and economic 
relationships  (Saito 1995, 191).  Throughout the work, the authors seem optimistic that 
relations among the three countries are improving “though the efforts of the G7, people-
to-people contacts, humanitarian relief efforts, nuclear weapons dismantlement, 
nonproliferation policies, and a shared interest in global and regional stability” (Ivanov 
1995, 268).   
According to Ivanov, what stands in the way of strengthening Russian relations 
with the United States and Japan is an issue of geography and an issue of allies.  
Regarding the geography problem, “Japan is too close to the Russian Far East, or the 
Russian Pacific coast is too close to Japan geographically” (Ivanov 1995, 277).  For 
more than a century, the two players have been competing for regional hegemony and 
the two countries are geographically too close as regional powers in northeast Asia.  
This geographical issue was also touched upon in Kent Calder’s 1994 manuscript, The 
United States, Japan, and the New Russia.  Calder presents the argument that “Japan 
and Russia are natural and indeed inevitable geostrategic adversaries,” and “Japan…lies 
physically astride all three of Russia’s prospective routes from the Sea of Japan to the 
open Pacific” (Calder 1994, 4).   
Regarding the issue of allies, Ivanov explains that “Japan is not a nuclear power 
itself, which is compensated by close security links with the United States” (Ivanov 
1995, 277).  Weakening Japanese-American relations is not desirable and neither is 
strengthening a Japanese nuclear program, so according to Ivanov, the solution lies in 
“changing the nature of Russian-American relations” (Ivanov 1995, 277).   
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Though the Goodby, Ivanov, and Shimotamoi work predates the Hashimoto plan, 
it provides a thorough discussion on possibilities for economic cooperation between 
Russia and Japan.  Meanwhile, the final chapter written by James Goodby called 
“Cooperative Security in Northeast Asia,” suggests ideas for increasing Russo-Japanese 
cooperation which are strikingly similar to the ideas expressed in the 1997 multilayered 
approach.  Some of Goodby’s suggestions for stability in northeast Asia include a 
balance of power, collective security, and concert, or “restraint and consultation” among 
the players in the region (Goodby 1995, 301).  Possibly, Hashimoto’s change of policy 
came as a result of the ideas expressed in this chapter.   
 Japan and Russia in Northeast Asia (1999), another extensive work edited by 
Vladimir Ivanov and Karla Smith, is a collection of essays written by scholars and 
diplomats on Russo-Japanese relations.  With a strong focus on the most recent political 
and economic developments, the work appears to be a direct response and critical 
appraisal of the 1997 multilayered approach.  In the chapter “Making a Comeback in 
Asia,” authors Evgenity Afanasiev and Vladimir Ivanov take the time to assess the 
regional impact of the Hashimoto plan: 
Through his Eurasian diplomacy concept and the three principles that apply to 
Russia a window of opportunity was opened.  It provides an exit from the 
stalemate over the Northern Territories and raises hope that both parties can act 
together to reach a positive sum solution (Afanasiev and Ivanov 1999, 117). 
 
Indeed, some reactions to the Hashimoto plan were optimistic in the sense that Japan 
and Russia could increase international dialog and economic ties.  However, it is 
important to remember that this particular work was written in 1999, a time when the 
international community was expecting Yelstin and Hashimoto’s successor, Keizo 
Obuchi, to have an agreement signed before the year 2000 (Afanasiev and Ivanov 1999, 
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117).  With such hopeful news coming from both sides, along with the Japanese cultural 
characteristic of finishing old business before the upcoming fin de siècle, it is quite 
understandable that the authors in this 1999 work had expected rapid developments in 
Russo-Japanese relations as well as a solution to the Kurile Island dispute (Afanasiev 
and Ivanov 1999, 117). 
 Japan and Russia in Northeast Asia is an excellent work to understand means 
for Russo-Japanese economic cooperation and increased political dialog.  However, 
time has proven the work to be outdated in the sense that the authors conveyed a 
message of relatively immediate results for bilateral economic developments and a 
solution to the territorial conflict and therefore, normalized relations.  The territorial 
dispute remains a decade after Hashimoto’s speech, but bilateral communication 
between Russia and Japan has indeed increased.  Consisting of several models for 
economic and political developments between the two countries, Japan and Russia in 
Northeast Asia is an excellent work to utilize in research. 
 A third excellent collection of essays by scholars and government officials 
which highlights the numerous attempts by the Russian and Japanese to normalize 
relations in the period for the last half of the twentieth century is Japan and Russia: The 
Tortuous Path to Normalization, 1949-1999 (2000a).  This work, edited by Gilbert 
Rozman, is written as a chronology beginning with the San Francisco Peace Treaty, yet 
the majority of the work focuses on post-Soviet developments.   
 In the introduction of the work Rozman argues that “Russo-Japanese relations in 
the Twentieth Century rank poorest among the great powers” (Rozman 2000a, 1).  This 
statement was based on the two countries’ history, including the initial contact in the 
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Russo-Japanese War, a prolonged cold war, and the unresolved southern Kurile Island 
dispute.  Rozman continues by proposing three ideas to accelerate the process of 
normalization; “cooperation,” “balance-of-power,” and “economic regionalism” 
(Rozman 2000a, 13). Rozman can be commended for his ideas to build Russo-Japanese 
relations, however the idea of cooperation is strikingly similar to Hashimoto’s axioms 
of trust and mutual benefit, which Hashimoto proposed just three years earlier 
(Hakamada 1997, 6).  The particularly useful idea of Rozman’s is economic regionalism, 
which centers “on Russian natural resources and Japanese investment” (Rozman 2000a, 
13).  For this reason, the possibility of Japanese investment into Russia’s Far East will 
be a critical part of this study. 
 One noteworthy chapter of this work which discusses the motivation behind 
Hashimoto’s change in foreign policy towards Russia is “Russo-Japanese Relations after 
Yeltsin’s Reelection in 1996,” by Konstantin Sarkisov.  According to Sarkisov, the June 
1997 G-8 summit in Denver was the turning point for Hashimoto.  Sarkisov explained 
that “Meetings between Yeltsin and Hashimoto persuaded the Japanese Prime Minister 
to pursue a fundamentally new policy highlighted by flexibility and building a 
constructive atmosphere” (Sarkisov 2000, 230).  Just a month later, Hashimoto outlined 
his plan on a new foreign policy with Russia.  Sarkisov summarized the Hashimoto 
policy as “progress on [bilateral cooperation] did not need to be balanced with progress 
on the Northern Territories question” (Sarkisov 2000, 233).  Indeed, but the question 
remains how successful this new policy will be for the Japanese in regaining their 
historical possessions. 
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 Hashimoto’s plan was also discussed by Shigeki Hakamada in the chapter, 
“Japanese-Russian Relations in 1997-1999.”  In particular, Hakamada discussed the 
Russian reaction to the multilayered approach, which “was seen as a concession that 
changed Japan’s former hard-line attitude concerning the Northern Territories question” 
(Hakamada 2000, 250).  Meanwhile, the relationship between Yeltsin and Hashimoto 
developed on a personal level (Hakamada 2000, 250). Indeed, the multilayered approach 
is a softer policy on Russian relations in which regaining the southern Kuriles seems 
less likely than before.  One might think the Japanese Rightwing which was consistently 
uncompromising on the issue in the past, would react negatively to Hashimoto’s new 
policy.  However, according to Hakamada, the Japanese media “highlighted it as a 
diplomatic success for the Hashimoto regime” because of Hashimoto’s and Yeltsin’s 
agreement to resolve the issue by 2000 (Hakamada 2000, 251).  The positive 
momentum between Yeltsin and Hashimoto came to an end in mid-1998 when 
Hashimoto resigned amid a deteriorating economy and Yeltsin had lost much of his 
popularity among Russians due to domestic political and economic crises (Hasegawa 
2000b, 317). 
 Japan and Russia is a particularly constructive work which is applicable to this 
study.  Along with the relative writings, the work has several diagrams and tables 
indicating public perceptions of Japanese and Russians, and the significance of the 
southern Kurile Islands dispute among the populations in the two countries.  Meanwhile, 
the focus of the work is the political dialog between the two entities. 
 A work which focuses primarily on mutual perceptions of Russians and Japanese 
is featured in the manuscript series The Carl Beck Papers.  This manuscript, 
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Misperceptions between Japan and Russia, features three essays written by Russo-
Japanese relations scholars Semyon Verbitsky, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, and Gilbert 
Rozman (2000b).  Verbitsky’s chapter focused on Russian perceptions of Japan while 
Hasegawa’s chapter focused on Japanese perceptions of Russia and Rozman discussed 
the most recent events in perceptions between the two.  In his piece, Rozman presents 
how Russia and Japan can develop their partnership;  
Russia can assist Japan in raising its political power, above all on the Security 
Council, and Japan can assist Russia in raising its economic power, through 
large projects to develop energy and natural resources and the creation of new 
organs of Northeast Asian regionalism (Rozman 2000b, 83). 
 
Although the work is an interesting discussion of mutual perceptions between the two 
countries, the essays seem to lack substance and historical analogies for the ideas 
proposed.  Nonetheless, Misperceptions between Japan and Russia is useful in 
comprehending the problems and lack of progress associated with the two countries’ 
political and economic cooperation and development in the last two decades. 
 Dmitri Trenin’s 2002 work The End of Euraisa features a section of the chapter 
“The Far Eastern Backyard” dedicated to discussing the geopolitical implications of the 
southern Kurile Islands dispute between Russia and Japan.  In the section titled 
“Southern Kurils or Northern Territories?,” Trenin explains why Russia is so steadfast 
on retaining possession of the islands politically, geostrategically, and psychologically.  
Politically,  
Giving up the islands would be the first case of actually ceding Russian 
territory…to a foreign power.  By extension, it is feared, this action would also 
bring into question the legality of other territorial arrangements made by the 
World War II victors, including above all the status of Kaliningrad (Trenin 2002, 
215). 
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Trenin continues by explaining the southern Kuriles also serve a geostrategic purpose by 
closing “the bottleneck of the Sea of Okhotsk, virtually making it a Russian lake, 
considered safe for a ballistic submarine bastion” (Trenin 2002, 215).  Psychologically, 
Russians feel their “global retreat [is] over, and that any further unilateral concessions to 
other countries would be unacceptable” (Trenin 2002, 216).  The author continued by 
explaining how Russians regard the Soviet victory over Japan in World War II as 
“redemption for the ignominious defeat” in the Russo-Japanese War (Trenin 2002, 216).  
Trenin’s geopolitical discussion on the territorial dispute between Russia and Japan is 
useful in understanding the Russian standpoint and how it affects bilateral developments 
between the two countries. 
 Some articles published after Hashimoto’s tenure as Prime Minister on the 
southern Kurile Islands dispute provide valuable information on current events in 
Russo-Japanese relations, and the influence of the Hashimoto plan thereon.  Judith 
Matloff’s 1998 piece in The Christian Science Monitor entitled “Tiny Islands Prelude to 
Russia-Japan Deal” supports the argument that the new foreign policy was already in 
effect, such as the Japanese promise of a $1.2 billion loan to an ailing Russia in April 
1998 (Matloff 1998, 6).  The author reported that the Japanese have pledged to send 
power generators and tons of emergency food aid to the residents of the southern 
Kuriles (Matloff 1998, 6).  Matloff continued by discussing how the Japanese are 
directing their cultural and economic influence upon the residents of the southern Kurile 
Islands; “Japanese influence has flourished on…the Kuriles since the Soviet Union’s 
1991 collapse.  Sushi abounds, as do Toyota and Nissan vehicles” (Matloff 1998, 6).  
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Gathering information on the methods of Japanese economic expansion will reveal the 
success of the multilayered approach. 
 The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press released a collection of media 
reports in the Current Digest Foreign Policy Series entitled “Russian Foreign Policy 
1994-1998: Charting an Independent Course” (1998).  Within the eighth chapter, 
dedicated to Russo-Chinese and Russo-Japanese relations, editor Gordon Livermore 
compiled a series of reports from the Yeltsin-Hashimoto “no neck-tie” summits of 
November 1997.  The section, entitled “In Summit ‘Breakthrough,’ Russia, Japan Set 
Goal of Signing Peace Treaty by 2000,” various detailed accounts of the “no neck-tie” 
summits are provided by media reporters.  This information is exceptionally valuable in 
understanding the developments of Hashimoto’s foreign policy. 
 Charles E. Ziegler wrote an important piece featured in the May/June edition of 
Problems of Post-Communism (1999), entitled “Russo-Japanese Relations: A New Start 
For the Twenty-First Century?”  Ziegler discusses the political and economic 
developments in recent years which have shaped the current relationship.  Ziegler 
contends that throughout the two Hashimoto-Yeltsin summits of November 1997 and 
April 1998 and the Obuchi-Yeltsin summit of November 1998, “Russo-Japanese 
relations at the close of the twentieth century [appeared] poised to enter a qualitatively 
new stage” (Ziegler 1999, 15).  Ziegler continues by addressing the progress made 
between the two countries after the fall of the Soviet Union as well as the potential 
barriers to increased bilateral development in the future.  With its plethora of sources 
and abundance of relevant facts, Ziegler’s piece is particularly valuable to this project. 
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 Another important piece featured in Asian Survey by William J. Long is 
“Nonproliferation as a Goal of Japanese Foreign Assistance.”  In this 1999 article, Long 
discusses the criteria set by the Japanese government in deciding where to send foreign 
aid, and how this criteria has been shaped and manipulated throughout modern history.  
Long points out that “because of constitutional strictures,” Japan’s available options to 
pursue national security interests are largely limited to its economic power (Long 1999, 
329).  According to Long, this can explain why Japan is the largest foreign aid donor in 
the world (Long 1999, 329).  Indeed, recognizing the significance of economics as 
Japan’s primary tool for international relations makes the impact of the multilayered 
approach and its vast economic distinction from the former policy with Russia even 
more significant. 
 The most significant piece of literature which spurred the idea for this study is 
that written by Randall Newnham in the journal Asian Affairs: An American Review 
entitled “How to Win Friends and Influence People: Japanese Economic aid Linkage 
and The Kurile Islands.”  In this 2001 piece Newnham analyzes the possibility of Japan 
regaining its historical possession by providing much needed economic aid to Russia in 
return for the islands.  According to Newnham, the Japanese foreign policy to Russia 
known as  seikei fukabun, or the unity of politics and economics, which dominated the 
late 1980’s and 1990’s up to the Hashimoto plan, “prevented most economic aid and 
investment in the the [sic] Soviet Union” (Newnham 2001, 250).  Newnham argues that 
a general linkage of economics and politics creates mutual trust and “aims to improve 
the overall tone” between the two parties (Newnham 2001, 251).  This quite possibly 
might be a tactic the Japanese are currently utilizing, yet it was not revealed in this 
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particular piece.  For this thesis, obtaining the directional flow of Japanese proposed 
foreign aid to Russia over the last decade will reveal if this is in fact occurring. 
 Newnham’s piece is inspiring and highly relevant to this thesis.  The author 
utilizes facts to back his case and interesting analogies as well.  Two analogies the 
author discusses included comparing German and Japanese foreign policies to the 
Soviet Union/Russia, its reactions to these policies, and comparing the transfer of power 
in the southern Kuriles to the Alaska purchase of 1867 and the Louisiana purchase of 
1803.  Albeit a short piece containing only ten pages of text, the material in Newnham’s 
article is closely related to the material researched in this project.  
 Alexei V. Zagorsky’s “Three Years on a Path to Nowhere: The Hashimoto 
Initiative in Russian-Japanese Relations,” found in the April edition of Pacific Affairs is 
also valuable.  In this discussion, Zagorsky details the Russo-Japanese summits which 
occurred after Hashimoto’s 1997 change in foreign policy.  Zagorsky continues in the 
article by examining Japanese investment projects in Siberia as they relate to 
Hashimoto’s policy.  The theme of Zagorsky’s piece was that Hashimoto’s policy was 
enacted too late, and was an overall failure;  
The Hashimoto doctrine was a product of Japan’s search to find a pathway out of 
a deadlocked relationship with Russia.  The only thing it got was the 
understanding that time has run out.  It might have worked if it had been 
launched in the early nineties (Zagorsky 2001, 90). 
 
This piece is valuable in that much of the information in the piece relates with the 
research material in this thesis, however differences are noted in the objectives and 
depths of research in the two projects. 
 An article which presents much of the post-Soviet developments in the southern 
Kurile Islands dispute is “The Dispute over the Kurile Islands between Russia and Japan 
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in the 1990’s,” by Yutaka Okuyama.  Featured in Pacific Affairs Spring 2003 edition, 
Okuyama provides a brief history of the Kurile Islands dispute and its advancements in 
the 1990’s.  The dispute was looked at from three angles in the discourse: first, at the 
governmental level, Moscow and Tokyo; second, at the regional administration level, 
meaning the governments of Sakhalin and Hokkaido which both claim the islands; and 
third, the local level, meaning the residents of the southern Kurile Islands.  With several 
tables on economic and public survey data, the essay is very useful in grasping the 
impact of the Hashimoto plan in the late 1990’s in three different spheres of bilateral 
relations. 
 In the December 2003 edition of the periodical Look Japan, writer Osamu 
Sawaji provided an update on the third annual Japan-Russia Forum held that autumn.  
The forum was established in 2000 by Japan’s former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori and 
Russian President Vladimir Putin who pledged to raise awareness about the significance 
of Russo-Japanese relations (Sawaji 2003, 4).  Discussions focused on three key issues; 
economic relations, energy and the environment, and mutual understanding and dialog.  
Events such as this are key to Hashimoto’s multilayered approach as well as increasing 
bilateral trust between Japan and Russia.   
Contribution to Surveyed Corpus 
 This study complements the surveyed corpus of works by supplying a project 
which focuses on one Japanese foreign policy, presents the motivations behind the 
creation of the policy, and accomplishments of the policy in the two fields identified by 
the policy creator, bilateral economic development and a solution on the territorial 
dispute.  Additionally, the advances in bilateral economic development and the 
 51 
territorial dispute are examined in contrast to statements made regarding the foreign 
policy created by Hashimoto.  Few of the identified works in the literature review focus 
particularly on the formation, existence, and actual ramifications of one foreign policy 
in Russo-Japanese relations.  Largely, the materials are studies or reports on economic 
developments, chronological critiques, and arguments for what revisions or 
transformations should be made in Japanese or Russian foreign policy.  This paper 
enhances the compilation of works by examining the motives behind Hashimoto’s 
foreign policy, the economic ramifications of the foreign policy, and the political 
increments toward his objective with the policy.    
The efforts from this project contribute to an understanding of the history of 
Russo-Japanese relations, particularly in regard to how Hashimoto’s policy was formed, 
and changed the course of bilateral dialog.  Secondly, efforts from this project contribute 
to an understanding in current Russo-Japanese economic developments, chiefly as they 
are affected by political policy.  Lastly this project contributes to an understanding on 
the progress toward a solution to the territorial dispute, which can have an effect on the 
arguments for policy revision by researchers. 
 
Methodology and Hypotheses 
 Because the core of this project is based on the reviewing of a foreign policy 
which will in turn reveal information on Russo-Japanese relations and the Kurile Islands 
dispute, an analysis of significant documents and statements, the tracking of time-lapsed 
economic figures, and the qualitative review of documents will be conducted at various 
points. 
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 In this study several evaluations of political speeches, media reports, and 
government documents will be conducted in order to detect changes and underlying 
themes in foreign policy.  This research method is a content analysis of sorts because 
special attention will be given to the wording of statements at various points to 
determine progressions in political policy.  However the limited quanity of political 
speeches and government documents relevant to this study does not provide an ample 
sample size for a formally structured quantitative analysis.  Adding media reports to 
such a sample would significantly increase the size, but media reports tend to be 
redundant and often cite an original source.  For these reasons, a quantitative analysis is 
not beneficial for an inquiry such as this. 
 At various points in this study, the tracking of economic data will be necessary 
to indicate trends over a period of time.  This will be done by assigning the time lapsed 
data to a timeline stretching across a given period with 1997 being the focus year in 
most instances for this study.  Much of the necessary economic data is available from 
MOFA as well as other government sources.  Also, along with the examination of 
policy-related expressions, a review of Hashimoto’s bibliographical background and 
political affairs information will be necessary at various points in the research.   
This third step will focus on gathering historical information in a traditional 
sense in order to achieve a more thorough understanding in the study. 
First Objective: Revealing Hashimoto’s Motivation 
1.) Gather statements made by Japanese political leaders, reports by the media, 
and academic writings which support Tokyo’s cause to terminate the former 
foreign policy with Russia in 1997.  This would be done by examining policy 
expressions written from the mid 1980s when seikei fukabun was 
implemented until 1997 when the expanded equilibrium was replaced.  The 
analysis entails noting the use of terms such as “balanced equilibrium,” 
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“multilayered approach,” or “general economic linkage” in these documents.  
The intention is to detect phrases which aim to treat economic and political 
affairs separately between the two nations as opposed to intentionally linking 
the two items.  The next step is to note any potential increase over time in the 
divorce of economics and politics.  This would indicate the formulation of a 
new foreign policy on the Japanese side. 
2.) Review the unsuccessful economic proposals presented by Tokyo to Moscow 
in exchange for the southern Kurile Islands, or aid-for-islands proposals 
from the mid-1980s until 1997.  By attaching these proposals to a timeline, 
and noting the varying amounts of proposed aid within each proposal and the 
formats of the proposals, one can uncover the developments of the unity of 
economic and politics policy and the expanded equilibrium, and why these 
policies were replaced. 
3.) Reveal what, if any, notions Hashimoto had towards developing relations 
with Russia or the territorial dispute prior to taking office.  Such beliefs 
would be a factor in the creation of Hashimoto’s Russia policy.  This is done 
by acquiring information on his political background, his perceptions of 
Russia, and his personal relationship with Yeltsin.  This can be achieved by 
reviewing his biographies, media reports during his terms as finance, foreign, 
and prime minister, and the reports from his summits with Russian diplomats.  
This step will not describe a specific activity in Japanese foreign policy, but 
acquiring a better understanding of the individual’s interests and 
predispositions will reveal insights to his motivation in creating a foreign 
policy. 
 
Second Objective:  
Examining the Impact of Hashimoto’s Policy in Bilateral Economic Development 
 The picture has become increasingly clear that Russia has natural resource 
reserves in Siberia in which Japan could readily invest.  This study will examine 
investment trends in Siberia by Japanese corporations, and how the distrust and 
unfavorable opinion of each other, stemmed primarily from the southern Kurile Islands 
dispute, has stagnated economic progress and cooperation between the countries.  It has 
been examined by Gilbert Rozman in his piece “Russia and Japan: Mutual 
Misperceptions, 1992-1999” (2000b), that Japanese corporations have indeed taken 
great interest in extracting Siberia’s resources, yet the Japanese struggle with trusting 
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those they would be working with.  Rozman wrote about previous attempts by Japanese 
corporations to invest in Siberia:  
Japanese firms could easily have become a dominant force in the urban 
economies of [Russia’s Far East].  They had trouble finding partners who would 
not deceive them.  After being cheated in some visible joint ventures in 
Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, Japanese investors knew better.  Power to get 
things done was elsewhere (Rozman 2000b, 75). 
 
According to Hashimoto, the axiom of shared trust is essential for a solution to the 
lingering island conflict between the two countries.  Regardless of his belief, shared 
trust will bring about an era in which cooperation between the two countries will benefit 
the economies thereof, and assist in the development of Siberia. 
 Three actions are necessary to reveal the effect of the Hashimoto foreign policy 
on Russo-Japanese relations:  
1.) To uncover economic cooperation between Japan and Russia in Siberia and 
the Russian Far East, review media reports and analyze the dynamics of 
Japanese corporate resource investment projects in Siberia prior and 
subsequent to the Hashimoto plan.  This entails gathering the volume and 
development of Japanese large corporations in Siberia and the Russian Far 
East over time.  Projects specifically mentioned in speeches and bilateral 
summits will be of primary significance.  This will indicate if Japanese 
investment or the attempt to open Japanese investment has increased in the 
regions. 
2.) As mentioned in the literature review, a study of the flow of foreign aid 
would greatly enhance this thesis.  Tracking the amount of Japanese foreign 
aid along with investment in Russia and bilateral trade years prior and 
subsequent to the 1997 change of policy would strongly indicate the impact 
of the Hashimoto plan, and the degree to which the multilayered approach 
policy is enacted.   
3.) Also mentioned in the literature review, Masaru Tamamoto noted that the 
Japanese government would have to provide incentives for a Japanese firm to 
invest in Russia.  Uncovering government incentives for Japanese 
corporations to invest in Russia would be necessary for the same period.  
This would be conducted by reviewing media reports and joint summit 
statements which would provide this information, and noting an increase or 
decrease in this practice.  With this, the impact of the multilayered approach 
will be revealed on bilateral development. 
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Third Objective: 
Examine the Success of Hashimoto’s Policy in the Southern Kurile Islands Dispute 
 It is important to bear in mind throughout this project that the focal point of 
Japanese foreign policy with Russia is the regaining of their historical possessions, the 
southern Kuriles.  This primary objective has been consistently reflected in the rhetoric 
on the Japanese side throughout each foreign policy exercised since the Soviet seizure of 
the islands in 1945.  Hashimoto stated that the island conflict would be solved via the 
principles of trust, mutual benefit, and a long-term perspective, all of which would be 
demonstrated in his multilayered approach to foreign policy.  To reveal the success of 
Hashimoto’s plan in regard to an eventual solution to the Kurile Islands dispute two 
steps must be employed:   
1.) Examine speeches and summit reports between the two countries premiers 
prior and subsequent to 1997.  Progress on the Kurile Islands dispute was 
noted by William Nimmo in his work Japan and Russia: A Reevalution in 
the Post-Soviet Era (1994);  
Where 25 years earlier Gromyko had said there was no territorial 
problem, and Brezhnev had insisted in the 1970s that there were only 
“unresolved differences,” and by the late 1980’s Shevardnadze had 
preferred to cite “the geographic question,” Gorbachev agreed to the 
inclusion of specific details in a joint communiqué on the talks by 
naming the islands that were claimed by Japan (Nimmo 1994, 96). 
Similar to Nimmo noting the evolution of Soviet terminology of the Kurile 
Islands dispute during the Cold War, this study will do the same for prior and 
subsequent to 1997 by analyzing the terminology used to describe the dispute 
by the two countries premiers.  Also to be analyzed is the number of 
instances and circumstances in which the Russian and Japanese premiers 
refer to the islands by name.  Noting increases and decreases in various 
terminologies will reveal the progress on the dispute and the degree of 
success that the multilayered approach has brought on resolving the dispute. 
2.) As mentioned in the literature review by Judith Matloff, Tokyo has been 
placing cultural and economic pressure upon the current residents of the 
southern Kuriles in recent years.  This strategy, which is in accord with the 
1997 foreign policy, can be revealed by tracking the foreign aid sent from 
Tokyo to the current residents of the southern Kuriles.  For the purposes of 
this study, the flow of Japanese aid to the southern Kuriles prior and 
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subsequent to Hashimoto’s implementation of the multilayered approach in 
1997 will be tracked.  Furthermore, details of the Japanese cultural impact 
upon the southern Kuriles should be noted in media reports from the islands 
(such as Judith Matloff’s report).  This will reveal if the Japanese are 
attempting to regain the southern Kuriles by enticing the current southern 
Kurile residents to support the transfer of power for the islands.  Such a 
strategy by the Japanese concurs with the axioms set forth by Hashimoto in 
1997.    
 
 This methodology leads to a better understanding of why Hashimoto changed 
the foreign policy in 1997, and the impact his change of policy has had on Russo-
Japanese economic and political development and the southern Kurile Islands dispute.   
Hypotheses 
 It is presumed that an increase in bilateral economic development between Japan 
and Russia and progress toward a solution on the territorial dispute have been achieved 
as a result of Hashimoto’s foreign policy with Russia.  These are the two objectives that 
Hashimoto addressed in his July 1997 speech, when he introduced his new foreign 
policy with Russia (speech by Hashimoto 1997a). 
 If Hashimoto’s desire to strengthen economic ties with Russia without linking 
them to prior progress on the territorial dispute was converted into policies, bilateral 
economic ties are assumed to have been subsequently strengthened.  The Russians will 
welcome the opportunity to freely strengthen economic ties with Japan as the Russians 
naturally desire no link between bilateral economic development and the territorial 
dispute.  Improvement to the Russian domestic economic state of affairs seems 
forthcoming if relations can be strengthened with an economic power such as Japan.  
The relationship between Hashimoto’s policy and bilateral economic developments will 
be identified and tested in this study.  Concrete units of analysis will be identified within 
available bilateral trade figures, Japanese aid figures, and Japanese investment in Russia.  
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Additionally, the impact of Hashimoto’s policy on major Japanese investment projects 
in Russia will be examined and the results of these relationships will reveal the extent to 
which the hypothesis is accurate. 
 Along with a stronger bilateral economic relationship, Hashimoto’s policy 
maintained the vital objective of all Japanese foreign policies with Russia to regain 
control of the southern Kuriles.  Progress toward a solution to the territorial dispute 
would be expected if handled separately from bilateral economic developments.  This 
study will examine a correlation between the public statements regarding Hashimoto’s 
foreign policy and actual progress in the two fields of bilateral economic development 
and progress toward a territorial solution.  In regards to the territorial dispute, obviously 
the two countries have not yet agreed on a solution, but a positive association is the 
postulated effect of Hashimoto’s foreign policy based on the openness of bilateral 
discussion, and opinions and activities observed in the region.  The terminology 
employed in bilateral discussions on the territorial dispute will prove to what degree this 
hypothesis is accurate, as references to the territorial dispute as well as a peace treaty are 
expected to increase on both sides.  Additionally, positive economic and cultural 
exchanges at the local level are expected to increase and develop, and opinion polls of 
the current residents will serve as units of analysis to indicate the degree to which 
Hashimoto’s foreign policy succeeded.  
 The results of this investigation will enable one to note trends or alterations in 
terminology prior and subsequent to Hashimoto’s policy being enacted in 1997.  It is 
assumed that Russian and Japanese leaders will increase their references to the territorial 
dispute when discussing Russo-Japanese relations together, and that references will be 
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made more specifically than before as a result of Hashimoto’s policy.  Additionally, 
Hashimoto expected the Russian leadership to be more willing to discuss the territorial 
dispute if the link between it and the bilateral economic relationship was broken.  The 
results of this study will reveal how Russian leaders have responded to Japanese’ calls 
for discussions on the territorial dispute.  It is put forth that Russian leaders will be more 
willing to discuss the territorial dispute after Hashimoto’s policy was enacted in 1997. 
 Hashimoto’s policy called for building trust among the current residents of the 
disputed southern Kuriles via regional economic support and cultural exchanges (speech 
by Hashimoto 1997a).  It is hypothesized that Hashimoto’s policy will result with a 
more positive image of the Japanese among the island residents and an increase in the 
number of islanders who would support or accept Japanese acquisition of the islands, 
which can be observed in public opinion polls and statements by islanders.  Such data is 
tested in this study. 
 It is assumed that Hashimoto’s policy succeeded in achieving its two goals to 
increase bilateral economic relations and work with Russian leaders toward a solution 
on the territorial dispute.  Hashimoto’s policy was a significant change in Japanese 
policy with Russia, and the results are expected to greatly differ with the results of 
previous policies.  Statements by Hashimoto and other Japanese and Russian leaders, 
relevant media reports, and economic data will reveal to what degree these hypotheses 
are accurate. 
 
 
 59 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 THE MOTIVATION BEHIND THE MULTILAYERED APPROACH 
 
 With a clear understanding of the background behind how Hashimoto’s 1997 
foreign policy with Russia was formed, one can better interpret the policy’s objectives, 
and whether those objectives have been met in the following years.  In July 1997, 
Hashimoto publicly laid out his plan for the first time.  However, what motivated the 
creation of this new policy, and are there underlying objectives to Hashimoto’s policy 
that he did not explicitly outline in his July 1997 address?  This chapter will examine 
those questions. 
At the root of the southern Kurile Islands dispute is the effect upon Russian and 
Japanese senses of identity and territorial integrity.  For Russia, ceding the territories 
would be the first case of actually relinquishing “Russian territory—i.e., territory lying 
within the borders of the former Soviet Russian Republic—to a foreign power” (Trenin 
2002, 215).  Although there is no direct linkage, Russians fear that if they concede 
Russian territory like the southern Kuriles, other territories acquired in World War II, 
such as Kaliningrad, would come into question (Trenin 2002, 215).  Furthermore, there 
is also the fear that ceding the southern Kuriles would encourage independence 
movements in various ethnic republics, such as Chechnya.  To the Japanese, the 
southern Kuriles are rightfully theirs based on historical agreements and were 
wrongfully seized by the Soviet Union (Nimmo 1994, xix).  The continuation of Soviet 
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and later, Russian occupation of the southern Kuriles as a result of World War II has 
resulted in a sense of humiliation for the Japanese.  Before and after Hashimoto’s tenure 
as Prime Minister, Japan’s primary consideration in crafting foreign policy with the 
Soviet Union and Russia has been to regain the southern Kuriles.  In 1997 Hashimoto 
took the initiative to significantly alter this strategy, but why?  This chapter will present 
an analysis of Japan’s foreign policy initially with the Soviet Union, and then Russia in 
an attempt to comprehend why Hashimoto modified foreign policy in 1997 and to gain a 
clearer understanding of the policy’s objectives beyond what was outlined in the July 
1997 address. 
 
Soviet-Japanese Relations 
 
 After the largely unsuccessful talks between Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and 
Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka in the 1970’s, the Soviet implementation of a 
200-nautical mile exclusive fishing zone around the Kuriles in 1977, and the Japanese 
Prime Minister declaring February 7 as “Northern Territories Day” in 1982, Soviet-
Japanese relations had reached the lowest point since the Soviet seizure of the Kuriles in 
September 1945 (Nimmo 1994, 54-58).  However, after the deaths of Soviet leaders 
Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko in just four years, the Soviet Union was destined 
for momentous changes in 1985 when Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.  It was in this time of Soviet adversity and 
Japanese accomplishment that Tokyo officially announced a foreign policy linking 
bilateral economic development with the immediate return of the four southern Kuriles 
(Carlile 1994, 415). 
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Japan and the Soviet Union 
 In 1985 seikei fukabun, the policy whereby the Japanese would not allow 
developments in bilateral economic ties without first normalizing political relations via 
the return of the southern Kuriles, was fully activated as Tokyo’s foreign policy with 
Moscow (Carlile 1994, 415).  After maintaining a hard line with Japan for decades, 
Moscow showed signs of softening to the Japanese by appealing for improved bilateral 
relations.  In a November 1985 speech Gorbachev proclaimed, “We stand for better 
relations with Japan, and it is our conviction that this is possible” (Washington Post, 
1985, 4).  However, it was noted in the Washington Post that Japanese diplomats 
responded to Gorbachev’s statement by reiterating “Tokyo’s position that return of the 
islands is a prerequisite for a peace treaty with Moscow and for long-term improvement 
of Soviet-Japanese relations” (Washington Post, 1985, 4).  This is a clear indication that 
the Japanese were assured seikei fukabun, or the ‘unity of economics and polities,’ was 
the optimal position toward the Soviet Union at the time. 
In 1986, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze visited Tokyo to revive 
ministerial talks between the two countries.  Later that year, Japanese Foreign Minister 
Shintaro Abe returned the favor by visiting Moscow.  In a joint communiqué distributed 
later that year, the two sides stated;  
Japan and the Soviet Union conducted negotiations concerning the conclusion of 
a Japan-Soviet peace treaty, including negotiations on various problems which 
can become the contents of a treaty.  The two sides agreed to the effect that this 
will be continued (Nihon Keizai Shimbun [Tokyo] 1986, 2). 
 
The particularly vague terminology and careful wording utilized in this joint 
communiqué signaled a lack of Japanese interest to reform its foreign policy as well as 
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reluctance from the Soviets to continue talks on the “various problems” mentioned 
(Nimmo 1994, 61).   
In response to Gorbachev’s proclamation of a Soviet desire to improve relations 
with Japan in November 1985, Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone demanded 
that Gorbachev admit that the territorial dispute was “a problem which has been left 
unsettled after the War” (Nihon Keizai Shimbun [Tokyo] 1986, 2).  In return for this, 
Nakasone claimed Tokyo “plans to clarify…an intention to respond to economic 
cooperation as much as possible” (Nihon Keizai Shimbun [Tokyo] 1986, 2).  Also 
carefully worded, Nakasone’s statement seemed to be more similar to the expanded 
equilibrium, because he promised a response “as much as possible” to Gorbachev’s 
admittance of the territorial dispute.  The expanded equilibrium, a restructured version 
of seikei fukabun which allowed for developments in insignificant bilateral affairs 
without a prior solution to the territorial dispute and incremental carrot-and-stick 
economic developments resulting from progress on the territorial dispute, was officially 
presented to the Soviets in May 1989 by Foreign Minister Sosuke Uno (Nimmo 1994, 
75-76).  
 As the Soviet Union spiraled into economic turmoil during the late 1980’s and 
early 1990’s, seikei fukabun and its 1989 expanded equilibrium revision appeared to 
many as a foreign policy which was likely to bear fruit.  By analyzing media documents 
written in 1990 through 1991, wordings within the documents frequently gave the 
impression that a power transfer of the southern Kuriles was imminent.  Two authors 
from the journal Foreign Policy first alluded to the territorial transfer of power and thus, 
the successes of seikei fukabun in its spring 1990 issue piece “Dateline Moscow: 
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Burying Lenin;” “Besides unilaterally reducing its naval forces, the USSR may 
further…return the disputed Kurile Islands to Japan” (Kull and Duffy 1990, 190).  
Though the piece does not directly link the return of the southern Kuriles to the need for 
the Soviets to develop bilateral economic relations with Japan, it was the first 
commentary which suggests a forthcoming transfer of power in the southern Kuriles.    
Unofficial Aid-for-Islands Packages 
On April 23, 1990 in Fukuoka, former Deputy Prime Minister Shin Kanemaru 
announced a proposal to buy back Shikotan and the Habomai group from the Soviet 
Union.  By doing this, Kanemaru’s proposed boundary would follow that nearly 
accepted in the 1956 joint Soviet-Japanese summit (Nimmo 1994, 78).  Kanemaru 
explained,  
I would rather see two of the four northern island territories returned to Japan 
first than to postpone the issue.  There may be some retorts to these suggestions 
since the islands are an integral part of our territory, but I even have an idea to 
purchase them if Moscow refuses to return the two islands as an interim step 
(Japan Times Weekly [Tokyo] 1990, 1). 
 
Kanemaru never gave details on how much money he would provide to the Soviet 
Union, but he did reveal that he met three times with a Soviet official known for his 
proclivity of securing relations with neighbors in the Far East, Soviet Presidential 
Council member Yevgeniy Primakov (Nimmo 1994, 78-79).  Kanumaru, who was at the 
time retired and thus, not holding any political position, explained that he was generally 
against purchasing territory which was rightfully Japan’s, but he simply wanted to break 
the deadlock: “[the Soviets] should at least return two islands to begin with, or there 
would never be a breakthrough” (Japan Times Weekly [Tokyo] 1990, 1).  The Japanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) quickly denied that Kanemaru’s proposal was 
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sanctioned by the Japanese government, issuing a statement: “Japan is not interested in 
any scheme to buy or lease the disputed islands” (Japan Times Weekly [Tokyo] 1990, 1). 
The second Japanese attempt to directly exchange aid for the disputed islands 
was in March 1991 when Ichiro Ozawa of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
went to Moscow prepared to give Gorbachev $26 billion of economic aid in exchange 
for the southern Kuriles (Newnham 2001, 249).  As Ozawa later explained, “Gorbachev 
did not reject Japan’s sovereignty over the islands,” however, the territorial dispute “is 
so burning you can’t tackle it with bare hands” (Japan Times Weekly [Tokyo] 1991a, 1).  
Gorbachev may have not rejected Japan’s sovereignty over the islands, but he did reject 
exchanging the islands for the $26 billion economic aid proposal.  Ozawa did not 
represent the Japanese government in his mission, but he was representing the interests 
of the country’s ruling LDP as well as the interests of his former colleague and friend, 
Kanemaru (Nimmo 1994, 91).  A few weeks after Ozawa’s visit to Moscow, he was 
obligated to resign amid running an unsuccessful campaign to remove the incumbent 
Tokyo mayor from office as well as displeasing many of his party members with his 
unofficial aid-for-islands proposal to Gorbachev (New York Times 1991, A3). 
Gorbachev in Japan 
In April 1991, Gorbachev became the first and only Soviet leader to visit Japan 
(Nimmo 1994, 94).  In an address to the Diet, Gorbachev commented on Soviet-
Japanese relations; “It is completely abnormal that the USSR and Japan still have no 
peace treaty that would put a legal end to World War II.  We must begin moving in that 
direction, without excluding anything positive that came out of bilateral talks in various 
years” (Izvestia [Moscow] 1991, 1).  Through the entire address, no mention was made 
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of the “territorial problem,” “the southern Kuriles,” “the geographic question,” or the 
“unresolved differences” which impeded normalizing Soviet-Japanese relations.  None 
of the aforementioned terms were used in a second Gorbachev speech in Japan to 
Keidanren, an association of Japan’s most influential businessmen;  
We invite Japanese firms to take part in the comprehensive development of the 
Russian gas and petroleum deposits in northern Tyumen Province, Western 
Siberia.  The development of the Verkhnechonsk deposit north of Baikal could 
be another major joint project.  The USSR has a program for modernizing 33 
petroleum refineries with the aim of increasing the degree to which oil is refined.  
We invite Japanese firms to 12 such refineries in the Far East and Siberia 
(Izvestia [Moscow] 1991, 1). 
 
In his attempt to improve economic relations, Gorachev pressed on themes of goodwill 
and optimism throughout his visit.  However, Gorbachev seemed to be concurrently 
ignoring the Japanese foreign policy which barred significant economic developments 
without prior political development on the territorial dispute. 
When Gorbachev finally did acknowledge the territorial dispute on the last day 
of his visit, it seemed that he had misinterpreted the Japanese foreign policy by 
informing Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, “The principle of seeking the islands for 
dollars, yen, rubles or whatever, is absolutely impermissible.  This kind of approach is 
humiliating” (Japan Times Weekly [Tokyo] 1991b, 1).  Kaifu attempted to set the record 
straight, responding “Japan will not buy the islands with money, but we are willing to 
cooperate with perestroika reforms” (Japan Times Weekly [Tokyo] 1991b, 1).  
Gorbachev’s misunderstanding of Tokyo’s Soviet policy was likely in part due to the 
Ozawa Moscow mission to exchange the southern Kuriles for $26 billion in economic 
aid to the Soviet Union which occurred only a month earlier.  Japan’s Russia policy 
would only become more complex as the Soviet Union fell and the newly formed 
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Russian Federation found itself in severe need of economic assistance from the 
international community. 
Hashimoto’s Perceptions of Soviet-Japanese Relations 
 Hashimoto’s first public comments on Japan’s policy toward the Soviet Union 
were in 1991.  At the G-7 summit that summer, Finance Minister Hashimoto stressed 
that Japan would maintain its position on linking economics with politics (Sankei 
[Tokyo] 1991, 10).  In response to the United States and western European countries 
that were being critical of Japan for its lack of support to the ailing Soviet Union, 
Hashimoto stated “the U.S. and European position on Gorbachev reforms…had been 
shifted from ‘perestroika support’ to ‘chaos support’” (Sankei [Tokyo] 1991, 10).  He 
continued in the newspaper interview by indicating that “Japan might have to review its 
position” (Sankei [Tokyo] 1991, 10).  These comments came just two years after Japan 
had already reformed its Soviet policy from the unity of politics and economics to the 
expanded equilibrium.  Evidently, Hashimoto was already dissatisfied with the 
expanded equilibrium and sought another adjustment to the foreign policy. 
Settlement Seeming Imminent Amid Changes 
The New York Times featured an item on September 11, 1991 entitled “Japanese 
Find Signs of Hope for Solution of Island Dispute,” in which the writer articulated;  
Japanese officials said today there was a new basis for hope that Boris N. Yeltsin 
and other leaders in the Soviet Union were more prepared to solve a 
longstanding territorial dispute that has soured relations and blocked 
consideration of large scale Japanese aid (Weisman 1991, A7). 
 
The wording in this article recognizes the unity of economics and politics by describing 
the territorial dispute had “blocked consideration” of significant aid from Tokyo.   
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 This theme of optimistic results and the strong unity of economics and politics in 
Japan’s foreign policy to the Soviet Union was reiterated the next day in the New York 
Times piece “Aid at Any Price,” in which the author chose the wording; “By…hinting 
that four Kurile islands might after all be returned to Japan, Soviet and Russian leaders 
have, in effect abandoned pride and begun begging for economic aid for their collapsing 
economies” (Whitney 1991, A13).   
 Other articles written in this two year period utilized terminology such as 
“Russian leaders, anxious for Japanese aid, appear more ready than ever before to settle 
a territorial dispute” in the Oregonian (Read, 1991, A8), “there are the Kurile 
Islands…which Gorbachev could offer in exchange for a dramatic new investment 
program” in Rolling Stone (Walker 1991, 36), and  
Russian officials began talking about handing back to Japan the southern Kurile 
Islands, which were seized at the end of World War II.  Tokyo has insisted on 
return of the islands as its principal condition for Japanese participation in any 
major aid program,  
 
featured in Time magazine (Church and Carney 1991, 32).  The common theme in all 
three items is the possibility, at least, that the islands would be transferred, and that the 
transfer would result in increased bilateral economic development between the two 
countries.  Media reports have not conveyed such a positive message of an imminent 
settlement of the southern Kurile Island dispute since this time.  The Japanese would 
soon find out the strategy of unity of economics and politics with the newly formed 
Russian Federation would prove to be more difficult than with its predecessor. 
A Final Aid-for-Islands Package 
As the Soviet Union was in its final months of existence in the fall of 1991, the 
Japanese government appeared to be espousing a new approach to Soviet policy in 
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contrast to the unity of economics and politics.  The Japanese cabinet approved a $2.5 
billion economic aid package in credits and trade insurance for the Soviet Union labeled 
“without conditions” (Nimmo 1994, 117).  However, when Foreign Minister Taro 
Nakayama arrived in Moscow for a meeting with the Soviet Foreign Minister Boris 
Pankin, Nakayama explained that the aid would be given “without conditions” only 
after the territorial dispute was solved (Nimmo 1994, 117).   
Realizing that no agreement would be made under these circumstances, the two 
foreign ministers began adjusting their positions.  Pankin promised a 30 percent 
reduction of Soviet troops in the disputed territories while Nakayama proposed the 
formulation of a Soviet-Russian-Japanese committee to make plans for the distribution 
of the economic aid (Japan Digest [Arlington, VA] 1991, 11).  The agreement was 
postponed by Pankin who explained he would have to discuss it with other members of 
the Foreign Ministry, but without a final agreement the Japanese implemented the 
proposal, albeit slowly, knowing that providing the economic aid without directly 
linking it to the territorial dispute would not be disputed by the Russian leadership 
(Japan Digest [Arlington, VA] 1991, 11).  In 1993 only $700 million in trade insurance 
from the $2.5 billion proposal was delivered (Nikkei Weekly [Tokyo] 1993, 1).  By 2003, 
slightly more than $700 million of the $2.5 billion proposal was issued in the forms of 
export credits and trade insurance (MOFA 2004).  Nakayama’s request for the 
unconditional economic aid with the condition that the territorial dispute must first be 
settled was simply disregarded by the Soviets, Russians, Japanese, and eventually, 
himself as he was the architect of the compromises made with Pankin. 
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The Development of a ‘Russia Policy’ 
 
Negotiating with a ‘New’ Russia 
 When the Russian Federation was established in early 1992, Japanese leaders 
were careful not to make any changes to their foreign policy so that their existing policy 
with the Soviet Union would remain with Russia (Carlile 1994, 416).  With 
independence movements occurring throughout the former Soviet republics and 
questions of territorial uncertainties rising, the Japanese assumed the time was right to 
regain the southern Kuriles from a volatile Russia (Miyazawa 1992, 10).  In a speech at 
a LDP seminar, Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa proclaimed “Now is the time to 
resolve the dispute with Russia, though it has been taking a lot of time to do so” 
(Miyazawa 1992, 10).  Moscow discovered that the Japanese had no intention of 
changing their foreign policy when Japanese Foreign Minister Watanabe declared that 
the Japanese government would be flexible only after “Russia would recognize Japanese 
sovereignty over the four islands” (The Economist [London] 1992a, 41). 
 Yeltsin was clear in his response to Japan maintaining its Soviet/Russian foreign 
policy in the Munich G-7 summit.  At the summit, Miyazawa pressured participants to 
agree in a joint declaration; “We welcome Russia’s commitment to a foreign policy 
based on the principle of law and justice.  We believe that this represents a basis for full 
normalization of the Russian-Japanese relationship through resolving the territorial 
issue” (Asahi Shimbun [Tokyo] 1992, 1).  Yeltsin responded, “I have no intention of 
discussing any territorial issue with Japan…The point is that the problem of the so-
called Northern Territories is not on the agenda of the G-7.  This is absolutely a matter 
between Russia and Japan” (Asahi Shimbun [Tokyo] 1992, 1).   
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Watanabe’s declaration that Japan would maintain the hard line diplomacy that it 
had with the Soviet Union along with Miyazawa strategy at Munich to bolster 
international involvement in the territorial dispute forced the fragile Russian leadership 
to refrain from territorial discussions until the Japanese would offer economic assistance.  
This was evident when Yeltsin twice cancelled trips to Tokyo in October 1992 and May 
1993, facing strong pressure from members of the Russian parliament. 
Beginning in 1992 a more pessimistic view on the progress made by seikei 
fukabun toward a territorial settlement could be detected in media reports.  The piece 
“Westward No?” from The Economist’s July 4, 1992 issue asserted that “Japan’s claim 
to [the southern Kuriles] is preventing closer relations [with Russia], and the dispute 
shows few signs of resolution” (The Economist [London] 1992b, 21).  In Izvestiya, 
Sergey Agafonov reported,  
All these elements taken together enable observes to say with sufficient 
justification that bilateral relations have reached a certain borderline beyond 
which a sample choice emerges.  Either a period of cooling is coming…or  a 
new compromise will be found which will remove the present tension.  Can 
Tokyo “throttle back” and avoid pinning its partner to the wall?   (Agafonov 
1992, 5). 
 
Relations soured in July 1992 when the vice president of Japan’s ruling LDP, Shin 
Kanemaru, referred to the leaders of the Russian government as “liars,” when discussing 
economic aid to Russia (Kyodo [Tokyo] 1992).  On Radio Moscow, commentator 
Valeriy Tsvotarev clarified the opinions of the Russian media;  
At the diplomatic level, the two sides seem to have exhausted all the legal and 
historical arguments concerning this issue.  The only solution now seems to lie 
in some political settlement.  As is known to all, however, politics is something 
that cannot be easily pursued (Tsvotarev 1992).”  
  
He added,  
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In Japan, there are still many people who support taking a hardline against 
Russia.  Nevertheless, it is quite obvious that radical views or an emotional 
approach will only serve as a braking device to the settlement of the issue, which 
is difficult to solve” (Tsvotarev 1992). 
 
In the February 7, 1992 New York Times, the article “Dispute Over Seized Islands 
Delays Tokyo Aid to Russia” describes Japan’s foreign policy; “Japan has found to its 
dismay that Russia appears even less willing or able to make concessions demanded by 
Tokyo on [the territorial dispute]” (Weisman 1992, A7).  Furthermore, “prospects for 
large-scale economic aid to halt Russia’s economic slide remain elusive” (Weisman 
1992, A7).  Combining Tokyo’s reluctance to support an ailing Russia, its request to 
maintain the territorial dispute at the forefront bilateral discussion, as well as 
inappropriate statements by government officials about the Russian Government, the 
encouraged reports on concluding the territorial dispute in 1990 and 1991 was replaced 
by less enthusiasm in 1992.  Furthermore, statements made by the Russian media 
conveyed disillusionment and frustration with Tokyo’s strict adherence to their foreign 
policy. 
 In the years following the establishment of the Russian Federation, the newly 
formed country found itself amidst financial chaos and political instability.  The United 
States and western European countries pursued a politically stable, democratic Russia, 
and provided billions of dollars of economic aid for the restoration of stability therein 
(Newnham 2001, 250).  However, Japan remained reluctant to provide unconstrained 
support to Russia, based on its foreign policy which linked economic ties to a solution 
on the southern Kuriles (Newnham 2001, 250).   
Voicing a concern for many in the West, American President Clinton was noted 
in the Washington Post as “pushing the Japanese to put aside temporarily their claim to 
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four bleak islands off Hokkaido…and, for a change, to take on a superpower role by 
coordinating the multinational aid effort to bail out Yeltsin’s democratic and capitalist 
reforms” (Doi and Willenson 1993, c1).  Harsher comments were made about Japan’s 
Russia policy from other Western leaders.  German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel 
declared with frustration, “the Japanese are the main obstacle” to the rescue of Russian 
democracy, while French President Francois Mitterrand commented even as other G-7 
governments supported “emergency” discussions on aid to Russia, “the one that has a 
peculiar attitude is Japan” (Doi and Willenson 1993, c1).  Facing increasing 
international criticism for its lack of support for Russia, along with Russian President 
Boris Yeltsin’s twice cancelled trips to Tokyo, the Japanese reluctantly decided to 
provide limited economic aid for Russia, but maintained that politics and economics 
would remain united under the expanded equilibrium (Carlile 1994, 415-16). 
 Once Japan began providing additional foreign economic aid to Russia, Russo-
Japanese relations were described in a somewhat more positive atmosphere; however, 
the perplexity of Japan’s Russian policy was often noted.  In the May 7, 1993 New York 
Times, Japanese officials were portrayed as “[tying] themselves in knots trying to 
describe a new policy toward Russia that loosened the linage between aid and the return 
of the islands” (Sanger 1993, A6).  Furthermore,  
It was clear that Japan’s Russia policy is in considerable disarray.  Under 
pressure from the West to give more aid, Tokyo appears to have lost much of its 
leverage on the islands issue.  Its only carrot now is the promise of future 
“massive aid” if Moscow can move toward a long-term solution to the islands 
issue (Sanger 1993, A6). 
 
The reluctant acceptance of the Japanese to provide foreign aid to Russia without 
seeking a prior settlement on the islands dispute and thus, circumventing its own foreign 
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policy verifies the steady disconnection of economics and politics.  This is an obvious 
indication that there were forces that pushed the Japanese to modify their foreign policy 
with Russia. 
Yeltsin in Japan 
 Yeltsin finally made his official visit to Tokyo in October 1993 where he and 
Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa signed the Tokyo Declaration.  Within the 
document,  
both sides agreed to proceed with negotiations in order to sign the Peace Treaty 
as soon as possible by solving the territorial issue on the basis of historical and 
juridical facts and documents worked out through agreements between the two 
countries, as well as the principles of law and justice and by this fully normalize 
bilateral relations (Tokyo Declaration 1993, 4). 
 
The Tokyo Declaration would be the basis for future Russo-Japanese discussions.  By 
signing this declaration, Yeltsin had admitted to solving the territorial dispute as a 
prerequisite to normalized bilateral relations, something no Soviet leader would do.  In 
this respect, seikei fukabun and the expanded equilibrium were successful because the 
Russian leader had acknowledged that solving the territorial dispute would be done prior 
to normalized relations. 
By comparing the Tokyo Declaration to the Soviet-Japanese joint communiqué 
of 1986, it is interesting to note the progression of terminology.  Both documents 
identify the negotiations for a bilateral peace treaty, but the Tokyo Declaration went 
further stressing the need for the peace treaty “as soon as possible.”  Furthermore, where 
the 1986 Soviet-Japanese statement identifies “various problems” impeding a treaty, the 
Tokyo Declaration identified the “territorial issue” as the barrier to truly normalized 
relations.  In this respect, seikein fukabun and the expanded equilibrium were successful 
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in forcing the territorial dispute onto the table in Russo-Japanese relations.  However, 
the Japanese would have to consider that the deliberate defiance of the current foreign 
policy, which would not allow economic developments without prior successes in the 
territorial dispute, was a benefiting factor for the formulation of the Tokyo Declaration.  
The question for the Japanese was whether the Tokyo Declaration was a successful 
result mostly of seikei fukabun and the expanded equilibrium, rather than the defiance of 
these foreign policies.  Hashimoto’s formulation of a multilayered approach to foreign 
policy with Russia proves that he judged the latter to be the case, as he presented a 
foreign policy which promoted the development of economics with Russia without a 
prior solution to the territorial dispute. 
Hashimoto Plan; The Divorce of Economics and Politics 
 Russo-Japanese relations were marked with profound developments in 1993 
with the Tokyo Declaration in which Russia and Japan agreed to negotiate “towards an 
early conclusion of the peace treaty through the solution of [the territorial issue] on the 
basis of historical and legal facts” (Tokyo Declaration 1993, 4).  The year 1994 saw 
tremendous economic development in Russo-Japanese relations.  Coming off the Tokyo 
Declaration with a renewed enthusiasm, Tokyo boosted its amount of aid to Moscow.  
Meanwhile, an earthquake hit the southern Kuriles in October, providing the Japanese 
an opportunity to offer much needed aid to the residents of the southern Kuriles as well 
(Hasegawa 2000a, 195-96).  Then in November, developments went a step further when 
the Hashimoto Plan was announced which would develop the bilateral economic ties in 
Siberia and the Russian Far East.   
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Also in 1994, Hashimoto’s book, Vision of Japan was published, in which he 
outlined his goals for Japan in various aspects of government and society.  In the chapter 
on foreign policy Hashimoto elaborated on misunderstandings he frequently had with 
Europeans and America regarding Russia; 
I found at the G-7 and other meetings that in discussions about assistance to 
Russia, my talks with the Europeans often struck a common chord but still 
usually wound up off course.  After listening closely to their words and putting 
things in perspective, I realized that the Russia that they were referring to lay 
west of the Ural Mountains.  The eastern sections of Russia did not register.   
In contrast, the Russia I had in mind did not include anything west of the Urals 
except for Moscow.  The Russia that interested me could roughly be defined as 
‘Moscow plus anything east of Lake Baikal’ and at most ‘Moscow plus 
anything east of the Ural mountains (Hashimoto 1994, 79). 
 
Hashimoto continued by elaborating on misunderstandings with Americans regarding 
Russia; 
When discussing assistance to Russia with the U.S., it is necessary to clarify at 
each point whether the focus is the entire former Soviet Union or specifically 
the Russian Far East, which includes Japan’s northern territories.  It is too late 
to realize these differences in perception after signing a joint statement 
(Hashimoto 1994, 80). 
 
Within these texts, Hashimoto reveals his frustrations with European and American 
pressure upon Japan to build relations with Russia.  Basing these frustrations on 
misunderstandings, he goes further by clarifying “Japan’s northern territories” as part of 
Russia which interests him and his country.  These differing notions of spatial 
perceptions of Russia between Hashimoto and Western leaders allude to the frustrations 
he was having while promoting the issues that occur in the Russian Far East, 
particularly the disputed territories. 
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 In November 1994, serving as trade minister1, Hashimoto was able to apply 
these interests in mutual benefits for Russia and Japan when he met with Russian First 
Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets to discuss an aid package which came to be 
known as the Hashimoto Plan.  The proposal was intended to smooth out a three year 
Russian economic reform program by enhancing aid in three areas: export promotion, 
industrial restructuring, and forming industrial policies (BBC Monitoring Service: Asia-
Pacific [Tokyo] 1994).  As a starter to the plan, Hashimoto and Soskovets agreed to 
promote large-scale bilateral projects, such as the development of oil and natural gas on 
Sakhalin Island, and to resume talks on trade insurance coverage for an oil project by 
Russian oil company, LUKOIL in West Siberia (Agence France-Presse [Paris] 1994).  
Also included, Japan would increase the number of personnel sent to Siberia to assist in 
the training of workers in management practices and efficiency (Newnham 2001, 252).  
The Hashimoto Plan was an enormous step in strengthening Russo-Japanese economic 
ties, yet it directly defied the outdated expanded equilibrium, which did not permit 
significant economic advances with Russia without prior progress on the territorial 
dispute.  It was, however, indicative of the frustrations and interests Hashimoto 
expressed in his book on problems in developing Russo-Japanese economic ties. 
Election Cycles Pass 
 Throughout 1995 and early 1996 few developments occurred in Russo-Japanese 
relations, providing for a small number of speeches and media reports to note trends in 
Japan’s foreign policy with Russia.  The Asian Wall Street Journal claimed Japan was  
                                                          
1
 Hashimoto served as Minister of Health and Welfare, Minister of Transportation, secretary general of the 
LDP, and Finance Minister before being appointed to Trade Minister in June 1994 under Japan’s first prime 
minister of the Socialist Party, Tomiichi Murayama (Pollack 1996, A2). 
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“playing a waiting game, convinced that Russia’s decline in Asia will eventually force it 
to relinquish control of the islands,” perhaps testing the waters for a new foreign policy 
which never crystallized (Wimbush, 1996, 8).  However, given that such a decline was 
not certain in the near future, the suggestion was somewhat unlikely.  A more likely 
proposition was that both sides were waiting out their respective 1996 elections, 
knowing that during a campaign each side would likely present itself as hawkish in 
discussions on the territorial issue in order to gain popular support (Kakuchi 1996).   
After the Russian summer election and the Japanese autumn election in 1996, 
both sides seemed eager to discuss bilateral developments.  Autumn 1996 media reports 
from the Inter Press Service, Reuters Newswire, and The Asian Wall Street Journal all 
indicated that both Russian and Japanese officials were eager to not only discuss 
economic development, but also discuss the territorial dispute.  This indicates a 
softening of the Russian foreign policy with Japan, which consistently sought to develop 
economic relations while overlooking the territorial dispute.  The Japanese change of 
foreign policy in 1997 would appear to be a response to the Russians relaxing their 
policy with Japan in late 1996.   
 
Russian Suggestions for Tokyo (and Hashimoto) 
 
Panov’s Influence 
As seen with the lack of media reports and government statements, Russo-
Japanese relations remained largely stagnant in the political sphere as both countries 
prepared for elections to be held in 1996.  In July 1996, Russian Deputy Foreign 
Minister Aleksandr Panov requested that the Japanese “stop linking economic relations 
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to the return of the disputed islands,” noting that Tokyo’s “foreign policy was restricting 
the development of bilateral ties” (Valliant 1999, 159).  Panov went further by 
suggesting Tokyo lift a ban on investment and trade with the southern Kuriles, citing 
that “it would benefit bilateral economic developments” (Valliant 1999, 160).  Two 
months later, Panov became ambassador to Japan (Valliant 1999, 160).  By moving to 
Tokyo and serving as Russian ambassador, Panov’s suggestions and views on foreign 
policy would be heard by MOFA and the Prime Minister.  It is unknown whether 
Hashimoto took Panov’s suggestions into account, but it is likely that Panov was able to 
express his suggestions and ideas directly to Hashimoto in late 1996. 
Primakov’s Influence 
In January 1996, Yevgeniy Primakov became the Russian foreign minister.  
Primakov, a former director of the Institute of Oriental Studies and self proclaimed 
“orientalist” (Strokan 1996), favored a “look east” policy for Russia which would turn 
Russian diplomatic attention to the bordering countries in Central and East Asia 
(Shimotomai 1999, 34).  One of Primakov’s outlined objectives as foreign minister was 
to “undertake a more active and professional foreign policy in the East, striving to 
balance the western and eastern directions in Russian policy” (Sarkisov 2000, 225).  In 
comparison to Yeltsin and Primakov’s predecessor, Andrei Kozyrev, who were known 
for their “westward-looking” stances on foreign policy, Primakov would prove to be the 
first Russian representative to take a balanced consideration of relations with the West 
and Russia’s easterly neighbors (Strokan 1996). 
Aside from the Tokyo Declaration, Yeltsin’s diplomacy with Japan was marked 
by irregularities and inconsistency.  His Japan diplomacy record included a five-stage 
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proposal to solve the territorial dispute in January 1990 which was largely ignored by 
the Soviet and Japanese leaders because he was not representing the entire Soviet state, 
the twice-cancelled trips to Tokyo in 1992 and 1993, and the eccentric emotional 
outbursts such as the one in July 1992; “Japan has not invested one yen or one cent in 
Russia at all” (Japan Times [Tokyo] 1992a, 1).  By appointing the experienced 
Primakov as foreign minister, Yeltsin proved that he was prepared to take Russo-
Japanese relations more seriously in the future and that the formulation of a more 
pragmatic foreign policy with Japan which stressed bilateral development was imminent. 
Upon being appointed foreign minister in January 1996, Primakov made the 
suggestion to Tokyo “that the [territorial] issue should be left to future generations” 
(Valliant 1999, 160). He proceeded in 1996 to press for stronger Russo-Japanese 
relations by outlining Russia’s new foreign policy with Japan:  
(1) remove the traditional imbalance in Russian foreign policy in East Asia, the 
weakest point of which was relations with Japan stalemated by the territorial 
dispute; (2) to create a new configuration of powers in the region, facilitate 
cooperation among the major powers, including the United States; (3) to avoid a 
unilateral slant in relations with China by counterbalancing these with relations 
with Japan, thus forestalling a situation in which China’s power may become 
overwhelmingly strong; (4) to secure Japanese support for Russia’s entry into 
regional structures, especially APEC; and (5) to attract Japanese direct 
investment and technology into the Russian Far East and Siberia (Sarkisov 2000, 
226). 
 
Primakov’s well constructed and detailed foreign policy with Japan was the first Soviet 
or Russian policy which recognized that normalizing relations with Japan would not be 
done within one pen stroke.  Rather, it would be done in slow, incremental movements 
to build a favorable environment.  
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Hashimoto’s Turn to Respond 
 Primakov’s suggestion for future generations to solve the territorial dispute as 
well as his new pro-East Russian foreign diplomacy paved the way for a reaction from 
Hashimoto and MOFA.  Three options were available.  Hashimoto could balk at the 
Russian opportunity to warm relations for the mutual benefit in the balance of 
economics and power in East Asia and shelve the territorial dispute for future 
generations.  In doing so, he would be turning back to the tenets of seikei fukabun 
whereby Russia must return the islands prior to Japan accepting the building of bilateral 
economic relations. Secondly, he could embrace the new Russian policy and reciprocate 
with a warmer Japanese policy.  Lastly, he could have made no change to the Japanese 
foreign policy at all.   
The third option was not likely.  If the Japanese truly wanted to see success in 
the territorial dispute, they would need to reciprocate the Russian change in policy.  In 
the Japanese perspective, the appointment of Primakov to foreign minister and the 
creation of a new, softer Russian foreign policy greatly modified the dynamics of the 
bilateral relationship.  By doing nothing, the Japanese would be proving they were 
disinterested in normalizing relations and thus, solving the territorial dispute.  
Furthermore, the current Japanese foreign policy to Russia was being radically 
disregarded by the building of economic relations through means such as the 1994 
Hashimoto Plan without seeking advancement of Japanese aims directly linked to the 
territorial dispute.  The necessity for a change in Japan’s Russia policy was long 
overdue. 
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 The first option seemed impermissible in that relations were already being 
strengthened by the Tokyo Declaration, the Hashimoto Plan, and the increase of 
Japanese aid and economic development programs to Russia.  By turning back to a hard 
line policy such as the unity of economics and politics, the Japanese would have to 
abandon these bilateral developments.  Furthermore, if the Japanese proposed such a 
policy, Russo-Japanese relations would fall back to a sort of small-scale cold war 
between the two countries.  Moreover, the Japanese would likely face a greater amount 
of international criticism beyond that which they faced from the West in 1992, when 
they held to a rigid demand for the islands in exchange for economic development.  In 
this case, positive developments regarding the territorial dispute would be highly 
unlikely.  Obligated to respond to Russia’s new policy with a Japanese policy which 
would not revert relations back to the early 1990’s, Hashimoto sought a softer policy 
toward Russia. 
 
The Setting for a Change in Foreign Policy 
 
A Strategic Partnership in Northeast Asia 
 Since making amends after World War II and agreeing to long term security 
alliances, the Japanese-American security bloc has been practically inseparable as both 
countries have cooperated closely in northeast Asian geopolitical affairs.  To many, the 
Japanese self defense forces are viewed as an extension of the American military based 
in East Asia (Brzezinski 1997b, 156).  Even more, the Japanese-American alliance is 
essential to the Japanese who lack strong alliances with their historic regional 
adversaries, China and Russia.  However, as Japan seeks a broader role in international 
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political affairs, indicated by the Japanese aspiration to become a permanent United 
Nations Security Council member as well as the expanded use of the Self Defense 
Forces abroad, this Japanese-American bloc could perhaps loosen in the coming years. 
It is obvious to many who observe geopolitical affairs in northeast Asia that 
China is emerging not only as a regional power, but a global power (Rozman 2000a, 
381).  In addition, North Korea serves as the principal source of unpredictability and 
volatility in the region.   In response to these issues, Tokyo must seek measures to 
restrain this rise of Chinese regional hegemony and align itself in a coalition against 
North Korea as it seeks to balance the regional distribution of power and ensure national 
security. 
Japanese leaders understand this geopolitical landscape quite well.  As explained 
by an unidentified officer from MOFA,  
the major threat for Japan comes from China and North Korea.  We need to use 
a ‘Russian card’ in the interests of national security.  Japan needs to 
complement the defense alliance with the United States with a strategic 
partnership with Russia able to restrict Beijing’s claim for hegemony in East 
Asia, as well as Pyongyang’s unpredictability (Golovnin 2000). 
  
It is probable that Hashimoto considered the geopolitical landscape in northeast Asia 
and Japan’s role as the only power which can counter China’s regional hegemony in the 
near future when he crafted Japan’s Russia policy in 1997.  In addition, broadening their 
alliances in the region will assist in ensuring that the Japanese, along with their allies, 
can effectively negotiate with North Korea.  By warming relations with Russia, Japan 
can counter China’s rise to regional hegemony, have the alliances necessary to contend 
with North Korea, and by default, recognize that the territorial dispute would only be 
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solved through Russo-Japanese trust, the mutual benefit, and the upholding of a long-
term perspective. 
The Effects of Internal Politics in Japan 
 In terms of governmental reform and the political system in Japan, it is 
understandable why Hashimoto chose to be proactive in his foreign policies as well as a 
reformer on domestic policies.  The LDP had retained the prime ministry from 1955 to 
1993.  From August 1993 until Murayama’s resignation in January 1996, the position of 
Prime Minister was occupied by members of other, less-significant minority parties.  
Clearly, the LDP members sought to change their image which was losing popularity 
among voters, indicated by the fact that the party had lost its control of the Diet and the 
office of Prime Minister.   
 Hashimoto was the first LDP member to occupy the Prime Minister’s position 
after a two and a half year hiatus.  It was his responsibility to change the image of the 
party among the voters who elected the Diet members.  Domestic and foreign policies 
must be effective and beneficial to the voters under LDP leadership.  Known for his 
abilities in developing Russo-Japanese economic relations after the initiation of the 
1994 Hashimoto Plan, it is evident that Hashimoto exercised this need to demonstrate 
beneficial reforms by changing Japan’s Russia policy whereby the Japanese voters 
would realize they had benefited from a LDP administration. 
Toward a New Russia Policy 
 In his acceptance speech to the Diet on January 22, 1996, Hashimoto proclaimed 
his priority was to develop “a proactive foreign policy position for the furthering of 
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peace and prosperity” (speech by Hashimoto, Vital Speeches of the Day, 1996).  He 
continued,  
In the field of foreign policy, my basic stance is to take a proactive approach. 
Rather than continuing to take the international political and economic situation 
as a given, Japan should, advancing beyond the traditional concept of 
international contribution, take active initiatives on its own for world stability 
and development while postulating ideals that the rest of the international 
community will embrace.  This is also, I am confident, the best way to ensure 
our own security and prosperity in today’s increasingly interdependent world 
(speech by Hashimoto, Vital Speeches of the Day, 1996). 
 
Within this passage, Hashimoto took a globalist’s approach by explaining that the 
Japanese should be “postulating ideals” which others in the international community 
will accept.  The building of trust and a mutually beneficial relationship with Russia 
qualifies as an ideal the international community, and moreover, Russia would accept. 
 Hashimoto continued in his speech, mentioning the significance and 
developments in relations with Russia: 
This year marking the 40th anniversary of the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration 
that opened the way for the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries, we will, watching the political situation in Russia carefully, make 
even greater efforts to resolve the Northern Territories issue, thereby achieving 
a full normalization of relations, based on the Tokyo Declaration, and we very 
much hope the government of Russia will also make a serious effort to address 
this issue (speech by Hashimoto, Vital Speeches of the Day, 1996). 
  
Hashimoto mentioned here that the developments in Russo-Japanese relations are linked 
to “the political situation in Russia.”  Perhaps this is an advanced disclosure that 
Hashimoto had been studying the details of reforming Japan’s Russia policy and would 
attempt to tactfully maintain the emphasis on the territorial dispute when working with 
the Russian leaders. 
 The last hint that Hashimoto would present a new, more forthcoming Russian 
foreign policy was in April 1996 when he attended a G-7 summit in Moscow.  When 
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Hashimoto expressed interest in building Russo-Japanese relations to Bill Clinton, the 
American President responded that it was in American interests to see the normalization 
of Russo-Japanese relations (Sarkisov 2000, 230-31).  Furthermore, Clinton suggested 
Hashimoto should “establish good personal relations with Yeltsin” in order to develop 
the relationship between the countries (Valliant 1999, 159).  By the end of the summits, 
Yeltsin had agreed to cut the number of Russian troops on the disputed islands to 3,500, 
and the two had agreed to conduct peace talks after the 1996 elections (Valliant 1999, 
159).  Clinton’s suggestion to Hashimoto would have a significant impact in the 
following two years as the Russian and Japanese leaders would conduct a series of 
informal “no neck-tie” summits, building personal friendships along the way. 
 
 
Outcomes 
 
Evaluation of Media and Official Statements 
As noted from the media sources and official statements from the mid-1980’s, 
when seikei fukabun and the entrance approach to foreign policy with Russia were 
implemented to their demise along with the expanded equilibrium and the establishment 
of the multilayered approach to foreign policy with Russia in 1997, shifts in foreign 
policy were evident.  At first, the Japanese seemed secure with the unity of economics 
and politics throughout their relations with the Soviet Union, but as the Russian 
Federation emerged in 1992 the policy seemed outdated and ineffective.  In 1993 under 
international pressure, the Japanese began revising the principles of their Russia policy 
by providing significant economic aid without associated progress on the territorial 
dispute (Sanger 1993, A6). 
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By comparing the terminology of the 1993 Tokyo Declaration to the 1986 
Soviet-Japanese joint communiqué, one can note the incremental movements in bilateral 
relations, and the Russians’ willingness to finally acknowledge the territorial dispute.  
Furthermore, it can be assumed that Hashimoto noted the best method to proceed in 
bilateral developments and discussions on the territorial dispute was to ease the 
Japanese hard-lined policies with Russia. 
The modification of the unity of economics and politics as well as the expanded 
equilibrium reached its peak in November 1994 with the Hashimoto Plan.  In 1995 and 
early 1996, few developments took place in Russo-Japanese foreign political relations, 
due most likely to the upcoming elections in both countries.  In late 1996, both sides 
were expressing interest not only in economic development but also in finding a 
solution to the territorial dispute.  In late 1996, Russian Foreign Minister Primakov 
presented a new, more accommodating foreign policy to Japan which put forward an 
opportunity for Hashimoto to reciprocate with a new Japanese foreign policy to Russia.  
In addition to Primakov’s new Japan policy, the suggestions for improving Russo-
Japanese relations made by Panov are strikingly akin to Japan’s 1997 Russia policy, and 
it can be assumed that Hashimoto considered the suggestions offered to him.  Japan’s 
change in foreign policy with Russia could be a response to the rise of China as a 
dominant regional power in northeast Asia.  As elaborated in the statement from a 
MOFA official, by forming an alliance with Russia, Japan can counter China’s eventual 
claim for regional hegemony with an American as well as a Russian alliance.  From the 
collection of world media reports and official statements, these factors led to the 
Japanese change of foreign policy with Russia in 1997 to the multilayered approach. 
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Results from Unsuccessful Aid-for-Islands Proposals 
The first aid-for-islands proposal by Kanumaru in April 1990 represented a 
prominent Japanese politician’s desire to solve the territorial dispute.  Although neither 
the Prime Minister nor MOFA had even sanctioned such a proposal, it was completely 
in accordance with the unity of economics and politics.  Even more, it was a proactive 
diplomatic move which was too bold for the Prime Minister and MOFA to neither 
sanction nor propose.  It was simply an expert’s attempt to make progress on the 
territorial dispute after 45 years of stagnation. 
The second proposal by Ozawa in March 1991 was the only true and direct 
attempt by the Japanese to utilize the strength of their economic clout in order to regain 
the southern Kuriles.  Ozawa presented a substantial economic aid package ($26 billion), 
calculating that this was the time when the Soviet leader would agree to take the much 
needed aid in exchange for the remote islands.  But as Gorbachev proclaimed there 
would be no exchanges of the sort.  Ozawa’s mission was the best example of the unity 
of economics and politics in action, yet it was too impulsive to be considered an act of 
the expanded equilibrium, which called for incremental acts to success. 
The third proposal by Nakayama in October 1991 appeared as an act classified 
under the unity of economics and politics in that he first proposed an agreement would 
be made after a solution to the territorial dispute had been reached.  However, it was 
clearly in step with the expanded equilibrium as incremental steps were made in the 
economic aid package along with Soviet, and later Russian, progress on the territorial 
dispute.  Nakayama’s $2.5 billion proposal paled in comparison to Ozawa’s $26 billion 
proposal, yet Nakayama’s proposal had been acted upon and steps were taken on the 
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territorial dispute as a result of the package.  In this respect, Nakayama’s proposal was 
the most successful, and thus, offering a softer policy such as the expanded equilibrium, 
was more successful in making progress on the territorial dispute than the hard line 
unity of economics and politics.   
It is possible that Hashimoto took into consideration the Soviet and later, 
Russian reactions to these aid-for-islands proposals and the successes and failures 
thereof.  By noting that the softer, more lenient proposal bore more fruit with mutual 
benefits for both sides, Hashimoto would be inclined to formulate an even softer foreign 
policy whereby trust and mutual respect would create an atmosphere conducive to 
bilateral development and through incremental steps a solution to the territorial dispute 
in the long-term.  By offering aid-for-islands proposals, the Soviets and later, Russians 
felt as if the Japanese were being condescending, and not treating the once global 
superpower as an equal.  This sentiment was evident in the statement by Gorbachev that 
such an “approach is humiliating” (Japan Times Weekly [Tokyo] 1991b, 1).  By 
analyzing the Japanese aid-for-islands proposals and how the moderately successful 
proposal advanced trust and mutual respect for both parties, it can be assumed that 
Hashimoto would be inclined to formulate a warmer policy with Russia with mutual 
economic developments and incremental achievements towards a solution on the 
territorial dispute. 
Conclusions Drawn from Hashimoto’s Perceptions of Russia 
It can be assumed that Hashimoto had sought a revision of the Japanese foreign 
policy with the Soviet Union and later, Russia.  Evidence of this assumption can be seen 
as early as 1991 when as finance minister, Hashimoto admitted that Japan’s Soviet 
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policy was not satisfactory.  In his 1994 book Vision of Japan, Hashimoto expressed his 
frustrations with the West when dealing with aid to Russia.  In addition, throughout his 
book, Hashimoto discussed issues he was contemplating which were relevant to Japan’s 
Russia policy.  By enacting the Hashimoto Plan he was able to strengthen Russo-
Japanese economic development, and make his first direct impact on Russo-Japanese 
relations.  It can be assumed that by challenging the linked economics with politics, 
Hashimoto was pushing for a newer foreign policy to develop closer Russo-Japanese 
relations. 
During the earlier part of Hashimoto’s tenure as Prime Minister, additional evidence 
was revealed which led to the 1997 foreign policy change.  First, by interpreting 
Hashimoto’s inaugural speech, recognizing his globalist slant, and taking into account 
his admittance that he was considering the “political situation in Russia” in early 1996, 
it is possible that Hashimoto was already working on revising the foreign policy with 
Russia upon his inauguration into the office of Prime Minister.  Also from his inaugural 
speech, it can be assumed that by declaring a “proactive” foreign policy based on 
Japanese domestic reform, Hashimoto was attempting to revive his political party’s 
popularity, which had been distressed in recent years with the loss of power, while 
undertaking the foreign relations with Russia at the same time.  Lastly, it can be 
understood that Clinton’s personal advice for Hashimoto in April 1996 to develop a 
private relationship with Yeltsin provided him with the motivation to hold informal 
summits with the Russian president where they would eventually make significant 
developments in Russo-Japanese relations. 
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Results 
It is noted that from 1993 Hashimoto was under the impression that a more 
friendly approach with Russia would result with increments toward a territorial solution.  
From the 1993 Tokyo Declaration, Hashimoto noted that a more welcoming strategy 
was rewarded with Russian acknowledgement of the territorial dispute.  With the 
Hashimoto Plan in 1994, Hashimoto was able to boost economic aid and deepen 
relations with Russia by defying the expanded equilibrium.  Less than three years later, 
in January 1996 Russian Foreign Minister Primakov elaborated on the territorial dispute 
as it relates to the desire to strengthen Russo-Japanese relations unlike any Russian 
official had done before him. 
It is evident the constructive and direct impact Hashimoto had on bilateral 
relations prior to his term as Prime Minister resulted with Hashimoto believing a warm, 
open foreign policy with Russia would be rewarded with greater progress towards a 
solution to the territorial dispute and the normalization of relations.  The progress made 
in the early 1990’s on account of the Tokyo Declaration and the Hashimoto Plan 
resulted in strengthened economic relations, but territorial progress was still slow.  With 
the statements made by Primakov in early 1996, perhaps it was the Russians underlying 
strategy to mollify the Japanese on economics, so bilateral economic progress could 
occur without attention placed on the territorial dispute.  Later chapters will reveal 
whether Hashimoto’s perceptible assumption to warm relations with Russia resulted in 
actual strengthened bilateral economic and political relations as well as progress towards 
a solution to the territorial dispute.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE IMPACT OF HASHIMOTO’S POLICY IN BILATERAL ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
 The January 1997 multilayered approach to foreign relations with Russia, 
outlined by Prime Minister Hashimoto, officially permitted the development of bilateral 
economic relations without any direct link to the territorial dispute.  Rather, incremental 
developments on the territorial dispute were expected only after advances in bilateral 
economic relations occurred.  Details of the new policy were outlined in seven key 
areas: 
 1) Continued negotiations on the peace treaty, including 2) the solution of the 
 Northern Territories question; 3) political dialogue between top leaders; 4) 
 assistance for Russian economic reforms; 5) negotiations with the Russian Far 
 East; 6) security dialogue; 7) and consultations for stability in Northeast Asia 
 (Asahi Shimbun [Tokyo] 1997, 1). 
 
None of these areas outlined for bilateral development were new to Russo-Japanese 
relations; however, what was different was that developments on the territorial dispute 
were not officially linked to bilateral economic progress.  The new foreign policy was 
elaborated even further in July 1997 when Hashimoto explained that trust, mutual 
benefit, and the maintenance of a long term perspective “are the principles which should 
guide us in improving Japan-Russia relations” (Speech by Hashimoto 1997a).  Clearly, 
seikei fukabun, the expanded equilibrium, and any entrance approach to foreign policy 
with Russia were laid to rest.  Officially, joint economic developments were free to 
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occur while the normalization of relations and the territorial dispute would be handled at 
a different layer of Russo-Japanese relations. 
 This chapter analyzes the economic growth and development of Russo-Japanese 
relations after the implementation of the 1997 multilayered approach and the methods 
that the Japanese government has utilized to encourage bilateral economic developments.  
As part of Hashimoto’s new foreign policy, the Japanese government not only allows, 
but encourages its private sector to invest in Siberia and the Russian Far East while the 
territorial dispute and thus, the normalization of relations are handled separately.  The 
latter issue is discussed in the following chapter. 
  
Japanese Corporate Resource Investment Projects in Russia 
 In Hashimoto’s July 1997 speech, the Prime Minister outlined his three axioms 
relating to Japan’s foreign policy with Russia.  Additionally, he presented the economic 
sector and geographic regions which would be central to the future advancements of 
Russo-Japanese economic development; “I propose that consideration focus on 
strengthening economic relations with Russia, especially in Siberia and the Far East 
region, and in particular, in the energy sector” (Speech by Hashimoto 1997a).  He 
continued,  
Specifically, we certainly could move ahead in dialogue on energy development 
in Siberia and the Far East between Japan and Russia.  For example, we continue 
to cooperate in the oil and natural gas projects in Sakhalin, which been [sic] 
already commenced, natural gas development projects and economic and 
technical possibility of pipeline construction projects in places like Irkutsk and 
Yakutsk, can no doubt provide opportunities for discussion and examination 
(Speech by Hashimoto 1997a). 
 
Because the Sakhalin, Irkutsk, and Yakutsk resource development projects were directly 
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pointed out in Hashimoto’s speech outlining his foreign policy with Russia and because 
they currently rank among the most feasibly lucrative of all large-scale resource 
extraction programs in Siberia and the Russian Far East, these projects will be the first 
to be discussed (Zagorsky 2001, 87).  The advances of two other potential projects in 
which Japanese corporations have expressed interest will be discussed subsequently. 
Sakhalin Oil and Natural Gas Projects 
 Currently, two oil and natural gas extraction projects exist on Sakhalin Island: 
Sakhalin-1, initially explored in 1972 and launched in 1975, and Sakhalin-2, launched in 
1996 after 12 years of explorations by competing international corporations (Sugimoto 
and Furuta 1999, 260-262).  Projects Sakhalin-3, -4, and -5 are being offered by the 
Russian government and are still being negotiated by potential buyers (Zagorsky 2001, 
87, and Interfax [Moscow] 2004).  The two active projects combined were expected to 
produce 410 million tons of oil and 692 billion cubic meters of gas in 2005 (Zagorsky 
2001, 87). 
 The Sakhalin-1 oil and natural gas project located off the northeast coast of 
Sakhalin Island was launched in 1975 by the Japanese joint stock company Sakhalin Oil 
Development Company (SODECO) and the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the Soviet 
Union (Sugimoto and Furuta 1999, 260).  Due to declining oil prices in the 1980’s and 
the limited presence of investors, extraction from the Sakhalin-1 oil and natural gas 
project was not significant to the region until 1991 when SODECO teamed up with 
American corporation Exxon and each agreed to cover 30 percent of the project’s 
expenses (Sugimoto and Furuta 1999, 260).  In 1993, the oil and natural gas project was 
expanded to include the Arktun-Dagi fields.  Two Russian corporations, Rosneft and 
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Sakhalinmorneftegas, joined the consortium two years later (Sugimoto and Furuta 1999, 
260).   
 Exploration of the Sakhalin-2 project began in 1984 with Mitsui and McDermott 
corporations forming a consortium two years later (Sugimoto and Furuta 1999, 260).  
By 1992 Mitsubishi, Marathon Oil, and Royal Dutch Shell had joined the project while 
McDermott withdrew (Yoshida 1999, 234).  The Sakhalin-3 project has been offered 
with Exxon-Mobil and Chevron-Texaco stepping forward to lead the consortium, but 
legal issues have restrained progress on the project (Sugimoto and Furuta 1999, 262). 
 As of 1999 more than 15 large Japanese corporations, including SODECO, 
Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Itochu, Japax, and the Japan National Oil Corporation (JNOC) were 
involved in the Sakhalin-1 and Sakhlain-2 consortiums with a total investment estimate 
at $25 billion (Ruzanov 1999, 209).  In total, the Japanese have more firms active at 
Sakhalin (121) than the United States (67) or South Korea (54), but the Japanese 
investments are at a much smaller scale (Vladivostok News 1998, 28).  Even more, the 
Japanese involvement in these oil and natural gas projects, in comparison to other 
international corporations, is dwindling.    At the Sakhalin-1 project in which SODECO 
was the initial contracting corporation, the company’s current share has remained at 30 
percent since 1991 while Exxon-Mobil now serves as the primary field operator 
(Zagorsky 2001, 89).  At Sakhalin-2, Royal Dutch Shell has bought up 60 percent of the 
project while the Japanese corporations combined occupy only 30 percent of the project 
(Zagorsky 2001, 89).  In addition to this, none of the Japanese corporations have yet 
expressed interest in participating in the Sakhalin-3, -4, or -5 projects. 
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 The Sakhalin oil and natural gas projects at peak outputs make up roughly eight 
percent of total Russian oil output in 1994 (Sugimoto and Furuta 1999, 263).  However, 
the projects are significant in that they can potentially play a vital role in opening the 
largely untamed Russian Far East for investment and international cooperation, 
particularly with northeast Asian countries.  Furthermore, it is a method for Moscow to 
gain more leverage in political affairs of northeast Asia as well as a key of passage for 
the Japanese to build economic ties with Russia.  Hashimoto understood this as he 
mentioned the resource possibilities of Sakhalin Islands in his July 1997 speech.  
However, it appears that Japanese involvement in these projects has not increased since 
Hashimoto implemented the new foreign policy with Russia.  Developments of Japanese 
corporations in the Sakhalin projects took place in the 1970’s through early 1990’s, but 
since then they have not increased their investments in these projects or expressed 
interest in joining in the future projects on Sakhalin. 
Irkutsk Natural Gas Fields 
 The Kovykta natural gas fields in Irkutsk province, near Lake Baikal, are 
estimated to contain between 850 billion and 1.5 trillion cubic meters of natural gas and 
80 million tons of gas condensate (Ruzanov 1999, 208, and Zagorsky 2001, 88).  If 
implemented, the project is anticipated to provide 20 million cubic meters of natural gas 
for 30 years to China, Korea, and Japan via a 2,100-mile pipeline.  Estimated 
investments on the projects are about $10 billion (Ruzanov 1999, 208-09).  An 
additional project is also being discussed in which the natural gas fields at Yakutsk and 
Krasnoyarsk Krai could be linked by extending the pipeline north and east (Ruzanov 
1999, 209). 
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 In 1996 the Russians and Chinese began talks about using the natural gas field to 
supply resource-deprived populations of northeast China (Zagorsky 2001, 88).  The 
following year Yeltsin and Hashimoto made the project a centerpiece of their Yeltsin-
Hashimoto Plan signed at the Krasnoyarsk “no neck-tie” summit by announcing a joint 
$10 billion project to develop the natural gas field and pipeline (The Economist 
[London] 1997, 34).  In early 1997 an international corporate consortium of private 
corporations including Japan’s Sumitomo, Marubeni, Nippon Steel, Tokyo Gas, and 
Osaka Gas was formed to discuss the potential for developing an Irkutsk pipeline to the 
East Asian markets (Zagorsky 2001, 88, and Ruzanov 1999, 209).  In December 1997 
JNOC officials met with representatives of China, South Korea, and Mongolia to 
discuss the project with Russian officials in Moscow (Ruzanov 1999, 209).  A statement 
was signed by all parties designating the pipeline location, agreeing on the details of a 
feasibility study, and detailing the marketing and financing of the project (Ruzanov 
1999, 209).   
 Hashimoto can assume credit for JNOC’s participation in the December 1997 
international statement on the Irkutsk pipeline which came months after his new Russia 
policy was implemented and weeks after his Krasnoyarsk “no neck-tie” summit with 
Yeltsin, however advances since have not been so productive.  In early 1999 Japanese 
companies began leaving the international corporate consortium with greater interest in 
other economic ventures (Zagorsky 2001, 88).  Furthermore, in the September 2000 
summit between Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori and Russian President Vladimir 
Putin the leaders abandoned discussions on the project and focused on the Sakhalin 
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projects as more of a centerpiece to bilateral economic development (Zagorksy 2001, 
88).  
Yakutsk Natural Gas Fields 
 The natural gas fields near the Sakha Republic capital of Yakutsk stand among 
the most significant of discovered resource deposits in the country, accounting for 42 
percent of the discovered natural gas deposits in southeast Siberia and the Russian Far 
East (Zaitsev 1999, 28).  The expected natural gas supply at Yakutsk is currently at 25 
billion cubic meters annually (Murakami 1997, 116-118).  A feasibility study was 
initiated in the mid-1970’s by Soviet, Japanese, and American participants, but the 
survey was discontinued in 1979 (Zagorsky 2001, 88).  Frequently, Gorbachev and 
Yeltsin mentioned the project to the Japanese in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s in 
hopes they would reinstate the feasibility study, but the Japanese were in the course of a 
foreign policy which would not allow for it.  By 1993 Russia announced that South 
Korean corporations would complete the feasibility study (Zagorsky 2001, 88).  
However, when the feasibility study was completed in 1995, the project did not carry on 
(Zagorsky 2001, 88). 
 The greatest barrier to this project is the financial burden.  Only two natural gas 
fields are being utilized in the region (Zagorsky 2001, 88).  In order to necessitate the 
construction of a pipeline, more natural gas fields would need to be operating first.  
After that, the nearly 2,000-mile pipeline would be built upon harsh terrain, permafrost, 
and in some of the world’s most severe weather conditions (Ziegler 1999, 21).  Two 
natural gas pipelines have been planned from Yakutsk to Japan: one extending from 
Sakhalin to northern Hokkaido costing approximately $10 billion, and a second from 
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Vladivostok and Pusan, South Korea, to Kitakyushu and Fukuoka estimated at $15.5 
billion (Ziegler 1999, 21).  However, the South Korean feasibility study in the 1990’s 
estimated that the initial investment estimates at Yakutsk by the Soviet-Japanese-
American team of the 1970’s would have to be tripled to more than $66 billion 
(Zagorsky 2001, 88).  Such a steep price for the initial investments is out of reach for 
the overly cautious Japanese corporations who are frequently encouraged to take part in 
the project by Russian leaders. 
Japan-Far Eastern Russia Economic Committee and Zarubino Port 
 In 1994 Japanese officials were dispatched to Primorskii Krai, Khabarovsk Krai, 
and Sakhalin Oblast to collect data on potential investment projects (Yoshida 1999, 235).  
Upon completion of the study, the teams selected four of 60 potential projects in which 
they would begin focusing on investing: first, the expansion of Vanino Port at 
Sovetskaya Gavan, Khabarovsk Krai; second, the development of the Uglegorskoe coal 
fields in Sakhalin Oblast; third, the development and transport of coal reserves in 
Primorskii Krai; and fourth, the expansion of Zarubino Port (Yoshida 1999, 235-36).  
All port and transportation development would be done in order to enhance the 
connectivity of energy resources to the Japanese markets.  After a more thorough review 
of their selections, the commission soon discovered that the Vanino port was controlled 
by various private companies which monopolized operation of the port and were not 
willing to compromise with the Japanese government on development (Yoshida 1999, 
236).  The Uglegorskoe coal fields in Sakhalin Oblast were operated by three largely 
inept private companies which were not interested in working with the Japanese on 
railway and port construction (Yoshida 1999, 236).  As for the coal reserves in 
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Primorskii Krai, the commission abandoned seeking development of the project when 
they discovered that the reserves were relatively small and the coal, itself was highly 
volatile (Yoshida 1999, 236).  Of all potential projects investigated by the commission, 
the Zarubino Port project was the only one in which a feasibility study was conducted.   
 In March 1996 the commission headed a feasibility study of Zarubino Port 
development funded by six Japanese prefectures, the Japanese government, and private 
corporations (Tsuji 1999, 289).  The results, published in November 1996, found that 
the total amount of transit freight passing through the port was estimated a 1.4 million 
tons in 1999 and 2.1 million in 2002 (Tsuji 1999, 289).  However, after the port 
expansion would be completed in 2012 the total amount of transit freight would reach 
4.3 million tons, with 50 percent of the estimate from China (Tsuji 1999, 289).  As of 
2004, the commission is conducting a feasibility study for the construction of a new 
engineering complex at the port (OANA [Tokyo] 2004).  The Japanese are interested in 
developing the port to utilize the Trans-Siberian Mainline Railway to ship products to 
Europe (OANA [Tokyo] 2004). 
 The Zarubino Port expansion project, which was briefly mentioned in the 
Yeltsin-Hashimoto Plan, can significantly improve trade not only between Japan and 
Russia, but all countries of northeast Asia.  Russia, and the Vladivostok area in 
particular, will benefit from the collection of revenues in the form of facility charges, 
taxes, and railway transportation fees as well as increased employment (Tsuji 1999, 
294).  The main roadblock to the development of the port is the investment (Tsuji 1999, 
294).  Evidently, the Japanese have been considering investment, but developments 
have been slow. One could assume that with Hashimoto’s 1997 foreign policy 
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promoting bilateral economic development with Russian and the Zarubino Port 
expansion project being mentioned in the Yeltsin-Hashimoto Plan, that developments 
would have occurred more progressively in the years following 1997.  However, it does 
not seem to be the case as the joint commission is, in spite of everything, still 
conducting feasibility studies. 
Yamal Peninsula Natural Gas Fields 
 One of the most lucrative possible natural gas ventures is at the Yamal Peninsula 
in northwest Siberia.  The onshore Yamal fields are estimated to contain more than 10 
trillion cubic meters of natural gas, enough to fulfill all of Europe’s and Turkey’s needs 
for 20 years, or Russia’s demand for 50 years (Asian Times [Hong Kong] 2000, 38).  
The Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District is currently Russia’s largest natural gas 
producing region, supplying 20 percent of the world’s and 90 percent of Russia’s natural 
gas (Interfax [Moscow] 2004).   
 Japanese interest in the project has been met with intense competition from 
Russian giant Gazprom as well as European corporations which have a geographic 
advantage to accessing the region (Asian Times [Hong Kong] 2000, 38).  After being 
asked to consider developing the resource in the region by officials of the Urals Federal 
District a month earlier, Japanese officials announced in March 2004 that they would 
begin a feasibility study on producing liquid natural gas at the Yamal Peninsula and ship 
it to Japan westward via ocean (Interfax [Moscow] 2004).  Japanese development and 
shipment of natural gas from the Yamal Peninsula faces great challenges such as the 
mammoth costs, the region’s harsh, arctic terrain, and competition with European 
corporations and Gazprom.  Moreover, the gas would have to be shipped an enormous 
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distance to reach Japan, whether by land across Siberia and the Russian Far East or the 
more viable route by sea around Europe, through the Suez Canal, and south across the 
Indian Ocean.  Nevertheless, the mass development of such a substantial deposit has the 
potential to greatly benefit Russia’s economy and improve bilateral relations with Japan. 
Conclusions on Japanese Corporate Investment Projects in Russia 
 Of the three resource development projects that were directly pointed out in 
Hashimoto’s speech outlining his foreign policy with Russia in July 1997, two have 
resulted in failures for Japan while one is a moderate success.  Currently, all three 
resource development projects have failed to meet Hashimoto’s foreign policy 
expectations.  The Sakhalin projects are a moderate success for Japan because the 
Japanese corporations are maintaining a notable presence at the Sakhalin-1 and 
Sakhalin-2 projects.  However, American corporations are now serving as primary field 
operators at both projects as the Japanese corporations maintain a much smaller 
presence in the projects.  Even more unsettling, no Japanese corporation has expressed 
interest in participating in the Sakhalin-3, -4, or -5 projects.  Hashimoto cannot take 
credit for the developments at the Sakhalin fields, as Japanese corporate interest at the 
Sakhalin-1 and -2 projects have maintained a steady involvement since 1996 with no 
significant increases (Zagorsky 2001, 88).  Even more, it seems unlikely Japanese 
corporations will lead in the initiation of Sakhalin-3, -4, or -5. 
 The Kovykta natural gas projects in Irkutsk which served as a centerpiece of the 
Yeltsin-Hashimoto Plan of November 1997 seemed a success for Japan and Hashimoto 
when the leaders agreed to a joint $10 billion project to develop the field and a pipeline.  
However, when the last of the Japanese companies left the international corporate 
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consortium to discuss developing a pipeline out of Irkutsk, the project lost its 
significance to the Japanese political strategy (Zagorsky 2001, 89).  When Putin and 
Mori chose to omit the project from their summit agenda in September 2000, it was 
understood that the project was at the time too ambitious for both sides. 
 Hashimoto also mentioned the development of resources near Yakutsk which the 
Soviets and Russians had been attempting to market to the Japanese for years.  After 
taking part in an uncompleted Soviet-Japanese-American feasibility study in the 1970’s, 
the Japanese showed little interest in developing the region other than mapping out 
possible pipelines from Yakutsk to Japan.  Due to the extraordinary costs to develop, 
many Japanese investment firms prefer developing at Sakhalin as a more beneficial 
option (Zagorsky 2001, 88).  The Yakutsk projects have been a failure for Hashimoto’s 
foreign policy which called for Japanese investment in the region, yet no large scale 
resource development is occurring in Yakutsk by Japanese firms. 
 The 1994 Japanese committee to find potential investment projects in the 
Russian Far East decided that of 60 projects, four were of Japanese interest.  After 
further review of the four projects, the committee realized that only one of the projects 
could be a possibility for Japanese investment: the expansion of the Zarubino Port.  
Feasibility studies on the expansion of Zarubino Port began in 1996.  However, the 
committee is still in the process of conducting feasibility studies.  Other than the 
continuation of the committee’s assignment, Hashimoto cannot accept credit for the 
developments at Zarubino Port.  Furthermore, despite the fact that the project was 
mentioned in the Yeltsin-Hashimoto Plan in Novemeber 1997, neither implementation 
nor construction has occurred in the last decade. 
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  One of the most significant known deposits of natural gas in Russia at the 
Yamal Peninsula has received much attention from Russians and other Europeans who 
see the benefits of developing the fields.  In March 2004, the Japanese showed interest 
in the projects by announcing they would initiate a feasibility study of producing liquid 
natural gas on site and shipping it to Japan via ship.  The lucrative project faces many 
challenges including costs, weather conditions, distance, and competition.  The 
development of the Yamal natural gas deposits would have a tremendous impact on the 
Russian economy and economic relations with Japan.  Hashimoto cannot be directly 
credited for the project as he never mentioned it by name.  However, a venture as 
significant as this is in accordance with his plan to freely develop Russo-Japanese 
economic relations without ties to the territorial dispute. 
 Hashimoto’s vision to develop Russo-Japanese economic relations in the field of 
resource development has failed overall.  With the projects at Irkutsk and Yakutsk being 
essentially abandoned, the stagnation of the Zarubino Port project, and the belated 
indication of interest and immense complications associated with the Yamal projects, 
the only large-scale resource development projects with Japanese participation in Russia 
are those on Sakhalin Island.  And with the Japanese participants not showing any signs 
of increasing their presence at Sakhalin Island after the 1997 initiation of the 
multilayered approach to foreign policy with Russia, no successes from the new foreign 
policy can be detected.  Rather, the best the new foreign policy seemed to accomplish 
was to maintain and embrace the already existing Japanese presence at such resource 
development projects. 
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Bilateral Economic Data Results in Trade, Investments, and Aid 
 With the multilayered approach to foreign policy with Russia announced in 
January 1997, the territorial dispute would officially not be a hindrance to the 
developments of Russo-Japanese economic relations.  After years of operating on 
opposing sides of the Cold War, bilateral relations remained stagnant between Russia 
and Japan with the unity of economic and politics.  Following these policies and the 
instability associated with Russia’s early years as an independent country, it seemed the 
time would be right for an increase in Russo-Japanese economic development.  
However, has any true increase in bilateral economic relations really occurred since the 
implementation of the multilayered approach in 1997?  In this section, developments in 
Russo-Japanese trade volume, investment volume, and the various forms of foreign aid 
are examined. 
Annual Trade Volume 
 The Russo-Japanese trade ties are among the weakest of all industrialized 
countries.  Russia accounts for less than one percent of Japan’s total trade international 
trade (Ziegler 1999, 19).  Japan, the world’s second largest economy, makes up slightly 
more than three percent of Russia’s total international trade volume (Ziegler 1999, 19).  
This pales in comparison to the world’s first and third largest economies, the United 
States and Germany, that in 1996 accounted for six percent and ten percent of Russia’s 
total trade volume respectfully (Turner 1999, 1322).  Fluctuating from the post-Soviet 
low in 1992 of $3.48 billion to a high of $5.93 billion in 1995, Russo-Japanese trade 
volume has been unsteady in the 12 years following the fall of the Soviet Union. 
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Figure 10.  Bar graph of Soviet-Japanese and Russo-Japanese trade, 1970 to 2002. 
Note: Data up to 1992 includes trade with the Soviet Union and after 1992 with 
Russian Federation only. 
Source: Data compiled by author from Japan Association for Trade with Russia and 
Countries of Eastern Europe, Monthly Bulletin on Trade with Russia and Eastern 
Europe 1997, and Japan Statistical Research and Training Institute, Japan Statistical 
Yearbook 2000, and Japan Statistical Yearbook 2003. 
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 The annual trade volume from 1980 to 1988, when the unity of economics and 
politics served as the Japanese foreign policy with the Soviet Union, totaled $4.87 
billion annually.  From the installment of the expanded equilibrium in 1989 to the fall of 
the Soviet Union in 1991, the annual trade volume averaged $5.81 billion, thus 
increasing 19 percent.  From 1992 to 1996 when the expanded equilibrium was in place 
in Russo-Japanese relations, trade dropped 20 percent from the previous era to $4.66 
billion.  In 1997, Hashimoto expressed the necessity to see concrete progress and special 
consideration to strengthen economic relations with Russia (Speech by Hashimoto, 
1997a).  With the installment of Hashimoto’s new Russia policy in 1997, an increase in 
Russo-Japanese trade was expected for the following years.  However from 1997 to 
2003 the Russo-Japanese annual trade average dropped more than two percent from the 
previous era to $4.54 billion. 
 The lack of any increases in Russo-Japanese trade after the implementation of 
the multilayered approach to foreign policy cannot be attributed to Russia’s economic 
transition.  As noted by economist Andrei Rodionov, “Many other companies of 
developed countries, including French, Italian, German, and U.S. firms, have 
established a more solid presence in Russia, including its Far Eastern provinces” 
(Rodionov 1999, 220).  Also, it is suspected that in the post-Soviet era, a significant 
amount of the products made in Japan are exported to Russia via third countries, namely 
Malaysia and Finland (Yoshida 1999, 232).  The estimated total of these indirect exports 
is around $1.5 billion annually (Yoshida 1999, 232). 
 One interesting aspect of the bilateral trade volume is the balance shift of 
imports and exports.  From 1980 to 1991 Japanese exports to the Soviet Union averaged 
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$2.99 billion annually while the imports averaged $1.77 billion annually, a 58 to 42 
percent imbalance in Japan’s favor.  From 1992 until 1996 Japanese exports to Russia 
averaged $1.19 billion annually while imports averaged $3.47 billion annually, a 74 to 
26 percent imbalance in Russia’s favor.  By the period from 1997 to 2002, Japanese 
exports to Russia averaged only $450 million annually while imports averaged $3.93 
billion annually, a 90 to 10 percent imbalance in Russia’s favor.  From this data, it 
appears that the Japanese have increasingly found a need for Russian products.   
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, most of the goods exported to Japan from 
Russia consist of food and raw materials (Rodionov 1999, 220).  More than a third of 
Russian exports to Japan are metals while sea products make up another third and fuel 
makes up just more than a tenth of the total value of the exports (Rodionov 1999, 220).  
Goods imported to Russia from Japan consist of machines, equipment, vehicles, home 
appliances, building equipment, and telecommunication (Rodionov 1999, 220).  Despite 
the increase in Japanese imports of Russian products, the relationship is still relatively 
weak.  For 1996 Japanese exports to Russia only make up a quarter of one percent of the 
total exports while Russian imports to Japan constitute slightly more than one percent of 
the total imports (Turner 1999, 950 and 1322).  If Japan is to increase its consumption of 
the natural resources found in Siberia and Sakhalin, the bilateral trade imbalance would 
continue to widen even larger.  By comparison, an increase in Russian demand for 
Japanese goods would lessen the imbalance.  This is unlikely until Russian consumers 
gain more affluence, and it is important to note that the large majority of wealth in 
Russia is found in the cities west of the Urals, geographically and culturally closer to 
Europe than Japan.  
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 In comparing the Russo-Japanese trade volume of the 1992 to 1996 era to the 
post-policy change era of 1997 to 2003, it is noted that no real increase in bilateral trade 
volume existed.  Despite the 13 percent increase of Japanese purchasing of Russian 
goods from the 1992 to 1996 period to the 1997 to 2002 period, the total Japanese 
imports for the same periods increased approximately 20 percent.  Therefore, no real 
increases in Russo-Japanese economic ties via bilateral trade volume have occurred in 
the post-1997 period. 
Japanese Investment in Russia 
 The amount of Japanese foreign investment in Russia during the 1990’s has 
paled in comparison to that of other developed countries.  By the end of the 1990’s, 
Japan ranked thirteenth among developed countries investing in Russia with 1.2 percent 
of all foreign investments going to Russia (Zagorsky 2001, 85).  The 1995 Japanese 
investment in Russia amounted to $75 million (Arai 2002).  After a sharp reduction in 
1996 to $22 million, investments increased to $139 million in 1997.  In 1998 it dropped 
again to $60 million, and again to $43 million in 1999 before nearly tripling that amount 
to reach $117 million in 2000 (Arai 2002).   
 By comparing Japan’s average annual foreign investment in Russia from 1995 to 
2001 to investments by other developed countries, it is evident that something is 
interfering other than the obvious political instability issues and economic crises with 
can equally affect other investment firms as much as the Japanese ones.  In the six year 
period from 1995 to 2001, the Japanese invested an average of $76 million annually, yet  
the yearly total was sporadic.  American investments averaged $2.05 billion annually, 
and the Germans averaged $1.38 billion annually, both with steady increases and 
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Figure 11.  Line graph of foreign investments in Russia by selected countries, 1995 to 
2000. 
Source: Data compiled by author from Arai, Hirofumi, “Foreign Direct Investment of 
Russia,” Institute of Developing Economies. 
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 declines in their investment trends (Arai 2002).  What is stagnating Japanese 
investment that is not affecting others such as the Americans or Germans?  The fact that 
Russo- 
 Japanese relations have not been normalized due to the territorial dispute is the obvious 
answer, even after the implementation of the multilayered approach to foreign policy 
with Russia in 1997. 
Tracking Japanese Foreign Aid to Russia 
 Japanese foreign aid to the Soviet Union began in November 1990 when 2.6 
billion yen ($17.9 million) was donated to Chernobyl victims (MOFA 2004).  Over the 
next decade the Japanese would increase economic aid to Russia, often disregarding 
their official foreign policies.  Under intense international pressure, Japan provided $2.5 
billion in economic aid in October 1991 in the previously mentioned discussions 
between Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama and Soviet Foreign Minister Boris 
Pankin.  Nakayama’s economic aid package in the form of bank export credits and trade 
insurance would be the largest Japanese aid package presented to the Soviets and later to 
the Russians over the next 12 years.  In April 1993 another agreement was made at the 
G-7 meeting among finance and foreign ministers.  On this occasion, $1.5 billion would 
be provided in the form of trade insurance and bank export credit.  With the bank export 
credit, the Russians utilized the funds to construct an Impuls microwave oven plant, 
modernize oil refining facilities in Yaroslavl’, and renovate the Kama truck factory.  
Also during the summit visit, $100 million was given in humanitarian aid to finance 
food supplies, pharmaceuticals, and medical equipment, $120 million was given to 
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promote and develop small and medium businesses in Russia, and $70 million was 
given for the dismantlement of nuclear weapons. 
 The next major breakthrough in Japanese economic aid was in February 1998 
when Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi visited Moscow.  As a conclusion to the meeting, 
a $1.5 billion loan was given to Russia to assist with the economic reforms that were 
taking place in domestic markets (MOFA 2004).  In November of that year, Obuchi met 
with Yeltsin as Prime Minister making another offer of $100 million in what was 
labeled “Japan-Russia Partnership for Reform” program (MOFA 2004).   
 From 1990 to 2002 the Japanese economic aid given to the Soviet Union and 
later, Russia consisted of 12 percent grant aid and 88 percent loans and insurance.  The 
loans and trade insurance were given sporadically as the results of summit 
breakthroughs such as the October 1991 Nakayama proposal, the April 1993 G-7 
summit among finance and foreign ministers, and the February 1998 Obuchi visit to 
Moscow.  The smaller portion of the economic aid, grant aid, can also be given 
sporadically as needs arise such as the assistance to Chernobyl victims, the financing of 
food, pharmaceutical, and medical supplies, or the dismantlement of nuclear weapons.  
However, one portion of grant aid which is given steadily is the dispatching of officials 
to Russia to provide technical assistance.  Despite making up only 13 percent of the 
funds donated by grant aid, tracking the technical assistance by personnel over time can 
reveal if the multilayered approach to foreign policy is enhancing Russo-Japanese 
economic relations. 
 In examining the account budgets for financing personnel to provide technical 
assistance, a significant increase can be seen from the $7.56 million budget in 1993 to  
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Figure 12.  Line graph of Japanese personnel assistance to USSR/Russia, 1990/2001. 
Note: Data up to 1992 includes trade with the Soviet Union and after 1992 with Russian 
Federation only. 
Source: Data compiled by author from MOFA, 2003. 
Figure 12.  Line graph of Japanese technical assistant (personnel) to USSR/Russia, 1990 to 2001. 
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the $13.4 million budget in 1994, an obvious boost by the Hashimoto Plan signed in 
November that year.  However, over the next three years the budget would fall back 
down to $7.33 million in 1998.  In 1999 the budget grew 39 percent to $10.18 million 
and again another seven percent to $10.95 million in 2000 as Tokyo was attempting to 
increase trade and bring down unemployment during the time of economic recession.  
The average annual budget from the years 1992 to 1996 was $10.75 million while the 
average annual budget from 1997 to 2001 was $9.52 million, down 11 percent. 
 Indeed, Hashimoto’s successor Obuchi made headway with his $1.5 billion loan 
offer in February 1998 and his $100 million grant aid offer in November 1998.  
However, there has not been any significant increase in Japanese economic aid to Russia 
since the new foreign policy was implemented in 1997.  This could be due in part to the 
somewhat successful restabilizing of Russia’s political system under President Vladimir 
Putin which has resulted in the lessening of demands for foreign economic aid. 
Similarly, Japan’s economic recession of the late 1990’s and early 2000’s could have 
possibly resulted in a decrease of donations to foreign aid funds to Russia.  Nonetheless, 
the fact that Japanese economic aid to Russia has not significantly increased since 1997 
supports the case that Hashimoto’s new foreign policy with Russia has not been 
successful in strengthening bilateral economic ties, particularly through economic aid.   
 
Tokyo’s Incentives for Corporate Investments in Russia 
  
As noted in the third chapter of this work by Russo-Japanese relations scholar Masaru 
Tamamoto, large amounts of Japanese investment in Russia would be dependent on 
actions by the Japanese government.  Tamamoto explained that “the government will  
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have to guarantee those investments.  Some businesses will go in kicking and screaming 
even with some sort of insurance” (Catlin Jacob 1991, 44).  In this portion of the chapter, 
incentives by Tokyo to encourage Japanese businesses to invest in Russia will be 
discussed.  In turn, it will be determined if this practice has increased with the 1997 
implementation of the multilayered approach to foreign policy with Russia. 
 In the late 1960’s Japanese firms began investing in the Soviet Union before 
seikei fukabun went into effect.  In 1965 a joint Soviet-Japanese cooperation committee 
was formed to select development projects for trade and investment (Nester 1993, 725).  
In agreement with the committee, Japan’s Export-Import Bank along with private banks 
guaranteed low cost financing and ample insurance for the projects (Nester 1993, 725).  
However, by the mid-1970’s the projects were mostly completed and few new projects 
emerged (Nester 1993, 725).  Meanwhile, the Japanese were adopting a new foreign 
policy which would not allow the financing and insuring of such ventures in the Soviet 
Union. 
 By 1992 the Japanese were clear in their rhetoric that they would not encourage 
companies to invest in Russia as it went against their foreign policy of the expanded 
equilibrium.  The New York Times reported:  
 Japanese industrialists say that large-scale investments in Russia or the other 
 former Soviet republics are too risky right now to be undertaken without some 
 similar form of insurance or guarantees from the Japanese Government.  And 
 such help is not to be forthcoming because of the territorial dispute (Weisman
 1992, A7). 
 
Though bilateral economic advancements would occur in the following years via 
Japanese economic aid and regional resource development studies in Russia, 
governmental insurance on investment projects did not occur.   
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 The rationale behind advancing economic aid and regional development plans to 
Russia without prior progress on the territorial dispute was in clear violation of the 
foreign policy at the time; however, it differed from insuring investment projects.  The 
advancement of foreign aid was justified by the increasing international pressure to 
support the ailing Russia and done in a good neighbor fashion.  Meanwhile, regional 
development studies were often used as a tool to lure Moscow into discussions on the 
territorial dispute by enticing them with the economic benefits of normalized relations.  
If the Japanese government was to insure corporate investment projects in Russia, they 
would not only be violating the foreign policy at the time; they would be acting directly 
against it by encouraging their corporations to invest in Russia without any progress 
made on the territorial dispute.  Insuring investment projects is a riskier and more 
complex activity than simply providing economic aid or conducting regional 
development studies because it involves trust, security, and an essential profit guarantee 
for the corporation.  However, as the foreign policy changed in 1997, so did the 
opportunity for Tokyo to insure Japanese corporations investing in Russia and promote 
investment through various means. 
 By using means other than investment insurance, the Japanese government 
began encouraging Japanese investment in Russia as early as 1994 with the creation of 
the aforementioned Japan-Far Eastern Russia Economic Committee, which conducted 
regional resource development studies in the Russian Far East.  As discussed, the only 
venture deemed worthy was the financing of the Zarubino Port expansion which 
remains subject to a feasibility study.   
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 In November 1997 an international symposium on regional economic 
cooperation in the energy sector was held in Tokyo with representatives from Russia, 
China, South Korea, Mongolia, and the International Energy Agency (Ruzanov 1999, 
208).   The meeting, in which the participants discussed means to harmonize energy 
needs for the future, was sponsored by, among other bodies, Japanese government 
agencies such as MOFA, Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), 
JNOC, and Export-Import Bank of Japan (Ruzanov 1999, 208).  By sponsoring this 
symposium and inviting Russian representatives, Tokyo was openly discussing bilateral 
economic relations with Russia without linking the territorial dispute.  Even more, 
Tokyo encouraged businesses to participate in the symposium and discuss investment 
projects with the Russian officials (Ruzanov 1999, 208).   
 One month later JNOC met with representatives from China, South Korea, 
Mongolia, and Russia to discuss and outline the pipeline route from the Irkutsk natural 
gas fields to the East Asian markets (Ruzanov 1999, 209).  By doing this JNOC, and 
therefore, the Japanese national government, was seeking the development of natural 
gas at Irkutsk and thus, opening the door for Japanese corporations to participate.  This 
was evident when Yeltsin and Hashimoto announced a joint $10 billion project to 
develop the natural gas fields and pipeline at their first “no neck-tie” summit (The 
Economist [London] 1997, 34). 
 At the second “no neck-tie” summit in April 1998, Yeltsin and Hashimoto 
agreed to form a regional venture fund in order to attract Japanese investment and 
develop the economy in Siberia and the Russian Far East (Ziegler 1999, 22).  The initial 
capital offer would be $100 million, provided by both governments in portions of 50 
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percent each (Sokolov 1998, 23).  By instating this fund, Tokyo has encouraged its 
businesses to invest in Russia by providing them with initial capital to begin their 
economic ventures. 
 Despite Tokyo’s encouragement for Japanese businesses to invest in Russia, an 
overabundance of barriers exist.  The most notable is the territorial issue blocking 
relations not between Moscow and Tokyo, but between Russians and Japanese.  One 
port director in Korsakov, Sakhalin Island commented “In every conversation I have 
with [the Japanese officials], the Kuriles crop up.  It’s much easier dealing with 
Americans.  They stick to business and not politics” (Brzezinski 1997a, 1).   
Continuing on the interplay of Americans in Russia, there is also the issue of 
competition as American investors tend to be more adventurous in Russia compared to 
their Japanese counterparts, and the Russian residents have preferred dealing with 
Americans, 
 Vodka-swigging Russians, who like to talk business in the sauna, complain that 
 the Japanese are too formal.  “We have to meet endless delegations and bow 20 
 times to do a deal,” grouses Mr. Ianhistky, the port director.  “When American 
 shipping company representatives come here from Alaska or Seattle, we grab a 
 beer and settle everything on the spot” (Brzezinski 1997a, 1). 
 
At Sakhalin Island, it has been noted that in discussions on Sakhalin-3, -4, and -5 
developments, “the accent most often heard…these days is a Texan drawl” (Brzezinski 
1997a, 1).  It is important to note that countries such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and the Netherlands which have invested heavily in Russia have the world’s 
leading energy exploitation companies such as ExxonMobil, Shell, and British 
Petroleum.  Even with support from Tokyo, JNOC cannot compete with the European 
and American supermajors to invest in Russia.   
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Aside from the territorial dispute and international competition, other barriers for 
the Japanese include excessive tariffs, inept transportation infrastructure, corruption and 
organized crime, and an unstable political system with little regional control.  
Additionally, Japan’s economic strengths such as automobiles and consumer electronics 
are areas where Russians are less receptive, both politically and economically.  A barrier 
of particular effect in Siberia and the Russian Far East is a rise in anti-Japanese 
sentiments (Brzezinski 1997a, 1).  One Sakhalin port director noted “To date, the policy 
of the Japanese has been to take our natural resource, without sinking a yen into our 
economy” (Brzezinski 1997a, 1).    
 In general, the Japanese government has provided few incentives to encourage 
investments in Russia.   Prior to 1997 incentives by Tokyo to promote investments in 
Russia were conducted through regional development plans such as the Zarubino Port 
expansion in 1992.  After the multilayered approach to foreign policy with Russia was 
implemented in January 1997, Tokyo hosted an international symposium on regional 
economic cooperation in the energy sector.  At the event, Japanese businesses were 
encouraged to participate in discussions on foreign investments projects including 
projects in Russia.  In December 1997 the JNOC along with representatives from China, 
South Korea, Mongolia, and Russia delineated the pipeline route for the Irkutsk natural 
gas fields.  This act was only an aftershock from Yeltsin’s and Hashimoto’s 
announcement of a joint $10 billion project to develop the Irkutsk natural gas fields.  In 
the second “no neck-tie” summit, the two leaders agreed to form a regional venture fund 
of $100 million for companies to use when initiating their investment ventures in Russia.   
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 Despite these acts, barriers remain which block bilateral economic developments.  
Conceivably, if Tokyo seriously seeks to advance Russo-Japanese relations with 
Japanese investment ventures in Russia, they would provide more opportunities to do so.  
Perhaps the Japanese do not need bilateral economic growth as much as the Russians do.  
Japanese economic expert Susumu Yoshida summarized the Japanese viewpoint with 
some justifications: 
 First, Japan’s options for investment are truly wide, including China, Vietnam, 
 and other economies.  Russia is only one of these numerous options.  Second, 
 Japanese products, such as consumer electronics and automobiles, could enter 
 the markets of European countries, including Russia, through trade channels and 
 without investment in product ventures.  Third, in the area of import deliveries 
 from Far Eastern Russia, including timber, nonferrous metals, marine products 
 and coal, Japanese companies earn profit by investing on a limited scale, only 
 adding to the investment made before 1992.  Fourth, Japanese companies cannot 
 allocate significant funds for investment in Russia because of the domestic 
 economic problems associated with the bubble economy in Japan that surfaced 
 almost in parallel with Russia’s transition to a market economy.  Finally, some 
 Japanese medium and small investors who are interested in trade and investment 
 opportunities of Far Eastern Russia failed because of Russia’s legal system’s 
 deficiencies.  The investment environment in Russia is lagging behind other 
 countries in tax, legal systems and development of infrastructure.  Moreover, 
 incentives for foreign investors in general are inadequate (Yoshida 1999, 233-
 34). 
 
Knowing this, it is understandable that the Japanese government is not promoting 
investment as much as one would assume by reviewing the rhetoric associated with the 
multilayered approach to foreign policy with Russia.  While other more secure 
investment options are available for the Japanese, the language on promoting bilateral 
economic development with Russia by Hashimoto and his successors has largely 
amounted to lip-service to the Russians while the territorial dispute is handled in a new, 
more welcoming tenor for Russo-Japanese relations. 
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Outcomes 
 Upon review of the results presented in this chapter it appears that Hashimoto’s 
multilayered approach has had little effect on Russo-Japanese economic development.  
This result counters Hashimoto’s stated desire to “strengthening economic relations with 
Russia,” elaborated as part of his new foreign policy in 1997 (Speech by Hashimoto 
1997a).  The following fundamental outcomes can be drawn from the three research 
measures carried out in this study.   
From the review and analysis of Japanese resource investment projects in Russia, 
three conclusions can be drawn.  Firstly, of the three resource development projects that 
Hashimoto openly cited in his July 1997 speech, none have seen an increase in Japanese 
participation.  The Irkutsk natural gas projects have been abandoned by Japanese 
corporations, the Yakutsk natural gas projects have been deemed too expensive for 
Japanese corporations, and although the Japanese are steadily participating in the 
Sakhalin-1 and -2 projects, they have not expressed interest in the three future projects 
on Sakhalin.  Secondly, the Zarubino Port project which was cited in the Yeltsin-
Hashimoto Plan has progressed at an incredibly slow pace as feasibility studies are still 
being conducted a decade after the project was proposed.  This too, is a failure for 
Hashimoto as the project has not been implemented and thus, has not spurred the 
development of Russian and Japanese economic cooperation in the region.  Lastly, if the 
Japanese do participate in the natural gas venture at the Yamal Peninsula, it will be a 
breakthrough in Russo-Japanese economic relations.  However, Hashimoto would not 
be able to accept credit for the project as he never mentioned it by name.  Nonetheless, it 
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was part of his vision to develop Russo-Japanese economic ties through the 
development of resource reserves in Siberia and in the Russian Far East. 
By reviewing Russo-Japanese bilateral economic data, four conclusions can be 
drawn.  First, in review of bilateral trade volume, it is evident the no real increases in 
Russo-Japanese economic ties via trade volume have occurred since the implementation 
of the new foreign policy in 1997.  Second, the sporadic nature of Japan’s investments 
in Russia as well as the low showing in comparison to other developed countries’ 
investments have continued through the 1997 foreign policy change and is thus, 
unaffected by the new foreign policy.  Third, moderate successes were achieved by 
Obuchi in 1998 by offering a loan and grant aid to Russia, but they do not surpass 
similar proposals enacted in the early 1990’s.  Lastly, the 1997-2001 average annual 
budget for Japanese personnel working to aid Russia is 11 percent lower than the 1992-
1996 average.  Therefore, the 1997 change of policy which encouraged bilateral 
economic development has failed to do so in the field of technical training by Japanese 
personnel.  
In review of Tokyo’s incentive projects for corporate investment in Russia, one 
can conclude that Tokyo has insufficiently encouraged Japanese corporations to invest.  
Prior to 1997 the Japanese encouraged investment in Russia with the formation of the 
Japan-Far Eastern Russia Economic Committee which discovered the Zarubino Port 
expansion project.  After the implementation of the new foreign policy in 1997, the 
Japanese government sponsored a regional energy cooperation symposium and JNOC 
met with other governments of northeast Asia to outline the pipeline from the Irkutsk 
natural gas fields.  Then at the April 1998 “no neck-tie” summits Yeltsin and Hashimoto 
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agreed to create a $100 million regional venture fund.  These initiatives have proven to 
be insufficient in significantly stimulating bilateral economic development. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SUCCESS OF THE MULTILAYERED APPROACH IN THE TERRITORIAL 
DISPUTE 
 
“…Japan’s possession as long as the Heavens and the Earth shall last.”  
—Masayasu Habuto (1752-1814), 
 shogunal administrator, referring to the Kuriles 
 
 The southern Kuriles have experienced many changes since the fall of the Soviet 
Union, affecting political sovereignty, economic re-stabilization, demographics, and 
aspects of society such as popular culture.  Nonetheless, one constant during this era of 
change is the southern Kuriles have remained the southern Kuriles and not the northern 
territories.  To the Japanese, the transfer of control of these islands is the most valuable 
offer the Russians could make.  Indeed, for more than half a century this seemingly 
insignificant row of volcanic rocks has served as the primary roadblock to the 
normalization of relations between two of the world’s most economically significant 
and populous countries.  Yet both countries declare they want to end the dispute and 
move on with closer, truly normalized relations.  The Russians want to improve 
relations and dismiss the territorial dispute immediately.  However, the Japanese will 
not accept anything less than a solution to the dispute before bilateral relations can truly 
be normalized.  Beyond all the changes on the southern Kuriles in recent years, the 
Japanese want to see one more change added: a change of national sovereignty. 
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 Nearly 52 years after the Soviets seized the Kuriles from the Japanese, Prime 
Minister Hashimoto presented a possible solution to get the islands back.  Hashimoto 
had keen insight to the issue as he had served two years as head of the Japan War-
Bereaved Families Association and had heard from those who lived on the islands 
before Soviet occupation (Pollack 1996, A2).  Hashimoto proposed strengthening 
Russo-Japanese economic relations and cooperation.  At the same time, the territorial 
dispute would be solved through the principles of trust, mutual benefit, and a long-term 
perspective.  As Hashimoto clarified, “we must remember that the Northern Territories 
issue is a matter which our nations have been unable to resolve in fifty years.  Obviously, 
it is very difficult to resolve it” (speech by Hashimoto 1997a).  Despite the difficulties, 
he continued by presenting the means to a possible resolution;  
 More than anything, steady, concrete progress could become a landmark that 
 will not have our children’s and grandchildren’s generations inherit this issue.  
 Considering the positive achievements made thus far, I believe that it is the 
 responsibility of our generation to now show the way forward toward the 
 resolution of this issue.  I would like to discuss this matter calmly, based on a 
 long-term perspective (speech by Hashimoto 1997a). 
 
Hashimoto’s new foreign policy was the first Japanese policy since the Soviet seizure of 
the Kuriles which reasoned that progress on the territorial dispute, and thus, regaining 
the Northern Territories, would be based on bilateral economic developments and a 
warmer diplomatic atmosphere.   
 
Analysis of Statements on the Territorial Dispute 
Statements Prior to 1997 
 To examine statements by Japanese and Russian officials, a sufficient point to 
begin analysis is where William Nimmo left off.  In his 1994 work, regarding 
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terminology used by Soviet leaders from Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in 
the 1960’s to Gorbachev in his April 1991 visit to Tokyo, Nimmo divulged; 
  Where 25 years earlier Gromyko had said there was no territorial problem, and 
 Brezhnev had insisted in the 1970s that there were only “unresolved 
 differences,” and by the late 1980’s Shevardnadze had preferred to cite “the 
 geographic question,” Gorbachev agreed to the inclusion of specific details in a 
 joint communiqué on the talks by naming the islands that were claimed by Japan 
 (Nimmo 1994, 96). 
 
With this gradual recognition by the Soviets of the dispute, it was obvious the Japanese 
where making progress.  When Yeltsin emerged as president of the Russian Federation 
in 1992 this continued, however unsteadily.  Known for his impulsiveness and 
irritability, Yeltsin once remarked in 1991 about the territorial dispute with Japan, 
“reconsidering the borders is out of the question for now.  It would be blood again” 
(Nimmo 1994, 109).  Just a year earlier, serving as representative of Russia Republic in 
the Soviet Union, Yeltsin proposed a five-stage, 15- to 20- year plan to transfer power of 
the southern Kuriles to Japan which was rejected by the hard lined Japanese leadership 
(Nimmo 1994, 109).    
 In February 1992 Yeltsin went a step further than Gorbachev’s detailed talks in a 
letter written to then Japanese Prime Minster Kiichi Miyazawa; “I am determined to 
continue pursuing a solution to the peace treaty issue, including the demarcation of 
territory, based on law and justice” (Nikkei Weekly [Tokyo] 1992a, 6).  He also stirred 
the Japanese optimism by identifying Japan as “a potential ally” (Nikkei Weekly [Tokyo] 
1992a, 6).  Hopes were high in Tokyo that an island transfer was imminent in 1992, but 
soon internal crises and the rise of nationalism in Russia would crush any optimism for 
the Japanese.  In May 1992 Yeltsin explained to Japanese Foreign Minister Michio 
Watanabe; “national sentiment against giving the islands back is making it difficult” 
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(Nikkei Weekly [Tokyo] 1992b, 5).  An article in The Economist also explained; “Mr. 
Yeltsin is under fire at home for his tough economic measures and for allowing the 
break-up of the Soviet empire.  As desperate as he may be for Japanese investment and 
technology, bartering away territory is at present out of the question” (The Economist 
[London] 1992a, 41). 
 In September 1992 Yeltsin was scheduled to make his first appearance in Tokyo 
as President of the Russian Federation.  Fearing he would sell or give away the southern 
Kuriles, conservative factions began pressuring him not to go.  Deputy chairman of the 
Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations Ivan Adronov 
explained at a parliamentary hearing why Yeltsin should not visit Tokyo, warning that 
“at this moment Russia is starting to give back these territories.”  Adronov continued: 
China…is still claiming two large pieces of our territory in the Amur region, 
including a suburb of Khabarovsk.  Latvia and Estonia are demanding that they 
be given part of Pskov and Leningrad oblasts and are accompanying this with 
firing at our soldiers.  You are well aware that there still remain in  Finland 
influential forces which are expressing out loud a desire to swallow up Karelia.  
There are already hankerings in the West and the East after Kaliningrad Oblast 
which had become a Russian land.  There would be an avalanche of territorial 
claims (Rossyskaya Gazetal [Moscow] 1992, 4-5). 
 
Less than a week before his scheduled September 13 arrival in Tokyo, Yeltsin 
postponed the trip citing “domestic circumstances” (Nimmo 1994, 149).  In May 1993 
Yeltsin postponed a second trip to Tokyo, this time citing a scheduling “inconvenience” 
(Nimmo 1994, 171).  Although Yeltsin did come to Tokyo for the July 1993 G-7 
summit, his officials worked out a previous agreement that the territorial dispute would 
not be discussed (Hasegawa 2000a, 191).  Nonetheless, Yeltsin issued a statement 
apologizing for the postponed visits, explaining the need to “remove the problems left 
over from World War II based on law and justice” (Yomiuri Shimbun [Tokyo] 1993, 1).  
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He also quipped to Miyazawa that “I can’t just promise some concessions or I may need 
a visa to get back home” (Japan Times Weekly [Tokyo] 1993, 2).   
 As governor of the Russian Republic and president of the Russian Federation, 
Yeltsin seemed willing to make progress on the territorial dispute with the Japanese by 
presenting a five-stage island transfer proposal and indicating to Miyazawa that he was 
“determined” to peacefully pursue solving the territorial issue.  However, known for his 
erratic behavior, Yeltsin’s responsiveness to the Japanese was tested by conservative 
members of the parliament.  Twice postponing trips to Tokyo and openly admitting that 
domestic politics was barring his participation in solving the territorial dispute, Yeltsin 
lost favor and trust among the Japanese.  The developments on solving the territorial 
dispute regressed to a tone similar to the era prior to Gorbachev’s rule, when, at least, 
the Soviet leader was willing to discuss the problem.  Now because of internal pressures, 
the Russian president was obligated to ignore the problem. 
 On October 12, 1993 Yeltsin finally visited Tokyo to rectify his twice postponed 
trips.  In order to relieve Yeltsin of uneasiness or controversy at home, Japanese Prime 
Minster Morihito Hosokawa carefully worked around the territorial dispute in the 
summits which remained focused on other affairs.  Yeltsin proclaimed his desire to 
develop Russo-Japanese relations on the basis of law and justice, not mentioning his 
previous offer of a five-stage process (Hasegawa 2000a, 192).  In the jointly signed 
Tokyo Declaration, the disputed territories were addressed: 
 Sharing the common view that the remnants of the difficult past in bilateral 
 relations must be overcome, the Japanese prime minister and the Russian 
 president conducted serious negotiations on the question of final possession of 
 Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, and the Habomai group.  Both sides agreed to 
 proceed with negotiations in order to sign the Peace Treaty as soon as possible 
 by solving the territorial issue on the basis of historical and juridical facts and 
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 documents worked out through agreements between the two countries, as well as 
 the principles of law and justice and by this fully normalize bilateral relations  
 (Tokyo Declaration 1993, 4). 
 
As a result of his visit to Tokyo, Yeltsin was able to co-sign a document that would be 
the foundation for Russo-Japanese relations for the next decade.  Furthermore, his five-
stage proposal was dismissed, and the territorial dispute was put back on the bilateral 
relations agenda without jeopardizing Yeltsin’s reputation in Russia.  With the Tokyo 
Declaration, the development of Russo-Japanese talks on the territorial dispute was 
amended and progress on the dispute surpassed that made with Gorbachev in 1991. 
 Developments on the territorial dispute were very slow after the signing of the 
Tokyo Declaration in October 1993 as both sides experienced changes in political 
leadership.  During the December 1993 campaign in which right-wing Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky was overwhelmingly favored, Yeltsin was obligated to “make a sharp right 
turn in all policies” (Hasegawa 2000a, 194).  When Japanese Foreign Minister Tsutomu 
Hata visited Moscow in March 1994 to reaffirm the Tokyo Declaration, he found 
Russian officials reluctant to do so (Hasegawa 2000a, 194).  Even more, Yeltsin refused 
to meet Hata fearing that he would have to reaffirm to the declaration if the meeting 
occurred (Hasegawa 2000a, 194). 
 When the anti-LDP coalition fell in April 1994 Hosokawa resigned his post as 
Prime Minister (Thayer 1996, 76).  Hata succeeded him for two months before resigning 
to the LDP-Socialist Party coalition, and socialist Tomiichi Murayama emerged as 
Prime Minister (Thayer 1996, 76-77).  Having a weak coalition with inexperienced and 
uncooperative cabinet members, Murayama was not able to adequately steer foreign 
policies (Hasegawa 2000a, 195).  Progress in bilateral developments was slow as 
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discussed by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa who reviewed media and academic content over the 
year prior and years subsequent to the signing of the Tokyo Declaration:  
Fewer articles and books were published in the press about the Kuriles after 
Yeltsin’s Tokyo visit, compared with the previous year, and if such publications 
appeared, they were…not conducive to the resolution of the territorial question 
(Hasegawa 2000a, 197). 
 
The political situations in both Japan and Russia were not conducive to bilateral 
developments on the territorial dispute.  However, this would soon change when 
Hashimoto was elected Japanese Prime Minister and Yevgeny Primakov was appointed 
Russian Foreign Minister in winter 1996, and Yeltsin won his second and final term as 
Russian President in summer 1996. 
 Upon being appointed as Foreign Minister, Primakov made it clear that Russia 
would abide by the 1993 Tokyo Declaration and it would remain the framework for 
bilateral political developments (Sarkisov 2000, 227).  He started his diplomacy by 
proposing the joint development of the disputed territories (Sarkisov 2000, 227).  Eager 
to make progress on the territorial dispute, the Japanese accepted his offer.  As a second 
offer Primakov put forward his commitment to an earlier proposal by Yeltsin to 
withdraw the 3,500 Russian soldiers from Kunashir and Iturup Islands (Sarkisov 2000, 
227). 
 Primakov’s moves opened up diplomatic relations between Russia and Japan on 
the territorial dispute.  From the Tokyo Declaration of October 1993 to January 1996 
when Primakov was appointed, Japan and Russia were in the midst of a diplomatic 
stalemate.  While economic ties were increasing via proposals such as the 1994 
Hashimoto Plan, there was little to no progress on the territorial dispute and thus, the 
normalization of relations.  With a series of weak Japanese Prime Ministers from 1994 
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through 1996 and Yeltsin’s strategic shift to the right to win popularity beginning 
December 1993, there was little room for progress on the territorial dispute.  However, 
with a couple of symbolic moves, Primakov temporarily revitalized Russo-Japanese 
relations and paved the way for the new Japanese foreign policy and the further 
developments to come. 
Statements: Yeltsin and Hashimoto 
 Much like a pendulum, Japanese optimism on an imminent solution to the 
territorial dispute has swung between extremes.  The optimism of late 1991 and early 
1992 was replaced by regret in late 1992 and early 1993 when Yeltsin twice postponed 
his visits to Tokyo.  Then with the Tokyo Declaration jointly signed in October 1993, 
optimistic attitudes reemerged only to be replaced by two years of unproductiveness on 
the Japanese side and recoil on the Russian side.  However, optimism would reemerge 
with the symbolic gestures by Primakov and the formulation of a new Japanese foreign 
policy by a promising Prime Minister. 
 In July 1997 Hashimoto detailed his new foreign policy in a speech to the Japan 
Association of Corporate Executives, in which he addressed Japanese diplomacy with 
the United States, China, Russia, and Central Asian countries.  In the speech, 1,950 of 
5,360 words, or 36 percent of the speech was dedicated to Japan’s diplomacy with 
Russia.  As for Japan’s diplomacy with China, 922 words, or 17 percent of the speech 
was dedicated to it.  Even less, 366 words, or seven percent of the speech dedicated to 
Japan’s diplomacy with the United States, and 450 words, or eight percent of the speech 
dedicated to Japan’s diplomacy with all Central Asian countries.  It is obvious from this 
analysis that the foreign policy with Russia deserved the most attention at the time.  This 
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speech signifies Hashimoto’s intent to strengthen Russo-Japanese relations and how he 
believed Japan’s relations with Russia were significant and called for greater discussion 
than other countries at the time. 
 It is interesting to note that there is one significant contradiction between 
Hashimoto’s foreign policy and the Tokyo Declaration.  Hashimoto mentioned in his 
address to the Diet in September 1997;    
        At the Denver [G-7] Summit in June, I stressed to President Boris Yeltsin the 
 importance of moving steadily forward in implementing the Tokyo Declaration, 
 and when I meet the President again in November of this year, I intend to lay a 
 foundation to open the path for development in a new Japan-Russia relationship 
 based on the three principles of “trust,” “mutual benefit” and “long-term 
 perspective” (speech by Hashimoto 1997b). 
 
The Tokyo Declaration, called for a solution to the territorial dispute “as soon as 
possible,” (Tokyo Declaration 1993) while Hashimoto expressed his desire “to discuss 
[the territorial dispute] calmly, based on a long-term perspective” (speech by Hashimoto 
1997a).  The axiom of a “long-term perspective,” which was possibly motivated by 
Primakov’s suggestion, received much criticism from Russians who viewed it as 
tanaage, or the “shelving” of the issue only to bring it back to the forefront later 
(Sarkisov 2000, 233).  Nonetheless, it contradicts the statement in the Tokyo 
Declaration to quickly solve the territorial dispute. 
 The first “no neck-tie” summit between Yeltsin and Hashimoto was held in 
November 1997 at Krasnoyarsk, Siberia.  The informal summit, held on the Yenisei 
River while the two leaders fished together, was very private with only one Russian 
interpreter accompanying the party (Zagorsky 2001, 78).  Two unofficial 
announcements were disclosed from the summit: first, it was leaked that Hashimoto 
never addressed the “return of the Northern Territories,” rather he would mention 
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“signing the peace treaty;” second, the leaders agreed that if a joint economic activity 
was successful on the southern Kuriles, a border demarcation would be settled 
(Zagorksy 2001, 78). 
 What can be confirmed from the official announcement is that Yeltsin proposed 
to “make the utmost efforts toward the conclusion of a peace treaty between the two 
countries by the year 2000 on the basis of the 1993 Tokyo Declaration” (Yeltsin-
Hashimoto Plan 1997, 12).  The two also issued goals in the Yeltsin-Hashimoto Plan on 
developing economic ties and increasing political dialog (Yeltsin-Hashimoto Plan 1997, 
12).  It is most likely that Yeltsin’s proposal to solve the territorial dispute by 2000 
came as a surprise to Hashimoto who had just outlined one of his axioms of his foreign 
policy as the maintenance of a long-term perspective four months earlier.  However, the 
Japanese leader was obviously compelled to agree to such a proposal despite the shame 
he would confront if the territorial dispute was not solved by the deadline.  Nonetheless, 
it, along with Yeltsin agreeing to continue growth based on the 1993 Tokyo Declaration, 
was a success for Hashimoto.  In all, the first “no neck-tie” summit resulted in optimism 
for both sides and for completely different reasons.  The Russians were optimistic that 
the Japanese would increase their economic aid, investment, and involvement in Siberia 
and the Russian Far East.  The Japanese were optimistic that the southern Kuriles would 
be returned to them; this time, without directly linking the return to aid packages.   
 In February 1998 Hashimoto gave an annual policy speech to the Diet which 
turned out to be unique in that he never made reference to hoppo ryodo, or the 
“Northern Territories.”  Since the Soviet era, all Japanese Prime Ministers had 
consistently reiterated the importance of the “Northern Territories problem” in the 
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annual policy speeches to the Diet.  This is a clear indication of how Hashimoto wanted 
to maintain a warm, mollifying position with Russia, and in particular, Yeltsin, who 
agreed to a peace treaty by the year 2000.   
 This absence of discussion on the territorial dispute did not go unnoticed in 
Japan.  At a press conference to detail the itinerary for Yeltsin’s April 1998 visit to 
Japan, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ken Shimanouchi spent several minutes answering 
questions about Yeltsin’s upcoming visit and Japanese foreign policy by reporters.  As a 
final question for the press conference, a reporter asked “Do you realize that in 45 
minutes that you have never mentioned the Northern Islands” (Press Conference by the 
Press Secretary 1998)?  Shimanouchi responded:   
 Nobody has asked me a question on the Northern Islands.  I have, however, 
 mentioned a number of times the negotiations for a peace treaty.  I have 
 mentioned the Tokyo Declaration.  I think that you have read the Tokyo 
 Declaration.  I do not think I need to read to you the relevant paragraphs of the 
 Tokyo Declaration regarding the Northern Territories (Press Conference by the 
 Press Secretary 1998). 
 
By citing his references to the Tokyo Declaration and negotiations for a peace treaty as 
items linked to the southern Kuriles, the press secretary proved that references he, 
Hashimoto, and the Foreign Ministry had made to the Tokyo Declaration and 
negotiations for a peace treaty were essentially references to the disputed southern 
Kuriles.  By linking these terms, it is obvious Hashimoto’s administration was simply 
disguising the terminology used in both the “no neck-tie” summit and in Hashimoto’s 
speech to the Diet.   
 In February 1998, Japanese Foreign Minister and future Prime Minister, Keizo 
Obuchi met with Primakov in Moscow to set up a second “no neck-tie” summit for their 
premiers.  In addition to his meeting with Primakov, Obuchi met with officials to sign 
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agreements on fish-industry cooperation in the southern Kuriles (Current Digest 1998, 
21).  According to the agreement, Japanese fishermen are permitted to harvest fish 
legally in Russian territorial waters while regulated only by Japanese border guards 
(Current Digest 1998, 21).  This long-awaited agreement came after two Japanese 
fishing boats were captured and the captains detained in 1994, an incident which 
followed years of similar interactions (Valliant 1999, 158).   
 The second “no neck-tie” summit was held in April 1998 at the Kawana Hotel in 
the resort city of Ito, Shizuoka.  Again at this informal summit, the two leaders 
discussed bilateral affairs while fishing in a nearby river (Agence France-Presse [Paris] 
1998).  Yet again, Hashimoto changed his terminology referring to territorial dispute at 
the Kawana summit as an issue of “border delimitation” (Asahi Shimbun [Tokyo] 1998a, 
1).  By using the term “border delimitation,” Hashimoto was more specific to Japanese 
interest than at the Krasnoyarsk summit when he would only refer to the “signing of a 
peace treaty.”  However, he was not as specific as the fundamental Japanese notion of a 
“simultaneous return of the four Northern islands,” despite that being the objective.   
 Yeltsin began the summit explaining to Hashimoto that he was “dissatisfied with 
the slow progress towards solving the Kurile Islands dispute” (Agence France-Presse 
[Paris] 1998).  However, the Russian leader had surprisingly little to offer at the summit, 
which took place just over a year and a half before his 2000 deadline to solve the 
territorial dispute.  Hashimoto had more to offer.  First, in response to Yeltsin’s 
dissatisfaction, Hashimoto proposed that both sides would hold regular vice ministerial 
talks to accelerate progress towards a peace treaty (Agence Frace-Presse [Paris] 1998).  
He also indicated that the Japanese were “considering supply[ing] [a] diesel-powered 
 136 
generator to residents on the disputed Kurile islands, because of the electricity shortages 
there” (Agence Frace-Presse [Paris] 1998).   
 Most significant, Hashimoto offered Yeltsin a detailed proposal for peace.  
Within this proposal, Russia would recognize Japanese sovereignty over the southern 
Kuriles, but Russia could maintain administrative control for an unspecified period 
(Current Digest 1998, 21).  Labeled the “Hong Kong formula,” it was more reminiscent 
of the Japanese-American arrangement for Okinawa after World War II, whereby the 
United States recognized Tokyo’s “residual sovereignty” over the territory, but the 
actual return was forthcoming after specific negotiations (Zagorsky 2001, 79).  
Hashimoto’s peace proposal was realistic, given Yeltsin’s similar five-stage proposal of 
the Soviet era and his desire to see a peace treaty signed by 2000.  Yeltsin described the 
proposal to the press as an “interesting proposal” which he would need some “serious 
contemplation” in order to respond (Current Digest 1998, 21).   
 Yeltsin’s adviser at the summit showed less enthusiasm in the proposal.  
Presidential adviser Boris Nemtsov explained at the summit that it was “perfectly clear 
that until our economic cooperation reaches a certain level, resolving any political 
problems will simply be impossible” (Current Digest 1998, 21).  He also affirmed that 
“as long as public opinion in Russia stays the way it is now, finding a solution will be 
impossible” (Current Digest 1998, 21).  Yeltsin never firmly rejected Hashimoto’s 
proposal, but it was understood he would not agree to it as he called for solving the 
peace treaty “in the very near future” at the end of the summit (Current Digest 1998, 21). 
 In response to Hashimoto’s proposal, Yeltsin also offered his own peace 
proposal which he called the “Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation” (Yeltsin-
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Hashimoto Summit 1998).  Within this treaty, long-term cooperative relationships in 
fields ranging from economic activities to culture would be enhanced and Russo-
Japanese relations would be officially normalized (Yeltsin-Hashimoto Summit 1998).  
However, Yeltsin’s treaty made no mention to the territorial dispute or border 
delineation.  Rather, it would be handled after relations were normalized.   
The offering of the “Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation” was a sudden 
move by Yeltsin who had expressed his desire to end the territorial dispute at the 
opening of the summit.  Furthermore, it was in contrast to Article Two of the Tokyo 
Declaration which stated that the territorial dispute must be solved prior to the 
normalization of relations (Current Digest 1998, 21).  Hashimoto responded that he 
would consider Yeltsin’s proposal if Yeltsin could agree to his “Hong Kong formula,” 
thus combining the two proposals.  Final replies would be announced later as the two 
leaders agreed to meet in Russia in the autumn for an official summit, and back in Japan 
in spring 1999.  However, the agreed official summits would not occur between the two 
as Hashimoto would resign less than three months later and Yeltsin would continue to 
weaken both physically and politically (Ziegler 1999, 17). 
 At the Kawana summit, both leaders raised the ante from the positive steps made 
at Krasnoyarsk.  With the clock winding down to 2000 the two leaders made the first 
official peace proposals since the 1956 Soviet-Japanese summits.  Yeltsin’s peace 
proposal was incomplete for Hashimoto who needed a solution to the territorial dispute 
prior to normalizing relations. Hashimoto simply misjudged Yeltsin’s reaction to his 
proposal.  Possibly, it was Hashimoto’s timing that resulted in Yeltsin’s indirect 
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rejection of his peace proposal.  As it appeared after Kawana, the struggle to solve the 
territorial dispute would continue into the final moments before the deadline. 
 In July 1998 Hashimoto resigned and Obuchi, who was a member of the 
Hashimoto-led faction in the LDP, succeeded him to become Prime Minister.  The 
autumn 1998 summit in Russia scheduled between Yeltsin and Hashimoto would still 
take place; however, Obuchi would take the place of Hashimoto in the summit with 
Yeltsin.  Obuchi and Yeltsin met in November 1998 at Moscow.  The summit was 
official and, unlike the previous two Yeltsin-Hashimoto summits, neck-ties were worn 
by the two leaders (Asahi Shimbun [Tokyo] 1998b, 1).  The two met for only an hour 
and a half in the Kremlin, yet managed to produce the lengthy Moscow Declaration 
which reiterated the commitment by both sides to conclude a peace treaty by 2000.  In 
addition, the document created two subcommissions, one on border demarcation and a 
second on joint economic activities on the southern Kuriles, under the existing joint 
commission on peace treaty negotiations (Ziegler 1999, 18). 
 As for the final answer on Hashimoto’s “interesting” peace proposal offered at 
Kawana, Yeltsin responded that the Russians were not able to agree to the Hashimoto’s 
“Hong Kong formula” (Asahi Shimbun [Tokyo] 1998b, 1).  Furthermore,  
Russia propose[s] to conclude the Treaty on Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation 
without solving the territorial dispute, including a clause promising further 
negotiations and a settlement in the future.  Current debates on the Southern 
Kuriles would be better channeled to the topic of joint economic development 
(Asahi Shimbun [Tokyo] 1998b, 1). 
 
Yeltsin had made it clear that he was only willing to sign a peace treaty if the Japanese 
would separate their bond between a peace treaty and a prior solution to the territorial 
dispute.  The multilayered approach had indeed softened Japanese foreign policy, but 
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normalizing relations without a prior solution to the territorial dispute would remain 
unacceptable to the Japanese, as did Yeltsin’s twice offered “Treaty on Peace, 
Friendship, and Cooperation.”  Each item of Yeltsin’s counterproposal was 
impermissible to the Japanese, and the possibility of solving the territorial dispute 
seemed less likely to happen by 2000, if at all.  However, Yeltsin did agree to visit 
Japan in spring 1999 to continue working on a peace treaty. 
 In March 1999 Yeltsin postponed his visit to Japan, the third postponement by 
Yeltsin since he became president of Russia, citing his “health condition” as the factor 
(BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific [Tokyo] 1999).  With the year 2000 deadline nine months 
away, the Japanese would send a delegate to visit Yeltsin and assure he would come to 
Japan in the autumn.  Having the best rapport with the Russian leader of any officials in 
Tokyo, Hashimoto would inquire about Yeltsin’s future visit to Japan while he visited 
Moscow.  
 After resigning as Prime Minister in July 1998, Hashimoto was appointed to top 
foreign policy advisor by his successor, Obuchi.  In April 1999 Hashimoto went to 
Moscow upon invitation by Yeltsin to meet for the final time (Ivanov 1999, 4).  
Although no significant breakthroughs were achieved, the two reaffirmed their 
commitments to solve the territorial dispute and thus, sign a peace treaty (Ivanov 1999, 
4).  However, this time, the two individuals worded the affirmation “in 2000,” not “by 
2000,” a clear indication that the two realized the deadline was fast approaching and 
perhaps unrealistic in the short-term (Ivanov 1999, 4).  Hashimoto also asked Yeltsin to 
visit Japan in the autumn, to which Yeltsin agreed (Ivanov 1999, 4).  A Yeltsin visit to 
Japan in autumn 1999 would obviously be the final attempt by the two countries to 
 140 
solve the territorial dispute by the 2000 deadline set in November 1997.  In what 
became characteristic to the Japanese, Yeltsin postponed his autumn 1999 visit to the 
spring 2000 again citing “health concerns” in December 1999 (Associated Press 
Newswires [Moscow] December 17, 1999). 
 Days after Yeltsin cancelled his autumn 1999 visit to Tokyo in December 1999, 
he announced his resignation effective at the end of the year, thus leaving Japanese 
officials bitter over his delayed and apparently cancelled trip to Japan (Japan Economic 
Newswire [Tokyo] 1999b).  The November 1997 deadline “by 2000” was a failure for 
Yeltsin as well as Hashimoto who agreed to it.  However, the two did change their 
terminology from “by 2000” to “in 2000,” adding one more year to solve the territorial 
dispute and thus, normalize relations. 
Statements: 2000 to Present 
 With Yeltsin’s resignation effective December 31, 1999 and Obuchi’s fatal 
stroke in April 2000, the new premiers of the two countries would have no involvement 
with previous bilateral contacts and were not bound by former propositions.  
Furthermore, the 1997 Yeltsin-Hashimoto Plan was set to expire in September, three 
years after the accord was signed.  With this, new Russian President Vladimir Putin and 
Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori met in Septemeber 2000 in Tokyo to repair the 
resentment left over from Yeltsin’s actions.   
 On his way to Tokyo Putin made his position on the territorial dispute clear at a 
stop at Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk; “But who has said we are going to give up the islands” 
(Vremia News Agency [Moscow] 2000)?  At the summit, Mori reintroduced 
Hashimoto’s “Hong Kong formula” as a solution for peace. However, Putin responded 
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“Russia’s plans do not completely match Japan’s but I recognize the problem’s 
existence and am ready to continue negotiations based on past agreements with Japan” 
(Japan Times [Tokyo] 2000, 1).  Also at the summit, Putin inform Mori that he would 
not pursue utilizing Yeltsin’s proposed “Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation Treaty” as 
Putin stressed that he recognized that a peace treaty is directly linked to the territorial 
dispute (Zagorsky 2001, 82).  Secondly, Putin notified Mori that he would accept the 
1956 Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration, which transferred Shikotan and the Habomai 
group to Japanese sovereignty, as an acceptable peace treaty (Zagorsky 2001, 82). 
Nonetheless, it was clear from the September 2000 summit that the Yeltsin-Hashimoto 
deadline extended in 2000 would not be reached.   
 By rejecting Yeltsin’s peace proposal yet accepting the 1956 Soviet-Japanese 
proposal, Putin offered a new approach to seeking a solution on the territorial dispute.  
However, it is interesting to note Putin’s inconsistency; where in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk 
Putin assured Russians that no islands would be given up, he agreed to the 1956 Soviet-
Japanese peace treaty in which Russia would relinquish control of Shikotan and the 
Habomai group.  Putin’s support of the 1956 Soviet-Japanese treaty would cause a stir 
in both countries’ state ministries through the following years, however he has remained 
consistent is his position. 
 In January 2001 Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov met with his Japanese 
counterpart, Yohei Kono in Moscow.  At the meeting, Ivanov irritably turned down a 
proposal by Kono to return Shikotan and the Habomai group, as specified in the 1956 
proposal, on the condition talks could continue on the other two islands (Izvestia 
[Moscow] 2001, 12).  Ivanov responded to Kono “the 1956 declaration has nothing to 
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do with Kunashir and Iturup Islands” (Izvestia [Moscow] 2001, 12).  The two left the 
meeting with no agreements made. 
 Kono’s offering to accept the 1956 Soviet-Japanese proposal did not sit well 
with other cabinet members, including Hashimoto who was serving as Director General 
of Hokkaido and Okinawa Development Agency.  Upon Kono’s return, Hashimoto 
remarked “Japan would adhere to the basic policy of winning back all the disputed 
islands at once.  It is inconceivable that Japan should propose a return of two islands, 
Habomai and Shikotan, preceding the reversion of the remaining two” (BBC Monitoring 
Asia Pacific [Tokyo] 2001).  Mori, however, agreed to Kono’s offering as he indicated 
to Putin in a second, otherwise unproductive summit in March 2001 at Irkutsk. 
 At this point, it is worth detailing the impact that Japanese official Muneo 
Suzuki has had on Japanese foreign policy and Russo-Japanese relations.  Suzuki first 
entered the Diet in 1983 serving for a constituency in eastern Hokkaido (Shimoinaba 
1997, 5).  In 1997 Hashimoto appointed him Director General of the Hokkaido and 
Okinawa Development Agency (Japan Economic Newswire [Tokyo] 1998b).  In June 
1998 Suzuki visited Kunashir Island, being the first Japanese cabinet minister to visit 
one of the disputed territories (Japan Economic Newswire [Tokyo] 1998a).  While at 
Kunashir, Suzuki presented Vladimir Zema, head of the Russian Southern Kuril zone, 
with funds to assist in the rebuilding of a pier destroyed in the 1994 earthquake (Japan 
Economic Newswire [Tokyo] 1998a).  Serving as Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for 
Political Affairs, Suzuki made a second visit to Kunashir Island in July 1999 (Japan 
Economic Newswire [Tokyo] 1999a).  Suzuki won favor from island residents when he 
announced that Tokyo would provide 2,000 tons of diesel fuel and medical supplies, and 
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would also dispatch Japanese doctors to the island (Japan Economic Newswire [Tokyo] 
1999a).  In addition, the Japanese would donate other materials for the schools (Japan 
Economic Newswire [Tokyo] 1999a).   
 In February 2001 Suzuki was critical of Hashimoto’s demand that all four 
disputed islands be settled simultaneously, “The remarks may send an incorrect message 
to Russia that Japan is inflexible on the matter” (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific [Tokyo] 
2001).  Suzuki was in obvious support of Kono’s plan to adhere to the 1956 peace plan 
while continuing talks on Iturup and Kunashir (Yomiuri Shimbun [Tokyo] 2001b, 8).  In 
April 2000, Suzuki went to Moscow as an envoy for Mori where he disclosed to Putin 
by phone that Japan would be interested in agreeing to the 1956 Soviet-Japanese peace 
proposal, a suggestion that Putin would later propose at his November 2000 summit 
with Mori (Yomiuri Shimbun [Tokyo] 2002b, 3).  Also in support of the 1956 peace plan 
was Mori who in November 2001 notified Suzuki regarding diplomatic relations with 
Russia: “I will be counting on you.  I’ll change the government’s policy course 
concerning negotiations with Moscow over the Northern Territories back to the original 
version that you and I jointly agreed on” (Yomiuri Shimbun [Tokyo] 2001b, 8).   
 By February 2002 Suzuki’s dominant influence in foreign affairs began to 
collapse when fellow Diet members began questioning if he was unlawfully using 
public funds in projects he initiated at Kunashir Island.  Japanese Communist Party 
official Kensho Sasaki revealed that a community center built on Kunashir named the 
“Muneo House” by residents was actually built by a Hokkaido construction company 
which received the task as a kickback for political donations to Suzuki (Asahi Shimbun 
[Tokyo] 2002a, 2).  Furthermore, a clinic on Shikotan was named the Muneo Suzuki 
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Medical Office and a four-wheel drive vehicle given to the island by Japan in 1992 was 
referred to as the “Muneo” (Asahi Shimbun [Tokyo] 2002a, 2).  Suzuki refuted Sasaki’s 
charges stating 
 I did not name those facilities such as Muneo House and Muneo Suzuki Medical 
 Office.  The local residents have used those names based on trust.  The political 
 donations have been handled according to the provisions of the law and there has 
 been nothing suspicious about them (Asahi Shimbun [Tokyo] 2002a, 2). 
 
Suzuki lost even more credibility in March when an internal document was found in 
which Suzuki was quoted as saying: “If the [disputed] islands are returned, it will not 
bring the nation any benefit.  The government should terminate negotiations for the 
return of the territory and instead promote economic exchanges with the four islands” 
(Yomiuri Shimbun [Tokyo] 2002a, 1).  Suzuki was asked to resign his post in the Diet as 
well as his membership in the LDP, and later was indicted for bribery charges (Asahi 
Shimbun [Tokyo] 2002a, 3). 
 The acts of Suzuki scarred Russo-Japanese relations and in particular, progress 
on the territorial dispute.  In July 2002 the residents of Kunashir Island, who at one time 
called Suzuki “Santa Claus,” complained that “Japan’s assistance smacks of political 
intentions” (Asahi Shimbun [Tokyo] 2002b, 1).  A village mayor in Iturup declared “We 
do not feel a need for Japan’s assistance anymore” (Asahi Shimbun [Tokyo] 2002b, 1).  
As a result of the Suzuki scandals, Tokyo suspended large-scale projects on the islands 
in early 2002 until further notice (Asahi Shimbun [Tokyo] 2002b, 1).   
Throughout 2002 Russo-Japanese relations would have to be put on hold while 
the Japanese would clean up the mess made by Suzuki and possibly rework their foreign 
policy which, officially, was still the 1997 multilayered approach.  In April 2001, 
Junichiro Koizumi replaced Mori as Prime Minister.  In October 2001 Koizumi 
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confirmed his position’ “We won’t sign a peace treaty with Russia unless it confirms 
that all four islands belong to Japan,” thus adhering to Hashimoto’s stance and objecting 
to that of Mori and Suzuki (Yomiuri Shimbun [Tokyo] 2001a, 1).  In January 2003 
Koizumi attempted to place the multilayered approach back on track when he met with 
Putin in Moscow.  Koizumi assured Putin he was not in favor of the 1956 Soviet-
Japanese proposal or the two-step approach preferred by Mori and Suzuki, “Once the 
attribution of the four islands is determined, we’ll be able to more flexibly consider the 
return of the territories” (Mochizuki 2003, 1).   
 The two leaders proceeded in the summit by signing what was described as an 
“action plan,” not a formal treaty (Myers 2003, A.6).  The first initiative of the Japan-
Russia Action Plan is the “Deepening of Political Dialogue: Advancing Multilayered 
and Comprehensive Dialogue” (MOFA 2003).  Note the obvious reference to the 
foreign policy of a multilayered approach. Two of Hashimoto’s axioms are also 
mentioned in the fourth initiative; “Cooperation in Trade and Economic Areas: Trust 
and Actions of Mutual Benefit” (MOFA 2003). Overall, the action plan included various 
means to increasing bilateral cooperation via economic, cultural, and security ties.  For 
Hashimoto the 2003 Japan-Russia Action Plan was a success because it deepened 
bilateral relations at various layers while the territorial dispute would not bar progress in 
these areas.  Additionally, Koizumi concurred with the implementations of the 
multilayered approach and the foreign policy was back on track. 
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Cultural and Economic Influence on Islands’ Residents 
 Public opinion has played a substantial role in the territorial dispute since the fall 
of the Soviet Union, particularly the opinion of those who reside on the southern Kuriles.  
If the current residents could see the economic benefits of living under Japanese rule or 
relocating at the Japanese expense, Tokyo would have an advantage in the territorial 
dispute.  To win the support of the current residents, the Japanese would have to create a 
friendly, neighborly atmosphere in which the current residents would consider Tokyo 
more responsive to their regional needs than Moscow.  However, obvious barriers exist.   
 The current residents are ethnic Russians who speak Russian (Okuyama 2003, 
46).  Most moved to the islands in the 1950’s and 1960’s because of salaries that were 
offered two- and three-times higher than the mainland (Okuyama 2003, 46).  Because all 
former Japanese residents were either extradited to Japan, escaped to Japan, died in the 
short-lived war, or sent to Siberia war camps, none of the current residents have ethnic 
kinships with the Japanese.  Furthermore, the predominant religion on the southern 
Kuriles is Eastern Orthodoxy, not Buddhism or Shinto, and the standard alcoholic 
beverage is vodka, not sake (Filipov 1997, A2).  If the current residents of the southern 
Kuriles are to support the transfer of sovereignty, the Japanese have to build cultural 
bonds with the residents.  Furthermore, a second difficulty to building a friendship and 
winning an ally on the territorial dispute is the wealth disparity.  Currently, Japan ranks 
among the wealthiest of countries while the current residents of the southern Kuriles are 
living in poverty with energy and health supplies shortages.  The current residents will 
only welcome the opening of cultural bonds if the Japanese are willing to economically 
support the residents. 
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 In this section the methods to entice the current residents of the southern Kuriles 
by Tokyo, via increasing Japanese cultural presence and economic ties with the islands, 
are revealed.  Hashimoto called for the building of economic ties with Russia without 
linking it to the territorial dispute.  In addition, he also stated in his July 1997 speech:  
 One example of a major advance toward the resolution of [the territorial] issue is 
 the movement to foster continuing trust in the islands through visits to graves in 
 the Northern Territories and Fishery Frameworks which are currently under 
 negotiation, among other measures (speech by Hashimoto 1997a).  
  
By increasing personal interactions between Japanese and the current residents, closer 
bonds are being built between the parties.  And with an increase in Japanese cultural 
presence on the islands, the residents will gradually feel more akin to their neighbors a 
few hundred miles to the south in Tokyo than their contemporaries thousands of miles 
west in Moscow. 
Chronological Backdrop 
 In 1986 an agreement was made between Soviet and Japanese officials to allow 
former residents and their families to visit grave sites on Soviet territory including the 
southern Kuriles (Panov 1995, 76).  Until this time the Soviet residents had insufficient 
contact with the Japanese and knew little about the territorial dispute itself (Nimmo 
1994, 129).  After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1992, the residents of the southern 
Kuriles began receiving invitations to Hokkaido for cultural exchanges whereby the 
Japanese could plea their case to the residents.  Upon arriving at the nearest Hokkaido 
port town of Nemuro, the Russians found billboards on the docks stating “Welcome to 
Nemuro.  Give back the Northern Territories” (Baker 1995, 3)!  In 1996 Japanese 
fishermen who had entered Russian waters near the Kuriles were shot at and detained by 
Russian officials, causing an increase of hostilities in the region (Filipov 1997, A2).  
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Hostilities continued in 1997 when residents of Nemuro complained that the Russian 
authorities placed a 30 foot Orthodox cross on one of the Habomai islands less than 
three miles from the Nemuro coasts (Filipov 1997, A2).  Inscribed on the cross was a 
plea for future Russian leaders not to give up the islands (Filipov 1997, A2).   
 Despite these unconventional hostilities, relations between Japanese and the 
current residents of the southern Kuriles have typically been pleasant since the fall of 
the Soviet Union.  In response to the October 1994 Kunashir Island earthquake which 
resulted in 11 deaths, Tokyo offered 100 million yen in much needed humanitarian aid 
to the residents of the southern Kuriles (Japan Policy & Politics [Tokyo] 1994, 1).  In 
April 1998 Russian and Japanese officials agreed to allow visa-free exchanges between 
the southern Kurile residents and the Japanese (Japan Economic Newswire [Tokyo] 
1998).  As agreed upon at Suzuki’s first visit to Kunashir in June 1998 a Japanese 
language teacher would be sent to Kunashir as the first specialist to visit the island after 
visa-free exchanges were initiated (Japan Economic Newswire [Tokyo] 1998a).  As 
previously mentioned, Suzuki also provided 450 million yen in humanitarian aid to 
assist in the rebuilding of a pier which was destroyed in the 1994 earthquake (Japan 
Economic Newswire [Tokyo] 1998a).   
 In November 1998 Tokyo pledged to donate two power generators and ten tons 
of emergency food aid to the southern Kurile residents to prepare for the upcoming 
winter (Matloff 1998, 6).  Meanwhile, the Japanese cultural influence was beginning to 
show on the southern Kuriles, as described by one writer who visited the islands; “Sushi 
abounds, as do Toyota and Nissan vehicles” (Matloff 1998, 6).  In July 1999 Suzuki 
conducted a second visit to Kunashir, this time bringing with him 2,000 tons of diesel 
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fuels, 18,000 disposable syringes, and announcing he would dispatch doctors to the 
southern Kuriles (Jiji Press 1999).  In addition, the schools would receive Russian 
books, stationary products, and electronic organs from Japanese donations (Jiji Press 
1999).  Suzuki also began talks on constructing an emergency shelter/community center 
in Yuzhno-Kurilsk, Kunashir, which would later be the primary cause for his dismissal 
from the Diet and his arrest in 2002 (Jiji Press 1999).   
 By 2001 the quality of life for the southern Kurile residents was beginning to 
improve as a result of combined efforts by the Japanese, Russian, and local officials 
(Chernyakova 2001, 8).  In July 2001 Sakhalin Oblast Vice Governor Sergei Podolyan 
openly credited Japan for solving the energy problems on the islands by providing fuel 
and building a generator (Chernyakova 2001, 8).  Podolyan further credited Moscow for 
assisting in road construction and the construction of a hydrothermal power station 
(Chernyakova 2001, 8).  In 1999 federal and regional government investment in the 
economies and infrastructures of the southern Kuriles amounted to $2.54 million 
(Chernyakova 2001, 8).   However by 2000 investment increased to $9.78 million 
(Chernyakova 2001, 8).  From 1999 to 2000 average salary of the residents grew from 
$109.65 a month to $154.55 a month (Chernyakova 2001, 8), and in 2001 the islands 
finally gained access to Internet connections (Chernyakova 2001, 8).   
 As it appeared the Japanese were facing competition from the Russians to assist 
development of the southern Kuriles, a disparity emerged in the development of each 
island.  Iturup has experienced the best results in development.  The island has the 
highest trade volume, with much of the trade coming from the United States, 
particularly Alaska (Ferguson 2000, 1).  In 1999 Iturup exported 60 percent of its 
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marine products to the United States and 30 percent to Japan (Ferguson 2000, 1).  
Rhenium has recently been found in the volcanoes on the northern portions of the island 
(Ferguson 2000, 1).  If the development of rhenium, which is used in electronic 
components, spacecraft, missiles, and high-octane fuel, is successful, the residents of 
Iturup could see an additional boost to their economy (Ferguson 2000, 1). 
 The economic situations at Kunashir and especially Shikotan are not so great.  
Power outages are a daily occurrence, and the islands are rapidly depopulating 
(Ferguson 2000, 1).  The population of Shikotan has fallen from 6,543 in 1994 to nearly 
half at 3,746 in 2000 (Ferguson 2000, 1).  On Kunashir, which was most affected by the 
1994 earthquake, the 1994 population was just over 11,700 (Brooke 2002, A4).  In 2002 
the population was around 7,800 (Brooke 2002, A4).  However, the Japanese cultural 
and economic presence at these two islands has been the most prevalent.  At Shikotan, 
where the Japanese have sent a disproportionally large amount of economic aid, Tokyo 
has financed the construction of a hospital (the Muneo Suzuki Medical Office), a school, 
a power generator, and the Japanese are also providing fuel and food on a regular basis 
(Working 2001, 1).  At Kunashir the Japanese were responsible for financing the 
construction of the 417 million yen Muneo House and the rebuilding of a marine pier 
(Asahi Shimbun [Tokyo] 2002a, 2).  Also, the diesel power generators built by Japan in 
2000 account for one-third of the island’s total power supply (Asahi Shimbun [Tokyo] 
2002b, 11).  Japan accounted for 50 percent of the total exports from the island with the 
majority of the remainder being exported to the United States (Asahi Shimbun [Tokyo] 
2002b, 11).  In 1997 Kunashir residents reported that 40 percent of their food came from 
 151 
Japan, and among the few thousand vehicles in the island, all were Japanese make 
except five Russian vehicles (Okuyama 2003, 47).     
 When the Suzuki scandals broke out in February 2002, the building of relations 
between the current residents of the southern Kuriles and the Japanese regressed.  One 
mayor declared “We appreciate Japan’s assistance such as diesel power generators, but 
recently we do not feel a need for Japan’s assistance anymore” (Asahi Shimbun [Tokyo] 
2002b, 11).  As a result of the Suzuki scandals and his role as advisor to MOFA, budget 
allocations for direct aid to the southern Kurile residents was cut 85 percent to 47.4 
million yen in 2003 (Takahara 2003, 1).  The overall budget which included 
construction and paying for exchange programs was also cut from 708 million yen in 
2002 to 364 million yen in 2003 (Takahara 2003, 1).  However, the Japanese revived 
their humanitarian aid program to the southern Kuriles in early 2004 when a ship 
carrying 9.4 million yen worth of supplies was sent to the islands (BBC Monitoring 
Asia-Pacific [Tokyo] 2004). 
Public Opinion 
   Polls taken in the southern Kuriles on the territorial dispute have had varying 
results, yet some consistency remains (Working 2001, 1).  In April 1998, the Hokkaido 
Shimbun conducted a comprehensive poll of the islanders, asking if they agreed with the 
return of the islands to Japan.  On average, 73 percent of responses said either “Never” 
or “No transfer, but mutual management,” while 27 percent responded “Transfer and  
mutual management” or “Return the islands to Japan” (Hokkaido Shimbun [Sapporo] 
1998, 1).  Interestingly, responses varied by island.  On Iturup, the island least impacted 
by Japanese aid, 76 percent responded either “Never” or “No transfer, but mutual 
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 “Should Russia return the Southern Kurile Islands to Japan?”  
(Values given in Percentage) 
   
      Kunashir   Iturup   Shikotan 
Never               48          53      36 
No, but Mutual Management    37          23      22 
Yes, with Mutual Management      5           1       7 
Immediate Return      10          23      34 
 
Source: Hokkaido Shimbun, 16 April 1998, p. 1 
 
2001 Addendum 
 “Should Russia return the Southern Kurile Islands to Japan?” 
(Values given in Percentage) 
 
      Kunashir   Iturup   Shikotan 
Never         48          58      26     
 
Source: Hokkaido Shimbun, 7 January 2001, p. 4 
 
 
Table 1.  Poll taken on southern Kuriles by Hokkaido Shimbun, 1998 and 2001. 
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 management” (Hokkaido Shimbun [Sapporo] 1998, 1).  Of this, more than 50 percent 
wanted to never transfer power (Hokkaido Shimbun [Sapporo] 1998, 1).  On Kunashir, 
“Never” or “No transfer, but mutual management” averaged 85 percent, with just less 
than half of respondents indicating they would prefer to never see the islands restored to 
Japan (Hokkaido Shimbun [Sapporo] 1998, 1).  On Shikotan, only 58 percent of 
respondents stated they “Never” wanted transfer, or “No transfer, but mutual 
management” (Hokkaido Shimbun [Sapporo] 1998, 1).  Regarding those who support an 
immediate restoration of the islands, 34 percent from Shikotan were in support, while 23 
from Iturup were, and only ten were in support from Kunashir. 
 Overall, “Never” and “Immediate Return” were both more favorable than either 
of the “mutual management” alternatives.  Among Kunashir residents, 42 percent would 
prefer a mutual management arrangement, while 24 percent of Iturup residents and 29 
percent of Shikotan residents also selected either of the “Mutual Management” options.  
Given that the two extreme options were favored by majorities on all three islands, 
opinions appear to be strong among the islanders.  
 In an update to this study, the Hokkaido Shimbun found in 2001 that the percent 
of residents in Iturup who responded “Never” transfer sovereignty increased from 53 
percent in 1998 to 58 percent in 2001 (Hokkaido Shimbun [Sapporo] 2001, 4).  Also 
observed was that the percent of Shikotan residents who responded “Never” transfer 
sovereignty decreased from 36 percent in 1998 to 26 percent in 2001, thus widening the 
gap in public opinion between Shikotan residents and Iturup residents (Hokkaido 
Shimbun [Sapporo] 2001, 4).  Kunashir residents maintained a response close to 48 
percent in both polls (Hokkaido Shimbun [Sapporo] 2001, 4). 
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 Clearly, a different attitude is emerging between the residents of Shikotan and 
the other islands.  Shikotan residents have seen the greatest effect of Japanese aid on 
their island which has the worst economy (Hokkaido Shimbun [Sapporo] 1999, 3).  On 
numerous occasions, Shikotan residents have presented a petition to Moscow proposing 
that Russia lease the Northern Territories to Japan, yet the idea was unsurprisingly never 
considered by Russian officials (Myer 1999, 3B).  It is geographically the most isolated 
from the other inhabited Kuriles, and given that the island would have been transferred 
in the 1956 Soviet-Japanese proposal, Shikotan residents likely understand how 
vulnerable they are to any change in the border demarcation.  Furthermore, aside from 
the uninhabited Habomais, Shikotan is the only southern Kurile Island which maintains 
its Japanese name rather using a Russian name1. 
 The residents of Iturup possibly have more pro-Russian tendencies because of 
the impact Russian investment has had on the island.  Living conditions are fair, and 
with a growing fishing industry on the island, the population is also increasing 
(Ferguson 2000, 1).  Generally, Iturup residents will continue looking to the mainland 
and Sakhalin for economic and industrial support unless they can more clearly see the 
benefits of Japanese economic aid and a change of sovereignty.   
 The survey suggests that Kunashir residents harbor the strongest reaction against  
immediate return, despite the large amount of Japanese aid that has been allocated to the 
island and the cultural exchanges that have occurred.  A consistent 48 percent of 
Kunashir residents indicated they would never support island restoration, and in the  
                                                          
1
 The Japanese names Etorofu and Kunashiri are simply reflections of the Japanese pronunciation of the 
Russian names for the islands.  Although this fact is based on historical maps of the area, it is disputed in 
Japan today. 
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initial survey 85 percent of residents implied they would not support restoration in any 
form.  In terms of economic development, Kunashir falls between Iturup and Shikotan, 
however it is the most populous island and serves as a regional seat of government for 
Sakhalin Oblast.  As such, it has closer connections to Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, the capitol 
city of the oblast, and the remainder of Russia.  With the more recent developments of 
the Suzuki scandals, another Hokkaido Shimbun survey would likely point toward 
further trends.  The residents of Kunashir were so fond of Suzuki they referred to him as 
“Santa Claus” when he came to visit in the summers of 1998 and 1999.  However they 
were consistent to resist the economic and cultural enticements from the Japanese.  
 It seems that the residents of Kunashir and a number of residents in all southern 
Kuriles appreciate the assistance and attention received from Tokyo; however, they are 
not accepting the arguments they hear when Japanese officials visit the islands or during 
exchange visits to Japan.  One Kunashir resident who went on a Japanese-financed trip 
to a “friendship banquet” in Hokkaido explained, “They try to convince us, and we 
listen politely” (Working 2001, 2).  When asked why go if her mind was already made 
up, the Kunashir resident replied “If they invite us, why should we decline?  We want to 
see how they live” (Working 2001, 2).   
 Since the implementation of the multilayered approach to foreign policy, Tokyo 
has worked to increase its economic and cultural presence by means of foreign aid and 
paid-for cultural exchanges with the current residents, but difficulties have ensued.  The 
Suzuki scandals resulted in the suspension of various forms of economic aid to the 
southern Kuriles from Tokyo temporarily from 2002 to 2003, but Tokyo stepped up 
efforts again in 2004.  In addition, an increase in living standards and Russian 
 156 
investment particularly in Iturup as well as trade with the United States have blurred the 
results of Japanese aid to the islanders.  On Kunashir the consequences of Japanese aid 
can be seen, but the impact of the Suzuki scandals has likely affected the islanders who 
had a personal fondness for Suzuki.  Considering that Shikotan has the lowest living 
standards among the southern Kuriles and Putin has indicated on several occasions that 
he would agree to the 1956 Soviet-Japanese peace proposal, it is obvious that residents 
are more likely to approve a transfer of sovereignty than residents from the other islands.  
Moreover, the island has a geographic proximity closer to Japan and is somewhat 
isolated from the Greater Kuriles. 
 
Outcomes 
 Prior to 1997 the Japanese experienced bouts of optimism that the territorial 
dispute would be solved.  However, these periods were always followed by stagnation 
on this issue.  After 1997 this observation would remain the same.  With the two “no 
neck-tie” summits in November 1997 and April 1998 and the agreement to set a 
deadline for rapprochement, the pendulum swing toward optimism was greater than ever.  
However, when the two sides did not achieve the 2000 deadline and because of the 
Suzuki scandals in 2002, the pendulum has swung back.  Hashimoto and Yeltsin made 
significant progress in the first “no neck-tie” summit at Krasnoyarsk by setting the 2000 
deadline and increasing dialog on bilateral economic ties and political cooperation.  At 
the second “no neck-tie” summit, both men made bold moves by presenting peace 
agreement proposals.  However, at the same time they realized the significance of the 
stakes involved and neither would budge. 
 157 
In theory, Hashimoto’s multilayered approach could possibly be successful in 
solving the territorial dispute.  However, in reality the foreign policy has faced some 
unexpected twists.  Hashimoto proposed maintaining a long-term perspective in relation 
to the territorial dispute.  He obviously was not prepared for Yeltsin to propose the 2000 
deadline, which he agreed to.  Similarly, when Suzuki, Mori, and Putin agreed at 
various times to reintroduce the 1956 Soviet-Japanese two-island transfer proposal in 
2000, the Japanese foreign policy came into question.   
With Koizumi as Prime Minister and Suzuki removed from the Diet, 
Hashimoto’s multilayered approach received a second opportunity to make an impact on 
the territorial dispute.  The 2003 Japan-Russia Action Plan signed by Koizumi and Putin 
is particularly reminiscent of the ideas associated with Hashimoto’s multilayered 
approach, and signals that Hashimoto’s policy was re-stabilized by Koizumi as Japan’s 
official foreign policy with Russia. 
The responses to Japan’s demands to regain sovereignty among the southern 
Kuriles’ residents have varied by the island and the economic well-being of the islanders.  
It appears a correlation exists between the economic well-being of the residents and 
their thoughts on the dispute.  The exchange programs between Japanese and current 
residents of the Kuriles as well as the Japanese allotting of generous economic aid to the 
residents have increased goodwill between the countries.  However, it appears these 
activities have done little to change the opinions of the residents.  Moreover, 
considering the Suzuki scandals, the campaign to entice the current residents of the 
southern Kuriles has faced some major setbacks that will require a significant amount of 
effort and time in order to have successful results, in the view of the Japanese. 
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Overall, the Suzuki scandal has served as the fundamental roadblock to the 
implementation of the multilayered approach as it affected relations with the residents of 
the southern Kuriles.  All things considered, it is not appropriate to state that the foreign 
policy has failed to solve the territorial dispute.  Significant steps were made in the “no 
neck-tie” summits in terms of both sides opening up dialog and creating an environment 
whereby Russian and Japanese leaders could directly offer peace proposals to each other.  
Nevertheless, with all events related to the Suzuki scandals along with Yeltsin’s 
unpredictability and later, resignation, it is understandable why little has been achieved.   
Final Remark 
 Hashimoto’s approach to diplomacy with Russia was successful in warming 
relations whereby the leaders of the countries could directly engage in discussions on 
the territorial dispute and offer proposals for peace.  However, despite the inviting 
language associated with Hashimoto’s foreign policy, he remained firm that any two-
island proposal, such as the 1956 Soviet-Japanese peace proposal would be 
impermissible, something that was reiterated by Koizumi on various occasions.  With 
the exceptions of Suzuki’s abuse of power and Mori’s naivety in allowing Suzuki to 
control Japan’s Russia policy, Hashimoto’s policy has remained solid in its objective to 
regain all four southern Kuriles as well as the means to achieve this objective.  Winning 
the support of the current residents of the islands is crucial if the Japanese want to regain 
sovereignty over the islands, as the current residents are the pawns being weighed in the 
balance between Russia and Japan.  Although the actual number of residents who 
support such a transfer of power is significant, the campaign to entice the current 
residents has seen little success.  Overall, Hashimoto’s foreign policy can indeed be 
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credited for setting a standard for a warmer, more welcoming relationship between 
Russian and Japanese leaders when discussing the territorial dispute.  However, with the 
impediments from Suzuki, the cultural and economic impact upon the islanders has yet 
to produce any significant results for the Japanese. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
Summary of Findings 
 The 1997 multilayered approach came at a time of dissatisfaction for the 
Japanese.  Russia had been a democratic country for five years, yet no solution to the 
territorial dispute seemed possible.  The Japanese were increasingly defying the tenets 
of the expanded equilibrium and a new policy was needed to break the deadlock on the 
territorial dispute.  In 1996 Russia modified its foreign policy with Japan to a warmer, 
more reasonable policy, and the Japanese were obliged to respond.  When the Japanese 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) regained the office of Prime Minister after three years 
of opposing party control, a new, reformist vision was needed to regain public 
popularity.  Meanwhile, with the rise of Chinese hegemony in Northeast Asia, Japan 
needed to start building alliances to balance Beijing’s emerging power.  The architect of 
the multilayered approach, Hashimoto, had received valuable suggestions on warming 
Russo-Japanese relations from Russian Ambassador Panov and American President 
Clinton.  In addition, he was known as an advocate of building Russo-Japanese ties 
since he drafted the Hashimoto Plan in 1993.   
 With the initiation of the multilayered approach to foreign policy with Russia, 
the Japanese embarked on a new approach, an exit approach, whereby regaining the 
southern Kuriles would come about after close economic relationship with Russia was 
 161 
built.  The policy was more reasonable than its preceding policies which only 
discouraged the Russians.  Essentially, Japan would still be using the economic lure in a 
carrot-and-stick manner, but this time Russians could view the Japanese as 
contemporaries unbound by the territorial dispute in economic affairs.   
 Contrary to what was postulated in the hypothesis, in the years following the 
implementation of the multilayered approach the foreign policy has achieved little in 
advancing bilateral economic ties beyond the modest ties that existed prior to 1997.  Of 
the large scale investment projects in Siberia and the Russian Far East that Hashimoto 
presented in his speeches and summit documents, only one has experienced moderate 
success.  The Irkutsk natural gas projects have been abandoned by Japanese 
corporations, the Yakutsk natural gas projects have been deemed too expensive, and 
progress on the Zarubino Port project has been extraordinarily slow.  However, the 
Japanese are maintaining a steady presence at the Sakhalin-1 and -2 projects, making up 
30 percent of investing corporations.  All the while, no Japanese corporation has 
expressed interest in the forthcoming Sakhalin-3, -4, or -5 projects.  Since the inception 
of the 1997 foreign policy there has been no consistent increase in Russo-Japanese trade 
volume, Japanese investments in Russia, or foreign aid.  Moreover, Tokyo has done 
little to financially support Japanese corporations venturing to invest in Russia. 
 Over the last half century Russia and Japan have maintained one of the weakest 
economic relationships between two of the world’s most economically significant 
countries.  Hashimoto hoped to develop this economic relationship in 1997 with the 
implementation of the multilayered approach.  However, barriers have emerged such as 
adventuresome international competition, lack of internal stability and infrastructure in 
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Siberia and the Russian Far East, and the bitterness that has ensued over the territorial 
dispute as well as the troubled historic relationship between the two countries. 
The 1997 multilayered approach to foreign policy with Russia has not 
significantly assisted in developing bilateral economic ties.  Indeed, mutual perceptions 
between Russians and Japanese might have been influenced, but little progress has been 
seen in economics.  In the case of this study, the factors of private enterprise economic 
systems outweigh the impact of political alterations to foreign relations.  Japanese 
corporations will increase their investments in Russia when there is a favorable 
environment and a consumer demand to do so.  So long as the political institutions in 
Japan provide such modest support to invest in Russia, corporations will implement 
their investment projects elsewhere. 
 Since the fall of the Soviet Union, bouts of optimism on solving the territorial 
dispute have only been succeeded by periods of stagnation on the issue.  This counters 
the hypothesis, which assumed that gradual advances in open bilateral dialog on the 
territorial dispute and a peace treaty would persist as a result of Hashimoto’s foreign 
policy.  The optimism of 1992 when an independent, democratic Russia emerged was 
succeeded by Yeltsin’s postponed visits and a series of weak Prime Ministers in Japan.  
Optimism reemerged in 1996 with Primakov’s appointment as Russian foreign minister, 
and the “no neck-tie” summits resulted in tremendous strides towards peace including 
the establishment of a peace deadline.  However, with Yeltsin’s ill health, Hashimoto’s 
resignation as Prime Minister, the Suzuki scandals, and the temporary deviation from 
the multilayered approach by Mori, the foreign policy came into question along with a 
solution for the territorial dispute.  With the emergence of Koizumi as Prime Minister 
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along with the 2003 Japan-Russia Action Plan signed with Putin, the multilayered 
approach was fully reinvigorated. 
 The Japanese cultural and economic pressures on the current residents of the 
southern Kuriles in order to win their support for reinstating Japanese sovereignty have 
had varying results.  Kunashir and Iturup islanders are the most likely to oppose the 
change of sovereignty while Shikotan islanders are the most likely to support it.  After 
the implementation of the multilayered approach, the Japanese increased their economic 
support and cultural exchanges with the islands’ residents primarily because of the work 
by Suzuki.  However, when it was revealed that Suzuki illegally hired a contracting 
corporation from his constituency to do work on Kunashir Island as a kickback, trust 
was broken between the islanders and the Japanese.  Economic aid and cultural 
exchanges have fully resumed, but are tainted by the acts of Suzuki. 
 As the Japanese leaders slowly work toward a resolution with the Russians, they 
will have to recognize that winning support from the islanders will not be as simple as 
they anticipated.  The residents of the southern Kuriles appreciate the economic support 
and cultural exchanges, but they generally do not want their home islands to be part of 
what is a foreign country to them.  It is quite understandable why the residents would 
not want to leave a largely heterogeneous Russia where they make up a part of the 
ethnic majority and join a largely homogeneous Japan where they are the ethnic 
minority.  Considering this innate “us and them” human approach, it is remarkable in 
itself that 22 percent of surveyed islanders stated they supported an immediate 
restoration of Japanese sovereignty in the 1998 Hokkaido Shimbun poll.  The only 
explanation available is that the economic situation is so grim that residents would 
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prefer selling their homeland for the promise of a better life under the rule of a foreign 
country.  This explanation is evident in that a larger percentage of residents from the 
poverty-stricken Shikotan Island support immediate change of sovereignty than 
Kunashir or Iturup, which is experiencing substantial economic development. 
 There is also the fear by the current residents that if a transfer of sovereignty 
actually occurs, the economic support the Japanese have been giving will end.  As one 
resident lamented, “Japan has built a hospital, a school, and a power generator, and it 
provides fuel and food to the islanders.  Of course, the Japanese are not going to feed 
these people if they take over the island” (Working 2001, 2).  However, others disagree 
that the transfer of sovereignty would result in improvements for their lifestyles.  One 
Kunashir resident stated “I support this idea with all my heart, because I am sick and 
tired of this disorder on the island.  Because right now for common people, nothing ever 
changes.  The prices are increasing, and there’s no fish in the stores” (Working 2000, 2).  
The Japanese need to gain trust from the current residents in order to convince them that 
a transfer of sovereignty is beneficial to their economic situations and in their best 
interests, despite the obvious ethnic barriers.  
 The multilayered approach has largely been ineffective in boosting bilateral 
economic development as Russo-Japanese economic ties have remained stagnant since 
the earliest years of bilateral relations.  A survey conducted in the 1990’s asked 
Japanese citizens if they considered relations with Russia, among other countries, 
important to Japan.  In 1995 and 1996, only seven percent responded that Russo-
Japanese relations were important (Hasegawa 2000b, 316).  In 1997, the year the 
multilayered approach was initiated, eight percent responded that Russo-Japanese 
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relations were important (Hasegawa 2000b, 316).  After the two “no neck-tie” summits 
of late 1997 and early 1998 and the announcement that relations would be normalized 
by 2000, 13 percent responded that Russo-Japanese relations were important (Hasegawa 
2000b, 316).  In 1999 the percentage remained above average as 11 percent of 
respondents stated Russo-Japanese relations were important (Hasegawa 2000b, 316).  
There was a slight increase in the number of Japanese citizens who considered relations 
with Russia significant after the multilayered approach was implemented, but this 
remains a very low percentage.  Considering the talk about economic potential since the 
multilayered approach was initiated, the geographic proximity of the two countries, and 
their political strengthens on the world stage, this percentage indicates a dismissal of 
Russia and one could further assume that if Japan was to ever regain the southern 
Kuriles, the Russian residents might not be treated so well.  Rather they could be 
marginalized and pushed out on account of Japanese settlement.   
 
Postscript 
 Alexei Zagorsky believes that the multilayered approach is a failure and should 
be abandoned by the current Japanese leadership as discussed in his 2001 Pacific Affairs 
paper: “Now Japan must find a new approach to Russia, while Moscow shows a lack of 
interest in spite of all the promising words said” (Zagorsky 2001, 89).  Zagorsky’s 
opinion on the ineptitude of the multilayered approach is not entirely accurate.  
Hashimoto’s foreign policy has faced immense challenges including: 1) Yeltsin’s 
unpredictability such as the 2000 deadline and later his resignation, 2) the two-stage 
island proposal created by Suzuki, conveyed to Putin, and endorsed by Mori,  
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3) Suzuki’s Kunashir Island scandal; and 4) an economic recession.  However, much of 
these obstructions are now gone.  Yeltsin is not in power and Russia has a more stable 
leader.  Suzuki has been reelected to the Diet but with much less power and with a much 
smaller political party.  Mori resigned from the office of Prime Minister.  Economic aid 
to the southern Kuriles has resumed at the standard rate, and Japan has climbed out of 
the economic recession. 
 The multilayered approach requires steady progress before the true benefits of 
the policy are to be seen.  Hashimoto knew this in 1997 when he explained, “More than 
anything, steady, concrete progress could become a landmark that will not have our 
children’s and grandchildren’s generation inherit [the territorial] issue” (speech by 
Hashimoto 1997a).  He continued “I would like to discuss [the territorial] matter calmly, 
based on a long-term perspective” (speech by Hashimoto 1997a).  With the 
developments at the “no neck-tie” summits and the recommitment to the policy in the 
2003 Japan-Russia Action Plan, relations are warming, particularly between the heads of 
state, and although no solution to the territorial dispute has been agreed upon, ideas have 
been proposed and commitments have been made to solve it.  These are developments 
from the period when the Soviets would not recognize the dispute, or the early 1990’s 
when Yeltsin would avoid discussing the dispute by postponing visits to Japan.  
 Nevertheless, the multilayered approach will continue to be vulnerable.  Only 
three years in existence, it already came into question when Mori endorsed Suzuki’s 
two-island proposal.  It is also relatively old.  The policy of seikei fukabun lasted from 
the 1985 to 1989, only four years.  Its revision, the expanded equilibrium lasted only 
four years before the Japanese started defying it under international pressure to do so in 
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1993.  However, that policy officially lasted 1989 to 1996, seven years.  As of date, the 
multilayered approach has been in existence ten years.  If there is a revision to the policy, 
it would be beneficial for the Japanese to maintain the exit approach, unless they forfeit 
demands on the southern Kuriles altogether.  In addition, the Japanese Prime Ministers 
who have succeeded Koizumi, Shintaro Abe and Yasuo Fukuda, have served as 
Koizumi protégés with regards to their foreign policies.  However, both are less 
charismatic leaders who have appeared neither as concerned nor effective with regards 
to Russo-Japanese relations.  If another Prime Minister emerges, particularly from an 
opposing party, the multilayered approach will come into question by the new 
administration. 
 The year 2005 marked the 150-year anniversary of Russo-Japanese relations as 
well as 60 years since the southern Kuriles were seized by the Soviets and the Japanese 
residents began abandoning their homes.  In the next decade, few if any of these former 
residents, who currently champion the campaigns to return the islands, will be alive.  
Additionally, Hashimoto passed away in July 2006 at age 68 (Japan Times [Tokyo] 
2006, 1).  The fight to restore the southern Kuriles will be left in the hands of a younger 
generation who never lived on the islands or during the time when the islands were 
seized.  It is questionable if this new generation will approach the conflict with a similar 
vigor and determination as the former generation.  If the future generation loosens its 
lobbying controls in Tokyo and support for cultural exchanges with the current residents, 
the Japanese government will gradually lose its drive to regain the islands.  This could 
easily result in the Japanese agreeing to a two-island transfer like the one proposed by 
 168 
Putin or seeking normalized relations without a return of the disputed islands.  This, 
perhaps, is something the Russian government is awaiting. 
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